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ABSTRACT
In 1981, the price of oil was $34 in current dollars ($50 at 1992
price levels). The consensus was that it would keep rising toward the
cost of synthetic crude oil or some such long-run ceiling. In fact,
the cartel had fixed the price far above the point of maximum profit.
OPEC members did not lose their power, they regained their wits, and
saw their limits.
The drop in consumption in belated response to the two price
explosions was borne entirely by OPEC as price guardian. Non-OPEC
production rose. OPEC market share fell to less than 30 percent.
OPEC members kept a remarkable cohesion. During 1982-1985 Saudi
Arabia absorbed most of the loss, and prices declined moderately. But
when Saudi exports went to near-zero, they ceased to be the restrictor
of last resort. The price fell below $10, until OPEC could patch up a
market sharing deal and bring it back to the neighborhood of $18,
where it has remained.
Consumption revived, and OPEC exports have approached but not
equaled the old peak. The once-massive excess capacity dwindled, but
in theory and in fact this had little effect on the price. Each
increase in exports meant a fresh contention over sharing it among
members. OPEC meetings and disputes became almost continuous. Each
member did its best to push the burden of restriction on to others.
This limited OPEC cohesion and power over price.
The oil market became "commoditized," with many re-sellers
probing for even a slight gain. Adherence to a fixed price became
much more difficult to monitor. Increasing reliance had to be placed
on production restraint.
Low prices caused Iraq to be hailed as savior for threatening
Kuwait and Abu Dhabi, but this in turn provoked invasion and war.
Despite the shutdown of two major producers, then one, prices have not
revived.
The cartel mission is to trade off market share against a higher
price. But their market share remains too low to bear the losses a
higher price would bring. Until it increases, the cartel stays in a
trap.
Whether revenues were higher or lower, OPEC members overspent
them and ran current-account and budget deficits. They had difficulty
raising money for oil capital expenditures, which were only a small
fraction of total government expenditures. The Iraqi aggression was
an extreme example of this tension, and of the temptation of a rich
neighbor.
The world oil industry is an oddity. Socialism is repudiated
everywhere, yet most oil is produced by bumbling state companies. The
travail in the Former Soviet Union is the extreme example. Taxes on
crude oil production in non-OPEC countries is usually regressive and
hinders development. But past mistakes are present opportunities, and
make likely continued long-time growth of non-OPEC oil, with the OPEC
price stuck in the market share trap.
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THE CARTEL IN RETREAT 1981-1992
M. A. Adelman
1981 "Sometime in the future (perhaps as long as two years) a gradual real [price]
increase up to the cost of production of synthetic liquid hydrocarbons."
--James E. Akins
1982 "[Oil] supply shortage may hit after 1985 ... anywhere from 9- to 21-million barrels
daily.
--International Energy Agency
1983 "American strategists have always found a silver lining in the stable pro-Western
Gulf that high oil prices helped create."
--New York Times, March 6
1984 "The world is running out of oil."
--Daniel Yergin
1984 "After the days of luxury, we have become
A lamb in the midst of the jungle.
Like a gang, the wolves of the market
Swarm around us."
--Sheik Manei Saeed Al Otaiba, Oil Minister, Abu Dhabi
1985 "There is no fear in OPEC of a price decline." [Price eventually equates to
synthetic hydrocarbons' cost.]
--James E. Akins
1985 "Market realities will again give way to geological realities. ... And that
will eventually put the era of surplus behind us."
--Daniel Yergin
1985 "If [the U.S.] Congress does not go for a (gasoline] tax soon, it will have
missed its best chance of returning the world to cheap oil, low inflation, low
interest rates and rapid growth."
--The Economist (London)
1986 "The protection of American security interests requires action to stabilize
the falling price of oil".
--George H. W. Bush
1986 "U.S. officials root for higher oil prices."
--Wall St. Journal, December 19
1987 "Saudi Arabia has contributed billions of dollars...in areas where the
executive branch has been unwilling or unable to gain Congressional support.
As the payments to the Nicaraguan contras demonstrate..."
--New York Times, June 21
1987 "Better relations with Washington have moderated Iraq's behavior considerably."
--State Department source in Wall St. Journal, March 31
1988 "I just cannot understand how this low price can sustain investments in high-
cost oil areas."
--Ali M. Jaidah
1989 "A consistent underestimation of potential supply and a consistent
underestimation of the consumers' ability to adjust their demand ... led OPEC
(and usually leads every other cartel) to overestimate its strength."
--Sheikh Ali Al Khalifa Al-Sabah,Oil Minister, Kuwait
1990 "Iraq has modified its behavior and policies in large part because of our
diplomatic efforts." --U.S. Ambassador
Glaspie
1991 "What we had before was a special relationship [with Saudi Arabia]. Now we have a
more special relationship."
--Daniel Yergin
2THE CARTEL IN RETREAT 1981-1992
INTRODUCTION - OPEC AT THE PEAK
By the middle of 1981, the second price explosion was over.
In January, Minister Yamani said that the 1979-80 increase was
"another corrective action" like the earlier one, a long-delayed
adjustment. [PIW 3-9-81 SS:1-4] In early 1981: "Fear of soft
market seems behind latest Mideast price rise" [PIW 1-19-81:1,
emphasis added] That is bizarre under competition, but rational
conduct under collusion: since you must soon defend the price
line, advance it as far as possible. (A last pre-emptive push was
to come in October 1981.)
[FIGURE 1: CRUDE OIL PRICES 1973-1992]
Figure 1 shows that in 1979-1981, as in 1974, spot prices
fluctuated while the OPEC nations kept excess capacity at bay,
and kept raising effective contract prices. But by mid-1981,
various crude oil prices which under stable conditions are close
to one another, and which had been widely separated after 1978,
were now rejoined. One could stop to characterize the new
conditions of the 1980s.
The clear blue sky As perceived in the producing and
consuming countries in 1981, all signals were Go, and prices were
[FIGURE 2 & 3: PRICE FORECASTS]
headed up and away. Figure 2 shows the consensus forecasts
tabulated by the International Energy Workshop, and Figure 3
those of the Society of Petroleum Evaluation Engineers. Implicit
in each forecast are two assumptions: first, the current price is
Figures 1 a-1c. Crude Oil Prices, 1973-1992
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the long-run competitive price. If the price changes, that
changes the data, and enables a better initial estimate. Second,
the price must increase from its current level because... how can
you doubt it? [Lynch, 1992]
Yet, by 1983, the deflated value of OPEC revenues was
actually less than it had been in 1978, before the second price
hike. Seldom has a mistake been so quickly punished, and so
slowly understood.
THE YEARS 1981-1992: A PREVIEW
From reserve price-raising power to market share-price tradeoff
For years, the OPEC members were guided by a vision of the market
which is sketched in Figure 4.
[FIGURE 4: OPEC: REAL & SUPPOSED DEMAND CURVES]
(The whole figure shifts slightly to the right in a year of
world economic growth, leftward in recession. We ignore these
movements to avoid needless cluttering of the diagram.)
Demand for oil was viewed as highly price-inelastic. As noted in
the previous paper, Minister Yamani in mid-1978 said oil demand
price elasticity was zero. Surely he did not mean this
literally, only that the price could be profitably raised very
high, with very little sales loss.
The target was a price just below the cost of producing
synthetic crude oils in large amounts. This is logical for a
monopoly. Only when oil-on-oil competition is suppressed can the
price be set by the nearest alternative. We showed in earlier
Figure 4. Real & Supposed Oil Demand Curves
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papers that the vision in Figure 4 was the explicit guide to the
first generally fixed price, on December 31, 1973. The never-
modest Shah of Iran called it his "new idea," but the U.S. State
Department had already suggested it in 1970, and its author still
clung to it at least as late as 1985. (Below, p. 69)
The synthetics' cost was also the goal set in the 1979
report of the Long Term Price Policy Committee, chaired by
Minister Yamani. The exact location of the ceiling was now seen
as uncertain, but a long way up. In the interim, OPEC would have
great unexerted price raising power. In early 1981, OPEC saw
itself as still on the upward path, and expected to raise the
price again in time. [PIW 3-9-81:SS 1, 4]
One 1980 estimate of the ceiling, by a renowned Oxford
economist and previous U.K. Minister of Energy, was $90-$100
($148 to $164 in 1990 prices). "The restraint by oil exporters is
entirely political," in deference to the U.S. [Balogh 1980] Of
course this flattering legend of the "special relationship" is
still believed. [Fesharaki 1980] expected the price to exceed
$80 (in 1980 prices) because OPEC nations would reserve oil for
domestic use rather than "deplete their dwindling asset to
appease the appetities of industrial nations."
This final paper is concerned with the loss of an illusion,
and OPEC's retreat since 1981, from a price above the monopoly
optimum. It was gradually realized that demand was really much
more elastic than had been supposed. Sales not only ceased to
grow but diminished.' An unexpected increase in non-OPEC output-
-which would have come about even without any price increase--
made things worse.
[TABLE I: CONSUMPTION & OPEC EXPORTS 1986-1992]
[TABLE II: RESULTS OF AN OPEC PRICE INCREASE]
The market share trap With the benefit of hindsight, i.e.
history, we can see that the OPEC mission has become to trade
market share for a higher price.
The purpose of Table II is to capture the relation between
market share and demand elasticity, 2 both for total OPEC and for
Saudi Arabia. Table II is much oversimplified, but the reader
can substitute his own assumptions at several places. The column
"notation" shows how to set up the table as a Lotus file, and
experiment with the parameters.
The demand for crude oil is derived from the demand for oil
products, whose long-run price elasticity was estimated by
[Griffin 1979] as around unity.3 The price elasticity of crude
oil is equal to the product elasticity, multiplied by the
crude/products relation, which in the OECD was only about 11
1 I once speculated, on no firmer basis than the average lifetime of
taxable business equipment, that the half-life of the consumption response was
about nine years, i. e. that 7.7 percent of the response was felt the first
year, and thereafter 7.7 percent of what remained. It is hard to measure any
such slow-acting process.
2 If Q=pE, In Q = E In P. Differentiating, 1/Q = E/P (dP/dQ)
E = P/Q (dP/dQ), the conventional elasticity definition.
3 [Kouris 1983] seems to indicate a modal value around 0.85. [Dahl &
Steiner 1991] estimate around unity for gasoline, the least elastic of oil
products. [CGES 1992] estimates product price elasticity at 0.85.
TABLE I. MARKET ECONOMIES' CONSUMPTION & OPEC EXPORTS, 1967-1992
(IN MILLIONS OF BARRELS DAILY)
MARKET ECONOMIES' CONSUMPTION
TOTAL ex OPEC OPEC OPEC
PRODUCTION EXPORTS
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
EIA 90
91
WRLD'91
WRLD'92
30.8
33.5
36.6
39.5
41.6
44.5
47.8
46.3
45.2
48.1
49.4
50.2
51.3
48.6
46.8
45.2
45.0
45.9
45.9
47.2
48.2
49.9
51.0
52.2
52.9
54.0
66.3
67.1
30.0
32.6
35.6
38.3
40.4
43.2
46.3
44.7
43.5
46.1
47.2
47.8
48.7
45.7
43.8
42.0
41.5
42.0
42.5
43.8
44.5
46.0
46.9
47.8
48.5
49.6
61.9
62.5
16.9
18.8
20.9
23.5
25.4
27.2
31.0
30.7
27.2
30.7
31.3
29.9
31.0
27.0
22.6
19.3
17.3
16.7
16.1
18.7
18.2
20.4
22.6
23.9
25.1
25.3
25.3
26.5
16.1
17.9
19.9
22.3
24.2
25.9
29.5
29.1
25.5
28.7
29.1
27.5
28.4
24.1
19.6
16.1
13.8
12.8
12.7
15.3
14.5
16.5
18.5
19.5
20.7
20.9
20.9
21.8
OPEC
SHARE
(PCT)
53.7
54.9
55.9
57.9
60.0
61.7
61.7
62.9
56.5
59.7
58.9
54.7
55.4
49.6
41.8
35.6
30.7
27.9
27.7
32.4
30.1
33.1
36.3
37.4
39.1
38.7
31.5
32.5
Source: 1973-1990, BP Annual Statistical Review
OPEC consumption from CIA, 1973-1989; estimated for earlier years.
1990-1992, EIA, International Petroleum
Statistics Report. (Format change after July 1992)
Natural gas liquids included.
TABLE II. RESULT OF AN OPEC PRICE INCREASE
AGGREGATE ALL SELLERS
New price: ratio to old price
Price elasticity of demand
New sales volume: ratio to old
New revenues: ratio to old
SUB-GROUP
Initial market share
New sales volume: ratio to old
New revenues: ratio to old
Sub-group elasticity of demand
notation
P
E
Q=P^EPQ=PA(E+1)
G
Q(G) =
Q-(1-G)/G
PQ(G) =PA(E(G)+1)
InPQ(G)/InP =
(50 PERCENT INCREASE)
CRUDE OIL CRUDE OIL
ONE YEAR
1.5
-0.10
0.96
1.44
0.37
0.89
1.34
-0.28
(Saudi)
0.12
0.67
1.01
-0.97
FIVE YEARS
1.5
-0.20
0.92
1.38
0.37
0.79
1.18
-0.58
(Saudi)
0.12
0.36
0.54
-2.51
10 PCT TAX
ON PRODUCTS
(LONG TERM)
1.10
-1.00
0.91
1.00
Total
0.34
0.73
-3.23
percent in 1970, but 53 percent by 1982. Crude price elasticity,
earlier negligible, was now worth estimating.
We take the initial price as unity, and a hypothetical price
increase of 50 percent. Following [EMF 1992], we take the price
elasticity of crude oil demand4 at -.1 in one year, -.26 in a
decade, and 0.38 to 0.56 after 20 years.5 The initial OPEC
market share is assumed at .34. It was lower in 1982-1987, and
is now, because of the integration of Former Soviet Union (FSU)
production into the world market. The Saudi market share is
assumed at one-third of the OPEC share, which it has been
recently.
A 50 percent price hike increases non-OPEC revenues by 50
percent. All the curtailment of output is by OPEC, which gains
34 percent in revenues. If nobody in OPEC cheats, the Saudis too
gain 34 percent. If everybody cheats, they gain only 1 percent.
What actually happens is somewhere between these two extremes--at
first. Over time elasticity rises, the OPEC sales loss grows,
and more of it is gradually loaded on to Saudi Arabia. It is an
unattractive prospect for them. The incentive is strong for
everyone to join in a firm quota agreement, and to keep their
word, at first. But it does not last. The table can be used to
see the effects of the incessant pull and heave of the OPEC
' This may be over-conservative because we set to zero the elasticity of
supply in non-OPEC countries. As we will see in a moment, the non-OPEC supply
response was swamped by changes in taxation and regulation.
5 It is safe to assume that elasticity increases at a decreasing rate,
e.g., proportional to the logarithm of time. Then E = -.10 + 2.3 In(t), and at
t=5, E = -.21.
members trying each to get just a bit more, and the final impact
on Saudi sales.
There is a risk for all OPEC: the demand response may not be
as expected. For the Saudis there is the additional risk that
other members will cheat. With the possible exception of Kuwait:
all OPEC members are weak risk-bearers. [Adelman 1986] They are
compelled to bet heavily on every price decision because they
have few sources of income except oil. Some of them have spent
heavily, of course, to start other industries, but with little
result. The purchase of downstream refining - marketing assets
has been profitable to Venezuela, and possibly to Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia, but the exceptions are simply too small. With
everything riding on their oil revenues, they must fear making
another big mistake. After 1981, nearly every member was
overspending its revenues. The cash squeeze made each one
bitterly resist any reduction in volume or in price. Yet both
were needed.
Table II is not a model, but it does show that OPEC's first
concern is the interplay between what would be good for the group
as a whole and what would serve the largest single member. The
three problems which OPEC needed constantly to keep solving and
re-solving were: price, total output, and output division.
The far right-hand panel of Table II shows the long-run result of
a 10 percent sales tax on oil products, assumed to be fully
passed on. OPEC loses 27 percent of its sales revenues. Nothing
else was to be expected, yet we must note with amazement that
when OPEC nations threatened to retaliate for tax increases with
additional price increases, they were taken seriously in the
consuming countries.
The awakening The story of the 1980s is OPEC's slow
realization that the the real world is in Table II and the lower,
not the upper, line of Figure 4. They had to awaken from the
comforting dream of unexerted price-raising power, "lots more
where that came from", and it was not easy.
But the sharper conflict was within the group. Even in the
1970s, when prices were being raised, market division was always
Topic A at OPEC meetings. From the squabbles of 1975-1977 they
had progressed to the secret agreement of 1978, the proposed
safety net of end-1979, and the gentlemen's agreement of 1980
(aborted by the Iran-Iraq war). Ahead were an endless succession
of annual and quarterly and special meetings and agreements.
The price decline during 1982-1985 was relatively mild, showing
OPEC members' impressive cohesion. But power is not wisdom. They
were unable to cooperate to share the burden of lower output, and
they let all the pressure flow on to Saudi Arabia. By 1985, total
OPEC sales were 29 percent of the Market Economies' consumption,
and Saudi Arabia was only 6 percent. Table II shows how elastic
their demand had become.
In late 1985 the Saudis refused to keep carrying the rest of
the cartel, and the price collapsed. In 1985-86, unlike 1983, it
took not two but nearly nine months to patch together an accord
at a price whose deflated value was about half where it had been
in 1981.
From late 1986 to mid-1990, despite reviving OPEC exports,
and disappearing excess capacity, they could not get the price
up, and it was always in danger of further decline under the
pressure of discounting. Saddam Hussein was the savior in July
1990 and a demon in August. When he failed and was kept out of
the world market, the rest of the cartel benefited, but could
barely cope with the zero-sum game of market division, and failed
to raise the price.
There, at the end of 1992, we must leave it.
STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE 1980s
Dis-integration and spot and term prices Outside of
Nigeria, Indonesia, and some Persian Gulf remnants, the
multinational oil companies had been formally stripped of
ownership by the mid-1970s. But they had remained in charge of
producing operations, and marketed most or all of the host
government's production. They were compensated by a price
preference or margin. But this connection was jolted apart by the
rapid increase in spot prices beginning in late 1978.
For over two years, as supply fears swelled the demand for
hoarding and speculation, and raised spot prices, the producing
governments repeatedly raised their official prices in pursuit of
spot. They disregarded contracts, openly or by various fictions.
Some would add various non-money elements to the price,
principally destination restrictions. It was often forbidden to
resell to South Africa or Israel, or the United States.
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There is no evidence that these restrictions had any effect
on the actual pattern of shipments. At most, they allowed the
non-restrictors to charge a slightly higher price. But
restrictions helped weaken or destroy the force of contracts.
Strangely, some commentators saw these restrictions as permanent.
They did not explain how a market could remain with permanent
excess demand. But by June 1982, the OPEC state oil companies
had discarded the restrictions, even Saudi Arabia. [PIW 6-28-
82:1] They were costly. [PIW 7-26-82:1]
The multinational companies ceased to sell OPEC crude oil.
In a few countries (Abu Dhabi, Nigeria and Indonesia the most
important) they lifted oil for their own use. Term contracts
shrank greatly in importance, "thanks to quarterly price reviews
and phase outs and unilateral mid-quarter price changes."
Security of supply was proved non-existent. "Japanese buyers in
particular feel hard done by in their past term dealing with OPEC
suppliers." [PIW 4-5-82:1]
Customer-supplier relationships continued, to a lesser
degree, because they saved transaction costs, of search and
negotiation. But prices were not fixed in the term contracts.
They were linked to the spot price, which fluctuated over and
under term prices, depending on short-run market conditions. (In
1988-1991 inclusive, term prices were perceptibly lower. (Below,
p. 181)
In Saudi Arabia, Aramco became Saudi Aramco, and the four
companies (Chevron, Exxon, Mobil, Texaco) who had once been its
manager-operators became suppliers of special management and
engineering skills. The four companies bought at a small fixed
differential from a contract price which was close but not
identical to the spot price.
"Commoditization" With dis-integration, short-term
bargains, and great price volatility, oil markets were rapidly
"commoditized." [Verleger 1987] The general and trade press was
supplemented by many individual services reporting prices in
great local detail, by place and even time of day.
Markets rapidly developed in the forward sale of physical
volumes of crude oil, notably Brent in the North Sea and Dubai
crude oil at the Persian Gulf. Much more important were the
various futures markets. In 1978, futures trading began in
middle distillates (heating and Diesel oil). In the early 1980s,
markets were set up for futures in other products and in crude
oils. By late 1990, there were "about 10 active futures contracts
trading worldwide, with combined daily volume equivalent to over
150-million barrels a day, or 130% more than total world demand."
[PIW 1990, p. 1]
Refiners and marketers, who depend on relatively thin
margins between the purchase price and resale price, can lose all
profit and run big losses when even relatively small price
changes occur between the time they buy and the time they resell.
Companies producing oil are at lesser but considerable risk
because of fixed tax payments. All of them urgently need markets
where they can hedge against unforeseen fluctuations, and "lock
in" the current price. In late 1982, this was still a novelty.
[PIW 10-18-82:1, "Refiners locking in future profits through oil
futures trading."] It soon became routine.
Buying or selling futures transfers the risk to speculators,
who are expected to win some, lose some, but on balance make a
profit. It seems to be agreed that these markets have worked
well, and provide liquidity and insurance to buyers and sellers.
The futures markets now extend to three years from the date of
the transaction, though the great bulk of the transactions are
for 18 months or less.
Moreover, a set of futures markets provide information to
the spot markets. Thus spot quotations have become better market
indicators.
There has also been a limited synthetic long-term market
through "swaps", a practice borrowed from the currency market.
[PIW 1990][Arshi 1992] Here a financial institution or sometimes
a large non-financial company provides a fixed price to a buyer
or seller, for a period which may be as long as ten years, but
rarely exceeds three. The provider tries to make a bargain with a
seller to offset every bargain made with a buyer, e. g. promising
a refiner a fixed price for his sales and an airline a fixed
price for their jet fuel purchase. Thereby the provider avoids
much or perhaps all of the risk. This is rarely attained. More
commonly, the provider lays off the risk in the futures market.6
6 Spot prices and futures/forward prices were decried as "speculative",
fly-by-night, no solid rock on which to base an industry. This was nothing
new. Spot prices were dismissed and belittled in the early 1960s, when they
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In contrast to the futures market, where the "open interest"
is published, not much is publicly known about the size of the
swaps market. In theory, swaps could provide finance for
investment in production, especially by governments strapped for
cash. A variant of the swap is the simple pre-selling of oil,
which in effect is an extension of credit from buyer to seller.
This has not amounted to much, partly because the credit standing
of most OPEC governments remains poor. But efforts will
undoubtedly continue as the OPEC countries try to find capital
without capitalists.
The success of forward and futures markets has also
highlighted their limitations. Refiners/marketers and others can
use these markets to cope with the kind of incessant up-and-down
of margins, caused by seasonal changes, inventory overshoot, and
changing refining patterns. But they can at best soften the
larger fluctuations caused by unforeseeable cartel actions.
Forward bargains cannot be struck for more than a few months at
most, and the insurance of futures contracts cannot be stretched
past 3 years, because there is no assurance against big and
ruinous changes.
Illusion: "the market sets the price" The wealth of
quotations, and the constant interaction among them, give color
to a half-truth: that "the market sets the price." Of course it
were first regularly reported. Invective shows there is more competition than
the name-callers would like.
14
does; but who controls the market? Under competition, nobody does
because nobody controls supply. Since the OPEC nations change
supply up or down to set the price, they control the market. The
various reporting systems discover the price, but they do not
determine it.
Open markets promote competition But the existence of wide
liquid markets has made one real difference. It has become easier
for a producer to "find a home" for crude oil, or for a buyer to
find crude oil. This has made competition more active. It has
become harder to maintain an above-competitive price. There are
too many parties constantly probing for a slightly better deal.
In previous times, when most crude supply went through the
multinational companies, there were two great conservative
forces: inertia, and respect for each others' turf. There were
few challenges to the customary price. After the early 1980s, as
many sellers looked constantly for buyers, and many buyers looked
for sellers, the challenges were many. More than ever, the price
had to be maintained by deliberate changes in supply. Thus the
"clumsy cartel" had to intervene often, and made the price more
volatile. The transition still had some way to go, and was not
complete until the mid-1980s.
NON-OPEC SUPPLY
The increase in non-OPEC production actually exceeded the
drop in world oil consumption. This was a surprise. The powerful
consensus had been "limited resources." Oil supply was expected
to run down everywhere except at the Persian Gulf.
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The famous 1977 CIA report on the Soviet Union merely put in
writing what was generally believed: it was an old played-out
province. Falling output and rising "needs" or "requirements,"
would make it an importer by 1985. As Yamani summed up: "All the
available studies point to the fact that the Soviet Bloc will be
definitely importing oil sometime in the eighties...." [PIW 3-9-
81:SS2] Instead, exports from the Communist blocs to the market
economies, which were 1.8 mbd in 1976 (the base year of the CIA
report) rose steadily to 2.9 mbd in 1985. [BP 1985 p. 18] (Some
have suggested that the CIA report shocked the Communist high
command into taking remedial steps. No support has been shown for
this.)
But the non-Soviet non-OPEC countries increased output from
17 million barrels daily in 1973 to 18.7 in 1978, and then to
25.9 mbd in 1985. By that time, it seemed that higher prices had
done their work on the demand and the supply side. When prices
collapsed in 1986, "symmetry" required a surge in demand and a
collapse in supply. But the revival in consumption was well short
of "symmetrical." And the drop in non-OPEC production did not
happen at all.
It would be tiresome to cite the many bad predictions. But
an impressive work with many authors forecast lower non-OPEC
production in the 1980s, despite higher prices, because of the
powerful resource constraint. [EMF 6, 1982] Instead prices slid,
collapsed and only partly recovered; yet non-OPEC output actually
rose.
[TABLE III: National Petroleum Council (NPC) Projections]
Table III is based on projections drawn up in mid-1986 by a
task force of the National Petroleum Council, which can draw upon
an incomparable richness of experience among its constituent oil
companies. They assumed alternatively a $12 price increasing at 4
percent annually, and an $18 price rising at 5 percent. We can
compute their implicit supply elasticities, which range from a
low of 0.11 to a high of 0.47. They obviously regarded the price
drop of 1986 as being such a cataclysm or divide that one should
not compute smooth functions across it. I would agree. But at
either $12 or $18 per barrel, they could see nothing but
declining output. For the USA, given a price halfway between $14
and $22, the predicted 7.4 mbd is exactly.right. But the other
non-OPEC sources all produced substantially more than expected.
Obviously there has been some powerful offset to the lower
prices. We need to look at the connection among price, cost, and
the inducement to invest.
Price, cost, and value A higher price increases the reserves
in a project, and the value per barrel. First, the life of the
reservoir is extended. If the daily operating cost of running an
oil well is $100, and the price is $10, the well must produce at
least 10 barrels daily or be shut in. At a price of $20, it can
continue until it produces less than five barrels.
Second, the higher price makes it profitable to develop more
intensively. This raises the needed investment, but it raises the
present value even more. [Adelman 1990] Thus more is produced,
'I ABLE Ill. NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL (NPC) PROJECTIONS
OF NON-CARTEL OUTPUT UNDER LOWER PRICES
YIiAR 1985 1990 1991 1995 2000
(ACTUAL) ( projected ) (ACTUAL) ( projected )
()il. PRICE 25.67 14.04 21.88 17.09 17.08 27.92 20.78 35.64
CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION (million barrels daily)
SISA 8.9 7.1 8.0 7.4 5.7 7.0 4.5 6.4
W lFUROP 3.8 3.3 3.5 4.2 2.6 3.1 2.0 2.6
()TI IER 9.7 6.5 7.6 11.6 6.6 7.9 6.4 7.5
N(I 2.7 2.5 2.6 3.1 2.4 2.6 2.2 2.4
B. ELASTICITIES
I ISA 0.25 0.43 0.62
W EUROPE 0.11 0.37 0.47
()Ti IER 0.36 0.36 0.29
NG;IL 0.11 0.18 0.19
S(I URCE: Survey conducted by Chevron for National Petroleum Council
Reported in PIW, 10-6-86:3; OGJ 10-13-86:40
I)AI'A: OGJ 3-9-92:25; liquids from EIA, International Petroleum
Statistics Report July 1992, p. 5
Prices are for "total OPEC", published in Monthly Energy Review.
Because the NPC takes "$12 oil" as the basis for increase at 4
percent, we use the price for "total OPEC", which was $12.21 in 1986.
1986 and $17.09 in 1991.
Other" production excludes Communist blocs.
N()TE: Elasticities by formula E=ln(Q1/Q2)/In(PI/P2)
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and sooner. Third, projects which were previously uneconomic are
now worth undertaking.
But taxation and regulation may turn these rules upside
down. We will look at some important examples, then try to draw
the general rule.
The United States ex-Alaska [Adelman 1992] The discovery of
large oil fields had peaked in 1929, and dwindled thereafter. Yet
the amount developed into new oil reserves each year increased
for thirty years, then stabilized around 1960. The unit cost per
barrel added tended if anything to decrease through 1972. The
decrease was mostly a one-time gain, the retreat from "market
demand prorationing", a wasteful cartel of the more important
producing States. [Adelman 1964] There is a hint worth
considering later.
What would have happened absent the first price explosion,
we do not know. But the price rise plus oil price controls and
pre-existing gas price controls worked a misfortune. Oil wells
vary greatly in cost. Even taking only depth as an independent
variable, in the USA the most expensive tenth of all wells absorb
half the capital expenditures. For deep or exotic oil or gas
projects, which hard-working lawyers could somehow winkle into an
exempt uncontrolled-price class, profits were huge. Investment in
these projects boomed, raising factor prices and imposing
bottlenecks everywhere. Unit costs soared. This depressed the
development of known fields, which produced the crude oil whose
price was under control. It was an attack on the very process
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which had kept the USA oil-gas industry in being--the continuing
expansion of old fields.
Hence as prices rose, the reserves-added in the early 1970s
were wretched--the lowest in decades. The decline in production
was much slower, of course, from just under 9 million barrels
daily in 1973 to just under 7 million by 1980. The decline would
have accelerated, had not price controls begun to be limited,
then abruptly ended in 1981. Reserves-added and production then
increased, despite weakening prices, until the collapse of 1986.
Gas prices were not decontrolled but they had been considerably
raised in early 1979.
Thus the effect of prices plus controls in the USA before
1980 was the contrary of what would have happened under
conditions of competition and stable taxes. Output declined when
prices rose, rose when prices fell, declined again when prices
fell very sharply. We cannot of course tell what would have
happened had the process continued, of diminishing returns versus
increasing knowledge. But it could hardly have been so abrupt.
The new areas: Alaska, North Sea, Mexico We showed in a
previous paper that all three were profitable and would have been
developed at prices existing before the first price explosion. In
Mexico, output went from half a million bd in 1972 to over 3 mbd
in 1982. The national oil company Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) was
the gaudy exemplar of investment spending for jobs, contracts,
and payoffs. Its burgeoning revenues propped up the existing
national economic policy of dirigisme and deficits. It was made
much worse by the confident expectation of revenues forever
soaring as prices and outputs rose. With roughly 50 billion
barrels in reserves, and current prices exceeding $30 per barrel,
the simple "Hotelling Valuation Principle" (value in ground
equals net wellhead price) would have yielded a current in-ground
value of up to $1500 billion. To borrow only $60 billion abroad
was conservative.
The resulting financial crisis starved Pemex and led to
massive disinvestment in oil production. Published money figures
are indecipherable, but wells drilled in Mexico fell by 76
percent, from 434 in 1980 to 103 in 1987. We cannot tell how
many of the wells were uneconomic, drilled to provide jobs and
contracts for local caciques. Mexican policy in the financial p
crisis was as prescribed by the school of Nicholas Kaldor at
Cambridge (U.K): more nationalization, more barriers to imports,
more subsidies, and more regulation. (For a good brief account,
see [NYT 10-24-82:1F])7
The policy was slowly reversed after 1982, then more quickly
under President Salinas after 1988. But revival and cleaning up
the debris of decades of mismanagement is painful and slow.
7 Kaldor thought oil prices should be kept high. "The very large
expenditures incurred on prospecting and developing new fields since the war
would not have been possible if oil had fluctuated in price in the same way as
copper or tin. ... Recently there was a threat of a collapse of oil prices due
to reduced demand which (in my opinion) was rightly received with a great deal
of misgiving, even by the large oil-importing countries: since they realized
that in the long run they are likely to fare worse under a regime of
fluctuating oil prices than under a regime of stable prices, even though the
latter would be a relatively high one in terms of industrial goods." [Kaldor
1983, p. 34]
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Output has held steady around 3 million barrels daily. It is both
a tribute to many unsung engineers and workers, and an indication
of how much fat there was to squeeze out. Thus the higher price
levels resulted in less not more Mexican supply in the world
market.
In the countries of private enterprise, the booming prices
led to drastic tax increase to capture the windfall rents. In
Alaska, it is not clear whether they inhibited expansion. Alaska
reached 1.2 mbd by 1978, and slowly expanded for the next ten
years, reaching just over 2 million in 1988, then declining, at 4
percent per year.
In the North Sea, the largest and earliest discoveries had
been off Norway, and as late as 1975 Norwegian output was-six
times British. But the UK expansion was far more swift, and one
reason was a more flexible tax regime, particularly after 1979.
British offshore production peaked at 2.6 mbd in 1984-1986, then
declined and revived. A comprehensive survey by County Natwest
Woodmac expects the UK to regain the peak in 1995 as fields under
development come on stream. [OGJ 8-17-92:50]. Norwegian
production expanded steadily, and the combined North Sea rose
throughout the period. There were strong cost reductions in the
North Sea, where the slowdown gave designers the chance to
optimize with respect to prices and costs long run, instead of
trying to maximize haste--which made for great waste.
Other non-OPEC producers There remained the miscellaneous
"all others." Their output rose from 5.4 million barrels daily in
1973 to 10.3 mbd in 1992, an average 3.5 percent per year. Here
too, "supply elasticities" were overlaid by more important
changes in costs and taxes.
[TABLE IV: Non-OPEC Producers]
Non-OPEC Investment Requirements Table IV shows the
investment per daily barrel in the 13 most important non-OPEC
producers outside North America, i. e. those which by 1985 were
up to 100,000 barrels daily. Their production rose from 3.8 mbd
in 1981 to 6.8 mbd in 1990. 8
The calculations can all be replicated from sources publicly
available. Anyone with access to better data can (and I hope
will) substitute them for ours at any point. In particular, they
may be able to improve on the averages we have been compelled to
use.
The start of the estimate is all wells drilled in the
country in a given year. This overstates, because some wells,
especially dry holes, are not for oil development but for
exploration, or for gas production. The next step is to raise
drilling costs 20 percent to allow for the non-linearity of the
8 A rare bit of published data: Arco in Indonesia expected total
Indonesian oil capital expenditures to be around $300 million during 1983.
"This will help push production...to about 220,000 barrels a day from
120,000." [NYT 6-8-83:D9] This suggests the capital coefficient was $3,000 per
daily barrel, close to the average in neighboring Malaysia. An offshore
development well drilled to 3800 feet is said to cost $1261 thousand; the 1990
[API-JAS] gives the class at $1136. "Costs associated with offshore
development [in South East Asia] are similar to those in the Gulf of Mexico."
J.A. Khin and D. Johnston, "Southeast Asia Drilling on the Rise," [OGJ 9-28-
92:66, 70]
TABLE IV. INVESTMENT IN $/IDB, NON-OPEC PRODUCERS 100 TBD OR OVER.
COUNTRY,
chae '81-'90
ARGMENINA-
BRAZL-
COLOMBIA -
PERU -
TRINIDAD+
ANGOLA-
*CAMEROON-
CONGO-
EGYIPT+
SYRIAna
OMAN-
YEMENmna
BRUNEI+
INDIAna
MALAYSIA -
AUSTRALIA-
TOTAL
INVESIfN RANK
TWDB
OUlFPU
Nd
1981
OUTPUT
tbd
497
213
134
193
189
130
86
76
627
172
328
NA NA NA
NA**
NUMBER COMPARABLE
LOWERQUARTILE
MEDIAN
UPPERQUARTILE
INTERQUARTIE RANGE
AVERAGE OPEC PRIE ($)
(exports to USA)
IRR BEFORE TAX: LOWERQ
MEDIAN
UPPERQ
HIGHEST
13
4.49
13.17
2334
18S5
35.17
INVESTENTMRANK
TS$IDB
NA
6 160
606
3 444
7 575
5470
OUTPUT INVEENTRANK
tNl T$/IDB
3736 12 460
18.33 9 563
56.07 13 176
36.90 11 189
18.03 8 185
4.49 4 231
2334 10 190
4.00 2 115
4.66 5 895
NA NA 176
1.20 1 505
13
4.47
859
21124
16.77
25.67
Formla: IRR pl(1.75KQ)- a
Explanation in text, Appendix
NOTE: An increasing ratio of investment per IDB to oupt indicates rising cost,
denoted by +. A lower ratio indicates declining cost, denoted by-.
Te comparis isof 1981 with 1990.
*Offshore only **Not available in a later or
earlieryear, ence rank eliminated
IRR BEFORE TAX, ASSUMING TRUE INVESTMENT 15 TIMES INDICATED (USER COST ALLOWANCE)
LOWER Q
MEDIAN Q
UPPER Q
HIGHEST
3326
8.93
7.63
2426
19.42
5.02
10.21
3.16
6.80
6.72
215
0.93
10.13
47.68 13 470
859 7 653
22.55 12 439
21.73 11 130
1355 9 157
4.61 5 474
5.18 6 155
11.15 8 170
2.69 3 893
388
138 1 668
- 194
21.24 10 152
14.05 - 656
IJ9 2 621
4.47 4 578
6798
13
5.02
8.93
1021
5.19
17.09 (1991)
NA**
9,10
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depth-cost relation, then double to allow for the difference
between the USA and the rest of the world. Finally we apply the
USA allowance for non-drilling costs: lease equipment, enhanced
recovery (gas and water injection, thermal and chemical methods,
etc), and overhead.
The investment is divided by the gross capacity increment,
estimated as the number of newly drilled oil wells multiplied by
the average production of all oil wells. I think newly drilled
wells tend to be bigger producers than average old wells. If so,
the true increment to capacity is greater than as estimated, and
the investment per unit is overstated. Whether and to what
extent capacity is really cheaper to install than we have
calculated, must be left for later research. There is some
confirmation in our calculation of decline rates (below, page
120).
Although one year's results may be temporarily high or low,
the rankings stay fairly consistent. The measure is affected by
changes in factor prices. The IPAA measure decreased by one
fourth between 1981 and 1985, then rose nearly 7 percent to 1990.
More important are changed technology and the mix of projects.
In a given project, the greater the output, all else being equal,
the greater the pressure on the reservoirs. Therefore a decrease
in cost might reflect only less intensive development, or the
culling of more expensive projects. If cost declines despite
higher output, that is a good indication of a rightward shift in
the supply curve, which is our concept of declining cost,
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indicated by a (-) sign. If cost rises despite declining output,
that signals a leftward shift (+). If cost and output change in
the same direction, the larger change, in output or in cost,
decides the sign.
Had the expectation been borne out, of lower output in the
1980s despite higher prices, the signs would have all been (+).
Trinidad and Brunei do show increases. Peru, Egypt, and Oman are
ambiguous. But most countries decreased. The median investment
fell sharply from 1981 to 1985, then held. So did the lower-cost
quartile. The more expensive countries improved sharply.
Table IV shows why predictions of declining output in 1981 and
later years were and are far-fetched. Returns were very high on
new development projects. From Table IV, we have an indication
of the rate of return in oil development. The general break-even
formula is explained in Appendix A. The bottom panel is a rough
allowance for exploration cost/user cost.
During 1981-1990, the price (here measured by the average
OPEC price on export sales to the USA) fell by half, but rates of
return stayed high. Most interestingly: the return in the lowest
cost countries fell from 1981 to 1990, but in the higher-cost
countries it actually rose.
If costs and prices determined investment, we might expect
with some confidence that output would keep rising for the group
as a whole. But costs are less important than taxes.
The taxation of oil production More important than cost
changes, perhaps even in the North Sea and certainly outside of
it were changes in tax systems.9 The ideal system induces the
operator to invest for maximum present value before tax, and
captures all economic rents, to offer the investor just enough
prospective profit to make the investment worth while. The higher
the pre-tax rent, the higher the tax. With no rent, no tax. The
ideal tax is progressive, not for equity but for efficiency.
Suiting a tax system to a mineral industry is particularly
difficult because of the difficulty of reckoning cost. In the
United States, a rough but effective way to capture rent has
been: cash bonus bids. The oil company is invited to estimate
how much they expect to earn, over and above cost of exploration,
development, and production; and to offer as much of it as they
think is needed to get the lease. U
Under stable conditions, bonus bidding is a very efficient
rent-skimmer on the whole, with large individual gains and
losses. Even under unstable conditions, it seems to have worked
well. The research of [Mead 1986] [Mead and Sorenson 1980] showed
that the return on oil leases won by bidding was normal or even
subnormal. Other features of the tax system, notably the excises
and royalties (a private tax) were shown by [Lohrenz et al 1981]
to lessen investment and production, as in theory they should.
But a cash bid system only works where the number of bidders is
large enough to insure independent i. e. competitive bidding. The
9 The following account is based on [Bradley 1986] [Eckbo 1987], [Smith
1987], [Bradley and Watkins 1987] [Kemp 1987] and [Kemp and Reading 1992]
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industry in the USA was large and long-established and the public
was willing to (correctly) assume competition. Elsewhere, with
the partial exception of Canada, this was not the case.
The other vehicle for rent absorption, the "resource rent
tax" was worked out in concept by [Garnaut and Clunies-Ross
1975]. Its practical difficulties are great. [Bradley 1986]
[Bradley and Watkins 1987] But an incomplete study [Eckbo 1987]
concluded at least tentatively "that a resource rent tax combined
with cash bonus bidding would capture rent in a tax neutral
fashion and behave robustly."
No country, however, has devised a tax system to capture
rent and be neutral to investment. Even outside the third world,
the air is thick with mistrust of private especially foreign
companies who had designs on the nation's precious bodily fluids,
or crown jewels, or whatever metaphor took the place of thought.
Taxes were badly designed or hardly designed at all. Changes were
a patchwork; some fields were actually subsidized, while others
were overtaxed. The higher prices of the 1970s led to taxes even
less tied to rent than previously.
There were also hidden regressive taxes, like requiring
crude oil or refined products to be sold at specially low prices;
putting customs duties on machinery or materials; favoring or
requiring local labor or suppliers; local graft and/or
corruption"0 ; and so on. The two price explosions led to hasty ad
"1 An oilman explained: "Graft is when you must pay someone in the
Government to do what he should do without payment. Corruption is when you pay
him to do what he should not do."
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hoc attempts to capture the suddenly increased profits. The net
result would as likely as not discourage or preclude more
investment.
But when prices stagnated and sagged after 1981, some
nations began to learn that the price would not necessarily keep
rising. The process is best seen in Canada, whose [National
Energy Plan 1980] was practically one long drool over the
revenues to be drawn from the constant price rise. Yet as prices
fell, the plan was soon scrapped and Canada moved toward freeing
up prices not only of oil but natural gas.
Previously Canadian gas exports had only been allowed with a
backup of 25 years' supply in the ground. Since investment in a
large unproductive inventory was unattractive, gas reserves
failed to increase, which of course "proved" how scarce gas was.
When border prices were nearly $5 per thousand cubic feet (mcf),
the Government of Canada withheld gas from export to the USA.
They argued with justice that their gas was no different from
exempted gas which the USA was allowing to be sold for nearly
$10. They should have recognized that the $10 prices were only
the temporary result of price regulation producing excess demand
for gas and then channeling it into a few exempt classes. In only
a few years the border price was down to a little over $2. Canada
had lost about 75 percent of the capital value of the gas it was
"reserving."
Taxes still regressive in 1992 It is impossible to
summarize the changes that came about after 1981. The oil trade
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press was full of items about new areas being opened, and of tax
reductions. By 1990, PIW said oil companies were "spoiled for
choice", with more targets than they could chase. [PIW 7-16-90:1]
One survey of 36 large US companies [OGJ 2-24-92:26] showed their
oil/gas production capital expenditures outside the U.S.A. going
from 40 percent in 1990 to 48 percent in 1992.
But by looking at taxes as they were in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, after many improvements, we see from how low a base
line the nations started, and how little progress they have made.
A comprehensive review concludes that "the great majority of the
fiscal schemes do not perform very efficiently as extractors of
economic rent." Only Australia had enacted a resource rent tax,
but coupled it with a highly regressive conventional
royalty/production tax. [Kemp 1987, p. 319-320] A more recent
study of offshore exploitation of new fields in ten countries
(U.K., Norway, Denmark, Netherlands; Australia, China, Indonesia;
Egypt, Nigeria; USA) concludes that the tax systems were highly
complex, not well-aimed at economic rents, and regressive. [Kemp
Reading & Macdonald 1992, pp. 52-56] A more detailed study of
Norway shows that its taxation aborts production which is
profitable pre-tax, sometimes to a startling degree. [Lund 1992]
Regressive taxes increase risk and abort discovery [Wood
1990] gives typical capital and operating expenditures, decline
rates, and project lives, for three hypothetical fields, of
respectively 15, 50, and 350 million barrels. At his assumed
price of $18, we calculate that even the smallest highest-cost
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field would earn nearly 40 percent before taxes, and the larger
ones are much more profitable. Wood reduces a large number of
known exploitation contracts in many countries to 20 types. The
small field provides the threshold 15 percent after tax in only
four of the twenty. In only seven of the 20 countries is it worth
developing even the intermediate field, which, we calculate,
earns 60 percent before tax. The large field is always worth
developing.'1
The result in a typical new country is that none of these
fields will ever be found. Regressive taxes raise the risk of
oil exploration. Exploratory effort typically finds many more
small than large fields. A small field, if taxed only on its net
profits, would provide the company with funds, knowledge of local
geology, and a stable beachhead for more exploration. But if it
is known in advance that anything small is a money-loser, the
risk of complete loss is unacceptably high. Large fields are not
found because small fields are overtaxed.
Ignorance of low costs and changing taxes frustrated even
the well-informed in OPEC.
"I just cannot understand how this low price can sustain
investments in high cost oil areas.... Somebody somewhere must be
losing his shirt." [Ali Jaidah 1988, p. 3]
In summary: lower oil prices did not prevent, and may even
"In a similar study, [OGJ 9-17-90:29], P.J. Hoenmans, of Mobil Oil E &
P, took a sample of 25 countries under 1989 published terms. In a hypothetical
50 million barrel (mb) field, government take ranged from 35% to 90%. Only in
six countries was profit after tax acceptable. In four countries, even a 200
mb field was unprofitable.
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have promoted, non-OPEC expansion in the 1980s, even after the
1986 crash. Costs were and are low even outside OPEC, and tax
changes pre-empted price changes. National companies in non-OPEC
countries like Mexico were another depressant.
There is a long way to go. Some of it will be travelled in
the 1990s. Costs ex-tax are far below the current "low" prices.
As understanding improves, tax systems will slowly move toward
neutrality, and non-OPEC production will continue upward.
THE PRICE PATH DOWNWARD 1981-1985
Spot and contract prices Figure 1 shows how Saudi Arabia
discounted in 1978-1980. Their price is the solid line, f.o.b. on
shipments to the USA, and it should be compared with those from
other Middle East countries, not with the spot price. Under the
conditions of the late 1970s and early 1980s, most oil moved
under contract. But the reported contract price was not a
meaningless average of old and new contracts. It was essentially
a stabilized current price, subject to change at any time.
The spot price was a special corner of the market into which
excess demand was channeled. Assume a 1 percent increase in the
amount demanded. If spot were (say) 20 percent of the total, a 5
percent increase in spot supplies demanded. If spot became 50
percent of the market, there would be only a 2 percent increase
in the demand for spot supplies. If the short term price
elasticity was around .1, the spot price would rise by 67 percent
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in the first case, but only 22 percent in the second."2
It is mistaken to regard the spot price as "the market" and
calculate the revenues Saudi Arabia could have earned had they
sold everything at spot. Had they tried to do so, the spot price
would have quickly collapsed.
First, the excess demand would have been spread over a much
larger spot market, and the price increase much less. Second, the
excess demand would itself have been less. If spot prices kept
leading the rise in contract prices, contract buyers were eager
to keep buying more, since they expected to resell at higher
prices. The temporary speculative demand disappeared once the
market was again in balance. By the end of 1980, this was
already approaching.
Our standard for comparison, therefore, is not the spot
price but the price charged by sellers who felt free to price as
they wished. By this standard, Saudi Arabia underpriced
substantially through the end of 1980. The discounting was a
success, as in 1977, but on a much larger scale. Their share of
the rapidly rising OPEC revenues rose from 30 percent in 1978 to
38 percent in 1980 and 45 percent in 1981, and only a minor part
of the increase was due to the Iran shrinkage.
[TABLE V: Saudi Exports & Revenues]
12 Let Q and P be the respective ratios of quantity and price. A 5
percent decrease in demand meant that effective Q was reduced by that much.
Then
.
95=p -'i, lnP=.51, and P=1.67. If spot shipments rose to 50 percent of the
market, a 1 percent demand increase would be a 2 percent spot demand increase,
and if .98=p--' , In P=.20, and P=1.22.
TABLE V. SAUDI OIL EXPORTS & REVENUES, 1970-1992
EXP
YEAR MBD
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
(NEW SOURCE)
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
ORTS
PCT
3.7
4.7
5.9
7.8
8.5
7.1
8.6
9.0
8.1
9.2
9.6
9.8
6.3
4.5
4.2
2.9
4.7
3.8
4.5
4.3
4.4
5.8
7.3
OPEC
0.166
0.194
0.232
0.261
0.287
0.278
0.299
0.306
0.290
0.319
0.389
0.471
0.367
0.292
0.272
0.210
0.290
0.238
0.254
0.257
0.233
0.290
0.363
REVENUES
BILS $US PCT OPEC
1.2 0.155
2.1 0.175
3.1 0.216
5.1 0.224
22.6 0.250
25.7 0.271
33.5 0.289
38.6 0.312
34.6 0.299
55.5 0.295
106.0 0.366
113.2 0.448
78.0 0.377
46.1 0.287
47.0 0.289
28.0 0.209
20.0 0.267
23.0 0.237
21.0 0.239
19.6
24.1
39.7
43.8
48.5
0.231
0.211
0.269
0.333
0.355
SOURCES:
1970-74, Petroleum Economist vol. 42, March 1975, p. 84
Petroleum Economist vol. 45, July 1978, p. 285
1974-80, Petroleum Economist vol. 48, June 1981, p. 232
1980-88, Petroleum Economist vol. 52, July 1985, p. 236
Petroleum Economist vol. 53, June 1986, p. 211
Petroleum Economist vol. 56, July 1989, p. 2 14
1988-Onwards, no longer reported.
1988-1992, OPEC Statistical Bulletin.
1991-1992 tentative, from PIW 1-11-93:3.
"Haggling" invades the market in 1980-1981 During 1979-
1981, as just explained, the Aramco companies bought their oil
more cheaply, and rivals complained bitterly about the "Aramco
advantage," which promoted their liftings. In late 1980, OPEC
demand was sagging and spot prices under pressure. But that was
viewed as temporary, and indeed prices rose at year end. In
December 1980, Minister Yamani warned of a possible $50 a barrel
by the Spring of 1981.
At the end of March 1981, Kuwait demanded that Gulf, Shell,
and BP pay a premium on contract sales. The companies refused.
[WSJ 4-1-81:2;4-6-81:20] A Kuwait minister complained: "The
companies have resorted to haggling." Kuwait cut its output
rather than deign to haggle, but nobody stirred. "For the first
time in years, OPEC seems genuinely worried that it has pushed
oil prices too far too fast...The time may have come to slow down
the drive for higher and higher oil prices."[WSJ 4-13-81:21,
emphasis added] Slow down the rate of increase, not to stop
increasing.
Then Arco notified Nigeria that it was ending two oil supply
contracts. "This is the first time in several years that an oil
company has willingly relinquished a guaranteed source of oil.
[Previously] buyers have swallowed high prices to insure
continued access to crude supplies." [WSJ 4-14-81:2] "I think it
is the starting point for a trend...I don't know how you could
send a stronger signal that prices are too high." [NYT 4-15-
81:D3] Before the month was out, Kuwait agreed not to require any
premium on contract sales. [WSJ 4-23-81:2; 4-29-81:4]]
Shortly thereafter, Minister Yamani said his country would
not raise its prices or cut production. "In the past, Sheik
Yamani has made similar...statements, only to end by raising
prices." [NYT 4-20-81:D1] Saudi Arabia had the right to be
complacent. Their 1981 surplus was expected to be $50 billion,
foreign assets were nearly $100 billion, and were expected to
reach $145 by years end. [NYT 3-24-81:A12] "To the surpise of
some observers," the Saudis kept production 1.5 mbd above "their
preferred ceiling," [PE 5-81:186]
"In the unaccustomed role of supplicant, the IMF has had to pay a
high price to persuade Saudi Arabia to lend it...around 16
billion dollars.... The Saudis did not press for the PLO to be
granted observer status at the joint annual meetings of the IMF
and the World Bank. But on the financial side the Saudis have
demanded and got their pound and a half of flesh.....Because the
IMF needed its money fast the terms have extracted are anything
but concessionary." [Economist 4-4-81:81]
By end-May, "the flood of Saudi oil is taking a stiff toll
on the production rates of other countries, who have reduced
output to maintain their official prices." [NYT 5-21-81:D1] As
OPEC gathered for a meeting, "all other members are pressing them
[Saudis] to slash production some two million to three million
barrels a day [to]...wipe out the oil glut...[It] would send
panicked purchasers into the market and would push prices up
again." [WSJ 5-22-81:1] At the meeting, Yamani refused to cut
production. [NYT 5-26-81:1] Others did cut, and there was a price
freeze, with the usual worry and inaction on differentials. [NYT
5-27-81:1] One view was that "the Saudis are good businessmen",
who increased their revenues by selling more at lower prices at
their rivals' expense. [NYT 5-27-81:D13]
The failed meeting had almost immediate results. The head of
Exxon, who had recently made light of inventories, now said the
company needed less oil and would not pay current prices. [WSJ 6-
1-81:20] Others made similar remarks, and said the refusals of
higher-priced oil mentioned earlier were only the beginning.
"Companies discuss the accelerating moves in only the most
guarded terms for fear of angering foreign suppliers." [NYT 6-2-
81:D1] But the fact that they discussed them at all was a clear
break with the past.
By early June 1981 there were numerous press reports of a
"buyers' revolt [and] actual bargaining." Again, language mirrors
life: "haggling" and "bargaining" were so unusual as to be
remarked. Moreover, the "Aramco advantage" was gone. "The have-
nots have turned into don't-wants."[PIW 6-8-81:3] For the next
three months, spot and contract prices both decreased, and
"companies, in a tough mood that hasn't been seen in many years,
are demanding that oil prices be shaved further." [WSJ 6-18-81:4]
The OPEC Long Term Strategy Committee, dormant for three years,
was again convened.13 [WSJ 6-17-81:4] Expert reports to it
recognized the drop in consumption, and recommended a price
policy "to keep price rises from forcing further conservation."
[WSJ 6-19-81:6] This was the first acknowledgment of price
elasticity. The Committee was scheduled to meet again in August
13 This indicates that the Committee's work was finished in 1978,
although its report was not leaked until 1979 and 1980.
1981. Nothing more was heard of it.
The negotiations between companies and governments over
third-quarter supply were now very different.
"It is a time of changing relationships....Dozens of oil
companies...have suspended or phased out [deliveries].... After
years of submission to the price demands of the oil exporters,
the willingness of oil companies to force a showdown with at
least some producers has come as quite a shock. 'I have never
seen contracts suspended on this scale,' said the chief
negotiator for an international oil company, who, like others,
declined to be identified because of the sensitivity of the
negotiations. The producing countries have responded to this
effrontery with threats of blacklists, diplomatic protests and
even economic sanctions against the oil companies' home
countries--everything but a significant price cut. ...
[Previously] even in times of oversupply, like the present, the
companies were willing to pay uneconomic prices just to maintain
a long-standing relationship with a producing country. But times
have changed .... 'We are no longer slaves to our capital
investments in these countries'... " [NYT 7-13-81:D1, emphasis
added]
The capital investments no longer existed. Through July
1981, the OPEC nations all stood firm on prices, and preferred to
let liftings decrease, thereby strengthening the market. And some
companies still felt "anxiety to retain friendly relations for
the sake of future oil supplies", thereby encouraging OPEC. [WSJ
7-16-81:1] The OPEC nations demanded that Saudi Arabia either
raise prices or cut production; either way, they would sell more
at existing prices. The Saudis refused, continuing to produce at
over 10 mbd. In mid-August an emergency OPEC meeting failed to
decide anything.
The spot market practically suspended trading "in the
apparent expectation that some [official contract] crude prices
would be reduced" [NYT 8-25-81:D1] And on August 26, Nigeria made
the first official contract price cut, from $40 to $36.[NYT 8-27-
81:1; WSJ 8-27-81:3] It equated to a Saudi Light price of about
$32, the current contract figure. But it was officially only a
"discount", i. e. revocable at discretion. During the next week,
other OPEC members cut prices also. It was a moment for taking
stock. Production was down by a third since 1978. It was about 20
mbd, against 35 mbd capacity. [WSJ 9-11-81:6]
Despite their insistence on lower prices, Saudi Arabia would
not cut contract prices to the Aramco companies. Since late 1980,
Saudi Arabia had had the best of both worlds: high prices and
high output. But Minister Yamani was worried over a price
collapse, which he thought was invited by the intransigence of
the other nations.The current $32 was the downward limit. [WSJ 9-
8-81:3]
In mid-September, informal negotiations again started on a
single crude price. [NYT 9-13-81:22] Meanwhile, the trade was
again puzzled and apprehensive because it did not know how large
inventories really were, nor the rate of downdraw in recent
months; hence they did not know how much was being consumed, and
how much would soon be demanded for consumption. [NYT 9-15-81:D1]
Long run comfort At the 1981 Oxford meeting, Nordine Ait
Laoussine predicted that before the end of the century six OPEC
members would have quit production, and the world would be
dependent on a few Persian Gulf nations with "small populations
and therefore little incentive to produce much oil. Oil
executives and the conference generally agreed...Many top
business and oil executives said they believe that the glut is a
temporary phenomenon that will end when the world recession
bottoms out." Robert Mabro said it was wrong to "predict an end
to the energy crisis. Forecasts of abundant oil supplies are as
wrong as forecasts of the 1960s that saw limitless oil supplies."
[WSJ 9-30-81:2]
James Akins, the former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia,
predicted that if AWACS aircraft were sold to Saudi Arabia, the
kingdom would keep the price at $32. "Then sometime in the
future (perhaps as long as two years) a gradual real increase up
to the cost of production of synthetic liquid hydrocarbons."
[Akins 1981, p. 9] (The aircraft were sold, but in the next month
the price was raised.)
While the sales of other OPEC countries fell by about 30
percent in the first eight months of 1981, Saudi liftings were
steady. But by September 1981, even Saudi Arabia had a problem.
The Aramco partners had built huge inventories, which they now
began selling off at discounts of about $1 per barrel. [PIW 9-28-
81:3]
By mid-October, contract prices had been reduced in ragged
fashion by most OPEC countries, and an agreement was expected
whose main feature had been widely discussed: raising the Saudi
marker price from $32 to $34, and cutting Saudi production [WSJ
10-15-81:4; NYT 10-16-81:D1] Minister Yamani was prepared to cut
Saudi output to 7 mbd to defend the price, but not below. [PIW
11-16-81:1]
"Spot prices [were] rising on hopes for OPEC accord." [PIW
10-19-81:1] They were not disappointed. When Saudi Arabia
raised its "marker" price, the whole structure rose. There was
even an accord on price differentials for 40 days, until the
regular December meeting. [PIW 11-2-81:1]
As usual, the October rise in the free-market spot price was
the result of an expected collusive increase in contract prices
in December. First came the expectation, then the effect, finally
the cause.
Production limited in March 1982 As exports receded, it was
realized that the main objective was to hold the price line. In
September 1981, Robert Mabro recalled the 1970s:
"OPEC's market power manifested itself as an ability to hold the
price line under adverse conditions.... The acid test of power is
a slack market when strong competitive waves batter the price
front." [9-28-81:SS3]
The December 1981 OPEC meeting had as its main business "how
to deal with the world oil oversupply. The differentials set in
October were temporary and "did not reflect real market
conditions", as Yamani said. [NYT 12-9-81:D11] In December, for
once, they did agree on differentials, with more decreases than
increases. [WSJ 12-11-81:6] But they had to face "an enormous
shift...OPEC members are now faced with the possibility that
increases in the price...are not in their own long-term
interests." This was progress in recognizing facts, but no
acknowledgment of any need for price reduction. The report of
the Long-term Strategy Committee was put off for another year.
[NYT 12-9-81:D1] [WSJ 12-10-81:4]
At least as early as November, non-OPEC producers were
taking the lead, cutting price in order to move output, forcing
OPEC to cut output to hold the price. [WSJ 11-9-81:2; NYT 11-21-
81:33] [PIW 2-15-82:3, 3-1-82:3; NYT 2-9-82:A1;WSJ 2-8-82:2; 3-3-
82:1] By February 1982, "price leadership is momentarily in the
hands of U.S. and North Sea crude sellers and their solution to a
shrinking market is to reduce prices rather than lose volume."
[PIW 2-15-82:3; also WSJ 3-2-82:6 (USA), 3-3-82:2(UK)] As we
shall see, it says much about the industry mind-set that all
attention was directed to the North Sea, none to the USA, which
was several times as large."4
Iran seems to have been the first open price-cutter in OPEC,
judging from occasional reports. (NYT 2-16-82:D12 noted their
"second" price cut.) Oil executives thought the Saudis wanted a
lower price [WSJ 2-25-82:2] Their opinion is to be respected,
but they were probably wrong: Yamani reprimanded Aramco partners
for underlifting, without mentioning a price cut. [PIW 3-8-82:1]
Kuwaiti oil minister Al Khalifa Al Sabah said the price could be
held. [WSJ 3-9-82:3] Nigeria was the most likely to cut prices,
and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait threatened sanctions against
companies which reduced their liftings there, since this resulted
in price cuts. Threats were cheaper than loans to Nigeria, but
accomplished nothing. [WSJ 3-26-82:2] [NYT 3-26-82:21] [WSJ 3-30-
14 In January 1982, Iraq announced it was planning to reach 6 mbd of
production (its previous maximum had been only 3.5) with the help of foreign
companies. [OGJ 1-4-82:73] That is precisely what they were to say ten years
and two wars later. (Below, p.***)
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82:5;4-1-82]
The Bank for International Settlements reported that by the
third quarter of 1981, oil exporters were again net borrowers, as
they had been in 1978. [NYT 2-15-82:D5; WSJ 2-16-82:31] They had
reverted to their normal deficit condition.
Production limited in March 1982 An emergency OPEC meeting
in March 1982 showed "an unprecedented hostility toward Saudi
Arabia" for not cutting output more. [WSJ 3-18-82:3] Had they
cut now, they would have been twice blessed, by the Aramco
companies and by the other OPEC producers. But profit took them
in the other direction.
[TABLE VI: OPEC QUOTAS 1982-1993]
The March meeting was a new departure. OPEC nations now
agreed to cut production from 18.2 to 17.5 mbd. It was not clear
how they would apportion the cut. [NYT 3-21-82:1] However, the
Saudis finally had the commitment from the others to share the
reduction. It was viewed as a "new market-sharing approach
instead of conventional price adjustment.... This is not OPEC's
first fling at production planning, however, and previous efforts
have been notably unsuccessful." [PIW 3-29-82:1]
But the March 1982 production agreement did succeed for a
time. By mid-May, inventories were down, spot price were up, and
"the crisis has passed." [NYT 5-17-82:D1] But even in this
"triumphant atmosphere," there was disagreement over whether to
continue with production controls. [NYT 5-21-82:D1] Iran said it
would not abide by any output ceiling and assailed Saudi Arabia
TABLE VI. OPEC QUOTAS 1982-1992
(iii thousands barrels daily)
S Arabia*
Iran
Iraq
Kuwait
Qatar
UIAE
'Tot PG
Algeria
(;abon
I ibya
Nigeria
I:cuador
Venezuela
Indonesia
T( OT OPEC**
MARCH
1982
7650
12(X)
12(X)
8(X)
3(K)
I (XX)
4500
650
150
750
13(X)
2(X)
15(X)
13(X)
10350
MARCH
1983
5000
24(X)
12(00
1050
300
1100
6050
725
150
1 I10)
13(0)
2(00
1675
1300(
125(X)
OCTOBER DECEMBER NOVEMBER
1984
4353
23(00
1200
900
280
950
5630
663
137
990
13(00
183
1555
1189
11647
excl
1986
4348
2369
996
299
948
4612
667
159
996
1301
221
1571
1190
10717
1988
4524
2640
2640
1037
312
988
7617
695
166
1037
1355
230
1636
1240
13976
JULY
1990
5750
3350
3350
1600
396
1590
10286
882
212
1320
1720
273
2070
1460
18223
2d & 3d
QUARTER
1991
8034
3217
excl
none
399
2320
5936
827
285
1425
1840
273
2235
1443
14264
SEPTEMBER
1991
8600
3300
350
300
400
2300
6650
780
290
1500
1840
290
2300
1400
15050
NOVEMBER
1992E
8030
3340
500
1600
360
2160
7960
730
280
1350
1780
290
2260
1310
15960
Ist
QUARTER
1993
8395
3490
500
1500
380
2260
8130
764
293
1408
1857
293
2360
1374
16479
S()OURCE: Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, various issues, latest 12-7-92:7
Nil *Saudi Arabia was acting as swing supplier in 1982, 1983, and 1984.
I Icnce the quotas stated here are those assumed at the meetings.
Neutral Zone quota 0.3 mbd equally divided between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
**lraq refused any quota in 1986, excluded from quotas, and total OPEC.
***August 1990 quotas identical with July 1990, except for exclusion
of Kuwait and Iraq. Hence not separately shown.
****November 1992 quotas are applied to second quarter 1993.
Ecuador, having left OPEC, is included at recent maximum for
comparability.
for allegedly discounting, and for supporting Iraq in the war.
"When Saddam Hussein falls all of OPEC's problems will be solved.
We will then see a much humbler Saudi Arabia." [WSJ 5-24-82:4]
The meeting reaffirmed the 17.5 mbd ceiling, but not a permanent
control mechanism. [PIW 5-24-82:3] The Saudis wanted to discard
it as soon as possible. Yamani said: "Saudi Arabia's policy still
precludes production planning." [PIW 5-31-82:3]
The market-watch committee was unable to decide whether or
not to change the ceiling, and "how any increase would be
allocated among members." 15 But more fundamentally, some wanted
to abolish prorationing, others to maintain it at least on a
standby basis. [PIW 6-21-82:1] The emerging strategy, as Yamani
had put it months ago was to "freeze or at least restrain nominal
price and let inflation erode [it] in real terms." [Id, 6] This
is the first approach to lowering the price, even temporarily.
Prices, policy and the long term Ministers Yamani and Al
Khalifa Al-Sabah were now willing to "concede that OPEC made a
serious 'mistake' in letting prices rise so rapidly after the
Iranian revolution." But they thought lower prices were bad in
the long term, for everybody. "A break in the nominal price would
only set the stage for another 'serious' shortage.... [Prices must
~5 On June 6, 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon. The siege of Beirut aroused
much indignation worldwide, including Israel. There was no suggestion of any
oil action by Arab or Muslim oil producers. "In fact, there was little popular
indignation in any Arab country." [Akins 1991) Instead, Iran and Libya
produced above their ceilings. [WSJ 7-1-82:2] And the Saudi ambassador to the
US "hinted ...that if the Israelis tried to enter west Beirut the Saudi
Government might consider cutting off some oil shipments and transferring its
dollar reserves out of American banks.--TNYT 7-22-82:A8, emphasis added] The
political element in Saudi or other OPEC nation's oil policy was the usual
zero.
rise in the long run to avoid a basic resource crunch before the
end of the century." [PIW 3-29-82:6] 16
The International Energy Agency "now warns [oil] supply
shortage may hit after 1985", "anywhere from 9- to 21-million
b/d." [PIW 10-4-82:3 The IEA chief economist, Herman Franssen,
thought OPEC could hold the marker price. In April, and in
October, PIW carried a special supplement by Robert Mabro on the
role of OPEC.
"The real issue is one of power. OPEC was able to hold its
reference price fixed at least in nominal terms in periods of
slack demand, when an unchecked market normally would have led to
a price collapse. ... Failure to hold is to surrender...the power
over price.... OPEC's power...manifested itself as an ability to
hold the price line in adverse conditions...The acid test of
power is a slack market when strong competitive waves batter the
price front." [PIW 4-19-82:SS1,2]
The senior managing director of the Shell group agreed and
was more precise on distinguishing monopoly from competition:
"These producers are now selling at less than half of their
available capacity rather than reduce their price. This
contrasts sharply, of course, with what is happening downstream,
where...the same phenomenon (of a substantial surplus in
capacity) generates such competition and price pressure that much
of the downstream industry is in jeopardy...That is indeed the
traditional market at work." [6-14-82:9]
"Divisive" differentials An obvious weak point was in
quality/location differentials. They could be used as a
subterfuge or cover for deliberate discounting. Perhaps more
16 This was of course the consensus. Daniel Yergin and Martin
Hillenbrand, Global Insecurity: a Strategy for Energy and Economic Renewal
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982)], have an "optimistic" scenario: a 2 percent
annual increase in the real price, from $30 in 1980 to $45 in 2000 AD. The
"pessimistic" scenario was one of OPEC reserves not growing, in which case the
price would rise at 4.5 percent per year to $75 per barrel. At 1992 price
levels, the optimistic oil price would be $74, over three times the 1992
price.
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important, at any moment a small competitive advantage for buyers
could bring a big diversion of sales. Sellers who unexpectedly
lost business had to retaliate and discount, or lose much
revenue. By December 1981, "the divisive issue of differentials"
was high on the agenda of the month's OPEC meeting [PIW 12-7-
81:1]. The next August a new working group was formed to
recommend action. [PIW 8-30-82:3] There was quick dissension,
starting with disagreement over the spread between Arab Light and
Nigerian crudes [PIW 9-13-82:3]. The committee report was stalled
[PIW 9-20-82:1], and the matter was referred to the full meeting
[PIW 10-18-82:3], where nothing could be done [PIW 12-13-82:1]
It is useless to cite additional reports. The issue has
never been resolved, and remains an irritant to this day.
Managing total OPEC output Production control was always the
leading topic at OPEC meetings. Reaching agreement was hard,
enforcing it was harder. Even good news was partly bad: an
increase in the amount demanded could disrupt. A year later,
looking back: "The disastrous pattern of Spring 1982 [was that]
OPEC nearly succeeded in restoring market prices--only to have
its production ceiling crumble the moment buyers showed some
interest in increasing purchase volumes." [PIW 4-11-83:1,
emphasis added] The problem was well summed up in July 1982:
"The organization's own hopes are pinned on a gamble to hold
firm for a few weeks in expectation that rising demand for OPEC
oil by autumn will save the day, firming up prices and enabling
discontented members to secure higher production quotas--if the
revived Iran-Iraq war doesn't 'solve' the oversupply problem in
an earlier and brutal fashion." [PIW 7-19-82:1]
In fact, the market division fell apart in July. Spot prices
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were down. The Saudis kept demanding that African producers raise
their prices. Otherwise, they would cut theirs. Both Saudi
Arabia and Venezuela threatened to disregard production limits if
others did not stop overproducing. But others demanded that the
Saudis cut production. Iran would no longer accept its quota, and
threatened "force. "'17
Yet the storm blew away, because of reviving demand during
the autumn and winter. It had made people think. Minister Al
Khalifa Al-Sabah of Kuwait pointed to the effect of OPEC nations'
macro-economic management on oil price policy. He echoed Ali
Attiga a year earlier. ["How Oil Revenues Can Destroy a Country",
PIW 10-19-81:SS] Higher revenues caused "sharp and irreversible
spending increases": to civil servants and other interest groups,
subsidies for goods and services, and new development projects.
The heavy spending inflated prices and imports, and liquidated
foreign assets. The national oil company, unless sound and well
run, would make "substantial discounts" to sell oil. [PIW 9-18-
82:3]
In October 1982, the Gulf Cooperation Council's oil
ministers warned that they would not tolerate
"'irresponsible...misguided' price cutting." But it was unclear
what they could do to stop it, except to punish offenders by
making even bigger cuts of their own. This might lead to a chain
reaction "of downward spiralling prices all around." [PIW 10-25-
'7 [Foregoing paragraph based on NYT 7-5-82:31; 7-8-82:D18;7-9-82:D3;7-
9-82:35; 7-11-82:3; 7-12-82:D1, D3; WSJ 7-8-82:3; 7-12-82:2; PE 8-82:315]
82:1] It was the classic dilemma. Sources in OPEC and the
companies said that retaliatory price cuts were "the only action
that would catch the attention of Libya and Iran." [OGJ 10-25-
82:91] But they did not dare.
An appraisal of 1982 We have paid much attention to 1982
because it was the first full year after the second price
explosion. The decline in output from 31 mbd in 1979 to 19 mbd in
1981 had been cushioned by the 4 mbd fall in Iranian output. Now
the Iranians were back, and others had to make room. OPEC
confidence in the long-run shortage and rising prices was not
shaken. But in the meantime, they had had to live with the same
everlasting "temporary" glut. And on the whole, they had done
well. They had fixed a production ceiling and maintained it
nominally at 17.5 mbd, actually at 19.3, despite bitter
disagreements over both the total and its allocation. The 1982
agreement marks a logical progression from the wrangling in 1974-
1977, the secret agreement of 1978, the proposed safety net of
1979, and the "gentlemens' agreement" of 1980. 18
Harbingers: Saudi Arabia now overpricing Previously Saudi
Arabia had underpriced and been well rewarded by their revenues
rising faster than total OPEC. But in 1982, on exports to the
USA, the Saudi price rose by 63 cents, while the non-Saudi price
'8 All of which did not prevent the rhetorical question: "If OPEC is a
cartel, where is the production-control mechanism?" Those asking it are like
Thomas Mann's hero waking up with a shock, outside the Magic Mountain; he had
neglected to read the papers.
fell by $3.05. 19 The Saudis had gone far beyond wiping out the
discount. They now overcharged.
In March, Yamani had reprimanded the Aramco partners for
underlifting. [PIW 3-8-82:1] While other OPEC members insisted
the Saudis must cut production by 2.5 mbd, the Saudis would only
permit the Aramco companies to cut by 0.7 mbd, and even so the
companies "may yet have to take the oil they didn't take in
February." [WSJ 3-1-82:2] The companies feared they would incur
large losses on Saudi oil at $34, which was now some $4 to $5
above spot. But they "are even more worried about alienating the
Saudis." [WSJ 3-4-82:3]
Some shed their illusions more slowly than others. In
December 1980, Mobil announced participation in some Saudi
industrial projects. In return, they would have "access" to an
additional 1.4 billion barrels over 15 years. The deals were part
of "Mobil's continuing efforts to cement its relationships with
Saudi Arabia in order to guarantee access to crude oil." [NYT 12-
10-80:D20] "Access" was mentioned three times in two paragraphs.
At a later Mobil stockholders meeting, president William
Tavoulareas defended
"Mobil's currently unprofitable supply agreement with Saudi
Arabia...:'A temporary glut should not make us forget that oil is
a dwindling resource, and the companies with access to it are the
ones that will be able to supply their customers and maintain
their earnings growth. ...[Losses were in the hundreds of
millions.] But it is a price we must pay for a long-term
arrangement with a country which owns a quarter of the free
19 Since Saudi production was 37 percent of the total, we can set up an
equation with one unknown: .37($.63)+.63($x)=-$1.69, where x is the change in
non-Saudi OPEC price. It is equal to -$3.05.
world's oil reserves and has proven itself to be a reliable
supplier at moderate prices." [NYT 5-7-82:D4]
The Saudis soon cut "ceiling" production, which was now
really a floor, from 8.5 mbd to 7.5, which was generally viewed
as still too high. [WSJ 3-8-82:3] In May, Aramco partners said
they were losing $5 per barrel, Texaco "has continued to make
these purchases...upon the expectation of having continued access
[sic] in the years ahead to Saudi Arabia's reserves." [PIW 5-3-
82:2] But then they must have cut back abruptly, since Texaco's
liftings for the whole year 1982 were half of 1981. [PIW 11-2-
82:8] In contrast, as late as October 1982, Mobil "has taken
pains to lift its full allowable all year, apparently partly to
maintain its standing with Riyadh." Mobil suffered a 50 percent
drop in corporate profits. [PIW 10-25-82:7]
By the end of 1982, the Aramco companies let it be known
that they were "gagging on expensive, money-losing Saudi crude
oil..." on which they had lost about $2.5 billion in 1982. "Even
formerly highly-prized rights to 'incentive' oil gained for
participation in Saudi industrial projects have lost their
attraction at full official prices." [PIW 12-20-82:1]
By December of 1982, they had finally learned the real value
of "access", "special relations", etc. They had cut liftings so
far that Saudi output was at only 45 percent of capacity, other
OPEC at 60. "Saudis seem ready for a showdown on price cutting."
A group of several former high OPEC officials and two others
(Robert Mabro, Ian Seymour) warned that Saudi Arabia, although
opposed to cutting official prices, might do so "if necessary to
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defend the market price by putting a halt to discounting." They
thought pricing discipline was a "must", and a new production
quota system. [PIW 12-13-82:1]
THE SLIDE RESUMES IN 1983
At a crucial meeting in January, the Aramco companies
finally screwed their courage to the sticking point. They gave an
"earnest warning" to Minister Yamani: they had already cut
liftings 50 percent, and would cut further unless the price was
lowered. [WSJ 1-4-83:2] [PIW 1-10-83:3] About a week later, there
was a special OPEC meeting in Geneva. It took them a week to
agree on a trifling output cut, with no agreement on price levels
or differentials. [WSJ 1-24-83:3] Minister Yamani walked out of
the meeting, calling it "a total failure." [WSJ 1-27-83:1] He
sent the parties home with the knowledge that stronger measures
were needed, and soon.
Cooperation, dialogue, interdependence The Iran-Iraq war
continued, with France buying more Iraqi oil and sending it more
weapons. "Their military aid to Iraq is intended to prevent its
military collapse and a destabilization of the region." [NYT 1-8-
83:4]
Fereidoon Fesharaki urged that the marker price actually be
increased to $36, that differentials also be increased, and that
production quotas be set with "a firm commitment to protect at
all costs any member country that is pressured by the oil
companies." [PIW 1-10-83:11] James Akins "derided analysts who
predict sharp declines in the oil price. He said Saudi Arabia
considers the 'correct price' of oil to be more, not less, than
the former marker price of $34." [OGJ 4-4-83:NL1]
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The OECD chief economist, Sylvia Ostry, thought lower oil
prices were harmful. "The ensuing fall in OPEC demand for OECD
exports would probably outweigh advantages of cheaper oil that
would help further lower inflation rates." [PIW 1-3-83:8]
"American strategists have always found a silver lining in the
stable pro-Western Gulf that high oil prices helped create." [NYT
3-6-83:E2, emphasis added] That tells us much about American
strategists. The World Bank's World Development Report 1983
predicted that by the mid-1990s inflation-adjusted world oil
prices would be 20% above the 1981 peaks. In 1992 prices, that
would be $62 per barrel. ($34xl.2xl.51=61.6) Daniel Yergin
warned that by the late 1980s "the industrial world would once
again rely increasingly on...the Middle East. This, in itself,
would bring us back to 1973." [NYT OpEd 7-19-83] The EIA 1982
Annual Energy Outlook said Saudi Arabia could meet its "needs"
producing 3 mbd.
The Group of 30, "a high-level body of international
economic and monetary experts and government officials led by
...the former managing director of the IMF", and including Sheik
Yamani and Sheik Al-Sabah of Kuwait warned of the need to face
the transition to higher future energy costs. Lower oil prices
promoted economic recovery, which would bring "a dramatic
increase in the demand for oil by the end of the decade. Another
interruption of oil supplies would then produce another oil
shock, repeating the cycle of the 1970s." The Group favored
"tacit collaboration" between importers and exporter nations.
During the past three years, they had themselves "helped to
persuade OPEC to hold its marker price to $34 a barrel..." [NYT
"Economic Scene" 3-18-83][OGJ 5-2-83:98] They must really have
believed it!20
In the consuming countries, there was talk of "Western aid
to OPEC" to maintain the price.
"The West may see political advantages, too.... Stable prices
would bolster Saudi Arabia and other... friends of the West in a
particularly volatile region. It would also improve North-South
relations. In return, the West might get what it has sought in
vain up to now--a long term agreement with the major producers
for reasonable price increases in return for guaranteed supplies
and an end to disruptive 'oil shocks'. According to Prof. Peter
Odell... the present glut offers 'a golden chance to build new
political bridges between North and South'." [NYT 1-30-83:E2]
The Brandt Commission on International Development Issues
also called for "a dialogue between major oil producing and oil
consuming countries to consider arrangements beneficial to all
parties, including safeguarding supplies to the poorest
countries." [IMF Survey, 2-21-83]
An example of cooperation was Algerian gas. A trans-
Mediterranean pipeline to Italy had been built in 1981, but no
gas was shipped until the Italians paid a higher price than the
one they had agreed on. Finally the Italian Cabinet approved a
subsidy, "linked to improved economic relations [and]...a tacit
promise ... to buy more Italian goods." [WSJ 2-25-83:31]
20 There was one interesting new development. "Ecuador, strapped for
cash to pay foreign debt, has stepped up its efforts to lure foreign
investment in its petroleum industry .... Ecuador, like other members of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, has been courting oil companies
in recent months because of the oil glut." But the best they could offer was
"a rate of return higher than the U.S. prime lending rate". [WSJ 4-7-83:33,
emphasis added] There has been only modest progress in ten years.
Minister Yamani warned the consuming countries:
[If prices fell "you would see bankruptcies all over the
world and mainly in the USA, ...[and] the banking system come
under serious pressure. So there is something to protect, and
Saudi Arabia is not alone here." [PIW 1-31-83:SS1].
"[C]ooperation between the producers and consumers ...has become
more necessary now than ever before." [PIW 2-14-83:8] [WSJ 2-11-
83:2]
Yamani was, as usual, well informed about the United States.
Until 1982, "most oil and gas loans were made on the premise that
energy prices would continue to rise sharply.... The estimates had
been for dramatic increases, [e.g.] ...at almost 10 percent a
year, to $90 a barrel by 1990." [NYT 2-14-83:D1] But in 1982
there had been an embarrassing bankruptcy because of oil and gas
loans, and banks were nervous. (WSJ 7-19-82:17)
Oil companies seemed to fear that if the price were not
deliberately cut by $4, it would fall even more of itself. But
the more important question was "whether the organization would
be able to agree to limit production levels for its 13 members."
[NYT 2-2-83:A1] While the OPEC countries were considering the
next meeting, they were approaching the non-OPEC producers,
notably the UK, Norway, and Mexico. "Nations in and outside of
OPEC are joining in unprecedented bid to support oil prices."
[WSJ 2-25-83:3] But the meetings never seemed to reach any
conclusion.
The sequence was again repeated: non-OPEC price cuts,
especially light crude oils from the North Sea, forced down light
African crudes, especially Nigerian, which in turn reduced the
light-heavy margin, which took sales away from Saudi Arabia and
the others. This happened in January-February 1983. Saudi
production was down to less than 3.5 mbd in March, which meant
exports were below 3 mbd. But in the meantime, non-OPEC price
cuts were led by the USA [WSJ 2-1-83:3] By mid-February, the
price of British oil "is now equivalent to a $29 price for Saudi
Arabia." [NYT 2-19-83:39] Nigeria then "clearly undercut the
British" [NYT 2-21-83:D1] It equated to Saudi Light at $27. [NYT
2-21-83:A1] Yamani had threatened to cut from the $34 base, but
he and his Persian Gulf allies were now reluctant to do so. [NYT
2-21-83:Al]
There followed a "hectic spate of mini-meetings", too
numerous to list. The Soviet Union "called on OPEC members to
close ranks to halt plummeting oil prices." [[NYT 2-23-83:D4]
What all parties obviously feared was an endless downward spiral.
In the meantime, Robert Mabro said that only coordination
between OPEC and non-OPEC countries would work. He suggested,
like Fesharaki, support for governments losing sales, ("the
special targets of oil companies in campaigns designed to lower
oil prices.") [PIW 2-28-83:1] He did not distinguish (a)
individual buyers, each acting alone and competitively to exploit
cartel weakness, from (b) concerted action, multi-company
"campaigns to lower prices", which incidentally would have been
against the companies' interests.
The March 1983 production allocation: Saudi Arabia the swing
producer The March OPEC meeting lasted nearly two weeks,
preceded by three weeks of negotiations. It was "the longest
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negotiating effort ever undertaken by the 13 oil exporters." [WSJ
3-15-83:3] Repeatedly stalled, in the end it was a success, and
put an end to the "hysterical talk of an oil price crash", as was
noted a year later. [PIW 7-9-84:1]
The marker price was reduced from $34 to $29. This reversed
the previous strategy of raise higher, the better to defend. But
spot prices, and effective government selling prices, were
already about $2 lower than $29, and there was widespread
disbelief that the line could be held. [NYT 3-15-83:1, D22]
Total OPEC production was set at 17.5 mbd, 1 mbd below
current output. [Id] It was a lot of effort for a small but
essential result. Explicit quotas were fixed for all but Saudi
Arabia. For the first time they accepted the role of "swing" or
residual supplier, to make up the difference between 17.5 mbd and
the total demanded at the new price. "Prices are floor prices,
...quotas are ceilings..." [PIW 3-21-83:9]
The marker price was above spot prices. "The growing opinion
of many buyers that OPEC is the marginal supplier of last resort
does not bode well in an environment that places little value on
term contract arrangements." [PIW 3-14-83:3] In fact, the
distinction between spot and contract was blurred. "Contracts
now seldom cover more than one year", renewable "if prices are
satisfactory." "Security of supply" had mostly evaporated,
including Saudi Arabia. [PIW 3-7-83:1]
The ministers feared the agreement could unravel; its very
success was the result of that fear. [WSJ 3-22-83:1] For the
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first time, there was discussion of how far down oil prices could
go in the short run before production began to be shut in. A PIW
survey placed it in the neighborhood of $10. [PIW 4-4-83:4]
Nearly 95 percent of UK North Sea output would have positive cash
flow at a price of $5. [PIW 6-20-83:5]
As the OPEC members placed their chief reliance on
production limits, they became aware of the deterioration in
output data. The possible error was now as much as 1.8 mbd, or
10 percent of their production.
"The data gap on oil production figures has mushroomed over
the past decade as oil companies lost most of their control over
the producing sector to OPEC and national oil companies. It seems
hard to believe nowadays that as recently as the early 1970s it
was possible to assemble monthly production data (down to the
last barrel) for all major oil fields, and often on a company-by-
company or crude-by-crude basis. ... Consumer nations should not
be too quick to criticize OPEC for its output data shortcomings,
since they have largely failed to provide complete current
information on oil demand and inventories. The largest single
discrepancy is in stocks, where assessments vary by as much as
700-million barrels--equivalent to almost 1.9 million bd over a
year." [PIW 5-16-83:1]
(Data bearing on exploration and development costs had
already shrunk more drastically than output data, and continued
to shrink.)
In the Spring of 1983, as at other times, a fearful season
turned into a tranquil one: spot prices actually rose close to
official levels, [PIW 5-2-83:1, PIW 7-11-83:1] An OPEC market-
monitoring committee expected to raise prices "'in a gradual and
orderly fashion' after 1985...in the context of a global
agreement with the industrial powers that will assure the world a
reliable source of energy at reasonable prices...Buyers must have
confidence in us...'" They were counting on a production
agreement already reached, they thought, with Britain, Mexico,
and Norway. [WSJ 4-13-83:31][WSJ 5-2-83:34]
The US Department of Energy expected a further price decline
to about $24 by 1985, but thereafter a rise to about $37 in 1990.
[NYT 5-6-83:D14] OPEC appointed a new ministerial committee on
long-term strategy, again chaired by Yamani. They would need to
recognize "the sensitive relationship between OPEC prices and
demand levels for its oil. That was an element totally missing
from the previous document." [PIW 7-18-83:5]
Two months later the group were "coming to terms with the
hard fact that, with the exception of Mexico, "none of the non-
OPEC producers would cooperate in reducing output. "Internal
supply and price discipline will require sharp sacrifices for
[OPEC] for the next two or three years, but [they] expect the
oversupply position to ease later this decade." [PIW 9-19-83:3]
Efforts to expand capacity Non-OPEC governments were said
to be now competing with each other for scarce company investment
funds. But fear of expropriation prevented any substantial
investment. [PIW 6-20-83:9] Despite the war, Iran and Iraq had
made great efforts to maintain and even expand oil output. Iran
had done better than had been generally expected. [PIW 1-17-83:6]
The Iranian oil minister estimated "production costs" as being as
low as 5 to 20 cents; this presumably meant only lifting costs.
[PIW 10-17-83:9] Iraq had conducted a wildcat drilling program.
"Mobil Oil has been providing technical services." [PIW 8-8-83:8]
As we will see later, Iraq had some substantial success. It was
evident a year later, when Iraq said it aimed at 7 mbd of exports
"by the 1990s", which would have been twice their previous output
peak. It would have required pipelines across Jordan and Saudi
Arabia; the latter was built later. There was no mention of any
resource constraint. [PIW 3-26-84:3]20
"The increasingly short-term nature of the oil market
...[requires] some non-bureaucratic mechanism that is market
responsive, even if only on volume and not price." Any scheme
which by-passed the Aramco partners would displease them, "since
they absorbed substantial losses at one time for the sake of
their valued "special relationship." Accordingly, Saudi Aramco
sold through a new oil marketing outlet, Norbec.[PIW 8-15-83:1]
One of the Aramco companies said Norbec was "directed against the
Aramco companies" [WSJ 8-28-83:15] The Saudis called it only a
temporary entity [OGJ 9-5-83:NL1], but it survives today and is
very important in short-term transactions. The Saudis' floating
storage, which also began at this time, is an important part of
20 Despite production down to 1 mbd and exports around 400
tbd, Iraq had been able to persuade "governments including those
of the United States, Brazil, Turkey, Thailand, Australia and
Japan, to supply credits for food imports, so austerity has not
pinched too hard. But the biggest accomplishment was persuading
the major foreign contractors for the development program not to
pull out, even though the Iraqis said there would be no payments
during 1983 .... 'We can't pay so you get your governments to
provide credits, and we will start paying you back in
1985.'...None of the major contractors left....The companies
wanted to keep in Baghdad's favor for the postwar period, and
their own governments were willing to back them...." [NYT 11-24-
83:D1] Of course they were not repaid in 1985. Thereupon, the
ploy was repeated. "When will they ever learn?"
its operations.
The felt need for enforcement OPEC, "deeply troubled by the
failure of demand to recover and their inability to trim output
far enough, are now giving thought to a series of really tough
measures" against quota violators. [PIW 10-31-83:1] "The oil
market is losing confidence in the ability of the $29 pricing
structure to survive in the coming year unless there is a
sustained demand upturn or dramatic new action by OPEC to rein in
production.... It seems less risky to refrain from buying oil than
to gamble on a market recovery." [PIW 11-7-83:1]
The advisory group which had, a year earlier, issued a
warning on the need for discipline (above, p. 47 [PIW 12-13-
82:1]) now criticized the lack of a mechanism to allocate output,
and urged OPEC to make "a show of strength" to make non-OPEC
exporters restrain production. In Mabro's words: "They too share
the burden of defending oil prices." The panel said that the
cheating of several OPEC members was masked by lack of production
data. They again urged a return to companies buying under long-
term contracts. They repeated the mantra that lower oil prices
were bad for consumers as well as producers, but this ritual
should not discredit a thoughtful report. [WSJ 9-30-83:35]
A well-reasoned paper by the Iran delegation urged higher
prices and lower output. For maximum OPEC revenues, the $34
marker should be restored. Like others, they recognized the
backward-bending curve: lower revenues increased the "propensity
to export", hence a production surplus, a further weakening of
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prices, with "a chain reaction ending in a serious market glut."
[PIW 11-21-83:5] The Iranian prime minister accused the Arab
monarchies of "treason toward Muslims" in overproducing to
reduce prices. [WSJ 12-6-83:6]21
The Mabro proposal In December, Robert Mabro issued his
most far-reaching plan for OPEC. Members should "offer their
traditional customers long-term contracts at official prices."
Additional oil, prorated to members, would be sold at shorter
term only through a central sales agency. It would match
immediately all non-OPEC offers. There was a threat, veiled
about as heavily as Salome:
"If OPEC, God forbid, were to engage in a price war against
non-OPEC producers it could lower the price on incremental
supplies without having to lose a penny on base-load sales, which
would continue at official prices under long-term contracts. This
is a formidable deterrent." [PIW 12-5-83:8]
Mabro was an important spokesman22, but the proposal had
no chance of success. First, the companies could not sign long-
term contracts at official prices. They knew that if spot prices
exceeded contract, governments would raise contract prices; when
spot prices fell, companies would be choked with unwanted oil
21 James Akins said the Israeli Defense Minister advocated
joint US-Israeli occupation of the oil fields. No proof was
offered. [OGJ 12-19-83:59]
22 Robert Mabro's newly established Oxford Institute of
Energy Studies was supported, among others, by OAPEC (not OPEC,
since Iran refused support because of his supposed partiality to
the Arabs); the European Community, energy research groups in
Japan, France and Sweden, the UK Secretary of Energy, the Arab
Banking Corporation, and other banks, corporations, consultant
firms and research institutes. Thus his proposal-s for stabilizing
prices indicate what these groups were willing to support.
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billed at full contract price. Aramco's experience had just shown
that.
Second, the threat to retaliate against price cutters was
simply provincial. North Sea production plus Soviet exports were
in round numbers less than 6 mbd. But production elsewhere in the
non-OPEC world was over 17 mbd, of which 10 mbd was in the USA.
Producers in the USA were among the first to reduce prices. [OGJ
2-8-82:85; 2-22-82:67; 3-22-82:71]
In ignoring US producers, Mabro ignored competition. When
producers are many and independent, they cannot threaten or be
threatened. Each one must take the price as an objective fact.
OPEC could cut prices enough to put many of them out of business.
It could not know in advance how many would be driven out--nor
how many would stay out when the price was raised back above the
old levels. But to threaten them was to demand that they act in
concert, which was exactly what they could not do. Those
unfamiliar with the economics of competition are baffled by it
because they can only think of a few actors reacting consciously
to each other. (There was the same lack of understanding in
1990, blaming Kuwait for weak prices.)
Unlike Mabro, Yamani understood the American scene. He
pointed to damage inflicted by low prices on the USA oil
industry, and on the banks, who had local and national political
influence. If the US government would help by enforcing a
price/production policy, that might make a difference; not
otherwise.
The new independence of oil refining worked the same way.
Slightly lower prices on spot crude oil would become slightly
lower prices on refined products, which would divert sales. OPEC
producers losing market share would retaliate by discounting, and
so on down the price ladder. Integrated private companies
preferred high prices to benefit their crude operations, but they
could not coordinate. Each company was also a buyer, who looked
for a lower price. In seeking his own benefit, as Adam Smith said
long ago; he brought about a result "which was no part of his
intention."
THUNDER WITHOUT RAIN IN 1984
Prices hold, supply shaky To the surprise of the trade,
prices were mostly stable in 1984. The OPEC average declined only
86 cents, the Saudis' export price by 43 cents. As ever, OPEC
was still plagued by unsatisfactory production data [OGJ 12-26-
83:Editorial] [PIW 3-5-84:3] and members were "resentful that last
year's [1983] big $5 a barrel cut failed to have the desired
effect." [PIW 3-26-84:4] An Iranian military offensive was
countered by Iraq, but the low level of production in these
countries had long been made up. Nigeria was the weakest link
financially, with foreign exchange reserves almost gone. A coup
at the start of January raised fears in the trade, but the new
junta reaffirmed their ties to OPEC. [NYT 1-5-84:D10] Iraq was
being helped by neighbors, and the American policy was now
definitely tilting toward it. [WSJ 1-6-84:24] We cannot say how
important this aid was in raising Iraq oil production from 0.9
mbd in 1983 to 2.8 mbd in 1989. Saudi Arabia had borne the brunt
of export loss, but its foreign assets were still said to exceed
$150 billion. [PIW 4-23-84:4]
[By mid-1984] "hysterical talk of an oil price crash so
prevalent in March 1983 has all but disappeared, even though
producer nations are still fragmented, oil is in oversupply, and
refining margins are poor...The lessons of 1983 are now clearly
perceived: OPEC output restraint, however unevenly applied, has a
major strengthening effect on spot prices." [PIW 7-9-84:1]
The horizon still fair Some large oil-company mergers
showed it. "Oil industry set for series of takeovers" because the
cost of adding a barrel of "oil equivalent" in the ground was
said to be in the range of $15-$17. [WSJ 1-10-84:35] Since the
barrel had to be held for an average of roughly 7 years before
sale, a reasonable discount rate (say 10 percent) meant it had to
fetch something well over $30, plus another 50 percent for
operating expenses, royalties, and taxes. [cf Adelman 1992] Some
may have dreamed of $45, some day. It is not credible that they
spent $15 for a barrel in ground.
But repetition made it widely believed that buying a barrel
was cheaper than finding/developing it, just as though there were
no market to equate the two choices. To do them justice, some
analysts and oil companies, including Exxon and Amoco, rebuffed
this chatter. But Daniel Yergin explained: "An obvious reason
for [mergers] is that the world is running out of oil." [NYT 2-9-
84:D1] He said that by the 1990s the current surplus "may well
have eroded, putting pressure once again on supplies." [NYT 4-29-
84:OpEd] But the International Energy Agency, which a year
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earlier had projected the 1990 demand for OPEC oil at 30 mbd, now
lowered it to 24 mbd. [PIW 7-23-84:3]
Barter deals At an OPEC meeting in early July, Yamani "told
reporters the recovery had already started." [WSJ 8-1-84:2] But
in the next three weeks, prices fell because Saudi Arabia
actually increased output. A Saudi barter deal became known, of
34 million barrels for civilian jet aircraft, the oil reputedly
valued at $27.10 instead of the posted $27.92.
Deals of this type were nothing new. In 1981, a Wall Street
Journal survey showed how various members of the Saudi royal
family had cut themselves in as sales agents for oil sold through
the state company Petromin or (later) Norbec, which they resold
at a commission.
"One problem facing top Saudi officials is that commission
payments--for oil export and for nearly every major development
project inside the kingdom--are part of the glue that holds the
4,000 princes of the royal family together. Prominent princes
have come to expect a big share of the kingdom's spoils.... What
worries Western oilmen is the likelihood... [of] a decline in the
relatively orderly marketing operations of the four U.S.
companies." [WSJ 5-1-81:1]
Such deals were viewed as discounts [Economist 7-21-84:62].
"The market disruption is wholly unintentional, and does not
reflect policy change." [PIW 7-23-84:3, 7-30-84:1, 8-6-84:3] But
control of export volumes and prices was "increasingly eroded" by
such barter deals. [PIW 2-13-84:1]
"[Yamani] is understood to have resisted the deal as much as
he could, but it was concluded above his head at the behest of
senior members of the royal family without regard for state oil
policy." [to gain a $50 million commission] [Financial Times 8-1-
84:10]
In early August 1984, the British government asked oil
refiners "not to put pressure on the British National Oil
Corporation (BNOC) to cut prices." [NYT 8-6-84:D4] [WSJ 8-9-84:3]
The London Financial Times called Britain "Opec's Other Member":
"There is something instinctively suspicious about ministers
acting in secret, in collusion with a cartel whose activities
have been the source of many of the world's economic problems."
[FT 8-13-84][Economist 8-4-84:53]
But the Aramco companies reduced their liftings and did not
make them up elsewhere, thus strengthening prices.
"Washington, while not overtly supporting OPEC, is not
fighting it either ...Lower prices would cut billions of dollars
of windfall profits taxes. Cheaper oil would undercut coal.
Development of wood, solar energy and synthetic fuels would
suffer, as would programs for conservation and to produce
domestic oil using new technology. Lower oil prices would lead to
greater long-term dependence on imported oil and thus risk a
future price shock. They also fear this would weaken Saudi
Arabia, further destabilizing the Middle East." [NYT 8-19-84:E5]
The Economist [8-4-84:13] mentioned "commentators [who]
bewail the 'danger' of much lower oil prices." Another key to
world public opinion is in a statement by Pope John Paul II
criticizing "imperialistic monopoly." Far from calling OPEC an
example of monopoly, His Holiness "was unambiguous in supporting
the call by third world countries for a redistribution of the
world's wealth." [NYT 9-18-84:A9] A few months later, he "spoke
sternly to the world's wealthy nations...[and the International
Monetary Fund about]...the market for raw materials." [NYT 2-4-
85:1]
France helped by renewing an oil supply contract with Iraq
"that last year allowed Baghdad to overcome severe financial
problems stemming from its war with Iran...The deal was imposed
on the state-controlled Elf Aquitaine and Total last year...In
addition to the oil contract, France has agreed to refinance
Iraqi debts totaling about $1.4 billion since May 1983." [NYT 8-
20-84:D6]
The lack of production data (1983 numbers were still not
released) became a kind of help. The additional Saudi production
may have gone into floating storage not sales, hence exerted no
pressure on price. [NYT 8-21-84:D1] This gave more credibility to
an earlier report that non-OPEC suppliers seemed almost openly
cooperative. [PIW 8-6-84:1] From this time, the distinction
between Saudi production and sales became routine.
Light crudes start a decline But in September 1984, even as
prices generally rose, Nigeria and Iran began discounting light
crudes. [WSJ 9-26-84:42] In October, for the first time since the
March 1983 accord, another OPEC light crude producer (Abu Dhabi)
warned it would unilaterally cut the price if it could not
otherwise sell enough crude because of competition from Saudi
floating storage. [WSJ 10-2-84:34] BNOC (British National Oil
Company) customers were no longer willing to accept the unchanged
prices which they had so recently approved. [WSJ 10-8-84:35]
Norway then reduced prices "in a break with British policy",
which had held prices firm. [WSJ 10-16-84:2] So did BNOC. [WSJ
10-18-84:3] Within a day, Nigeria more than matched them, and
there was an emergency meeting of OPEC ministers.
"Even if the $29 marker price now seems beyond rescue, a
policy of toughing it out and waiting for the market to turn
round could still be OPEC's best short term bet. ...The sudden
fracturing in the $29 pricing edifice comes after an almost
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unbelievable series of miscalculations by both OPEC and non-OPEC
producers... Individual actions taken by producers...can all be
justified when viewed in isolation. But taken together in the
context of a weak and volatile spot market, the moves domino [i.
e., cumulate] far beyond the intentions of each producer." [PIW
10-22-84:1]
"OPEC output must fall fast and far enough, in combination
with rising seasonal demand, for the shaky $29 oil price to be
reestablished.... The oil marketplace has not only lost
confidence in OPEC intentions, but also in the industry's
supply/demand appraisals. ...A secret accord between Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait is the real underpinning of last week's OPEC
agreement...[where] consensus was achieved more quickly than some
had anticipated."[PIW 11-5-84:1]
Of course the Saudis and Kuwaitis wanted the accord kept
secret, in order not to advertise that the two were bearing the
burden of cutting back output. It would be worthwhile if the
market might be starved into a price jump. As Yamani said,
cutbacks could make spot prices rise "well above" official
levels. [NYT 11-15-84:D30] That was their obvious goal. But
secrecy did not last out the week, and the known willingness to
cut back did the Saudis immediate harm. Their December 1984
output was below 4 mbd.
Another meeting was held in December. Norway had begun
openly to base its own price on recent spot prices. [WSJ 12-12-
84:4][FT 12-16-84:10] The same fruitless quest for revised
differentials was resumed. [NYT 12-19-84:D17] Members first
blamed Britain and Norway [WSJ 12-19-84:6], then each other. [WSJ
12-20-84:3] They needed to regain credibility, whose loss had
been making prices tumble. To do so, they would retain an outside
firm to audit production. [WSJ 12-21-84:2][WSJ 12-28-84:3]
"[J]ust a month ago--following OPEC's quota cuts--most
forecasters...were predicting that a yawning supply gap of 1 mbd
was opening for November and December, but no such thing has
materialized." [PIW 12-3-84:1] [At year's end, the market was]
"closer to the brink now than in 1983... OPEC is launching an in
extremis bid to reestablish its credibility and...role as manager
and defender of the world price structure." [PIW 12-24-84:1]
During the December meeting, the UAE Minister Manei Saeed Al
Otaiba wrote some mournful verses:
After the days of luxury, we have become
A lamb in the midst of the jungle.
Like a gang, the wolves of the market
Swarm around us.
Yet the actual prices cited in the desperate-sounding PIW
appraisal were in the neighborhood of $27 or a little less. The
decrease was only about 10 percent over nearly two years. The
trade seemed to overreact, but the potential for a crash was
always there.
Throughout the period, one heard facile wisdom that after
all, "when the market talks, OPEC must listen." On the contrary,
it was clear that changes in spot and futures prices responded to
actual and hoped-for OPEC action, or inaction, on output cuts.
THE SAUDIS ARE PUSHED TOO FAR IN 1985
Emergency meeting, data gaps, prices decline and hold In
January, spot and futures prices continued to slip. The British
national company (BNOC) followed the Norwegian example, abandoned
official prices and sold by the current market. "OPEC's ministers
repeatedly have threatened that such a cut by Britain would force
the cartel into a price war." [WSJ 1-8-85:3] The threat was not
taken seriously. Indeed, a spokesman for Britain's Ministry of
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Energy said that Britain would not reduce oil production to ease
pressure on prices. [WSJ 1-15-85:5] That ended the collaboration
which had troubled some in Britain.
In January, there was another emergency meeting.23 Minister
Yamani remarked that the $29 price was "not sacred" [NYT 1-29-
85:D10], but it was not changed.
The "decision" was a set of price cuts between 25 cents and
$1.16 per barrel, derisively small; and several members refused
to agree to anything. [WSJ 1-31-85:3; NYT 1-31-85:A1] But the
hope of production cuts caused a sharp jump in futures prices,
regaining most of the ground lost since August 1984.
Saudi Arabia had suffered a sharp decrease in non-oil gross
domestic product, which was mostly a use of oil revenues,not an
independent source of income. "The private sector ... is much
smaller than it was even two years ago. Over the past 18 months,
some 1,500 companies have either gone out of business or asked
for emergency financing." Payments to American companies were
much delayed. [NYT 2-18-85:D3]
OPEC retained a Dutch accounting form to audit members'
prices and production. In early February, Minister Yamani
expected "exact figures on production" by the end of the month,
and selling prices for March. The need was obvious: "increasingly
23 With nothing of substance to report, the veteran Youssef
M. Ibrahim, to whose work we and all other observers are greatly
indebted, wrote an item on high living at the hotel: late
suppers, and "a procession of $200- to $1,000-a night 'escorts'
making their way to the elevators." [WSJ 1-25-85:1] Only jangled
nerves can explain why Mr. Ibrahim was, very briefly, barred from
these meetings.
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unreliable output statistics and imaginative pricing schemes have
plagued the group." [PIW 2-4-85:1] It was a formidable task, and
observers recalled that in 1983 the market monitoring committee
had hired Arthur D. Little, whose contract was terminated in
December 1984. [WSJ 2-26-85:39] But by end-February, prices were
excluded from the audit. [PIW 2-25-85:1].
The auditing process took longer than expected [PIW 3-25-
85:1], and in April Nigeria, Kuwait, and two others stopped
sending production data. [PIW 4-29-85:1] Somehow this was
smoothed out. By early June, although members had been
disconcerted by the auditors' thoroughness, and by regular
followup visits, the Dutch auditors could "provide fully
certified statements on all members' production." [PIW 6-3-85:1]
This was too hopeful. An oversight ministerial committee, chaired
by Yamani, was categorical: "Not one single OPEC country has from
the beginning given the auditors sufficient access to date to
enable unqualified positive endorsement to any member's complete
statistics." [PIW 7-29-85:1] At about that time, OPEC hired a
London-based group to track tankers to get reliable export
statistics. [PIW 8-12-85:1]
At this point, auditors and trackers disappear from view. A
year later, the auditors' contract had lapsed. [PIW 4-14-86:4]
Short run gloom, long run rosy The anxiety of early 1985 was
reflected in expert opinion. Cambridge Energy Research Associates
and Arthur Andersen polled 125 forecasters. "Nearly all expect
oil prices, adjusted for inflation, to continue declining over
the next several years, but to rise again in the 1990s. One
dissenter not polled by CERA-Andersen thought the glut had
existed for 70 years. "OPEC is on the verge of a dogfight." [NYT
1-30-85:D2] A distinguished expert team called for "a new
initiative between oil producers and users." [PIW 4-1-85:5]
Britain, however, was still uncooperative. They dissolved the
national oil trading concern BNOC. It was generally agreed that
this would make it harder to maintain prices. [WSJ 3-14-85:3] In
March, Norway was shocked by the loss of a large gas contract of
sale to Britain.24
"The [U.K.] government had been under intense pressure to
force the corporation to maintain prices....OPEC officials have
alternately pleaded with Britain to help prop up prices and
threatened to initiate price wars or trade boycotts if it did
not. The OPEC ministers have allies in the British Treasury...The
opposition Labor Party which created the oil corporation in 1975
condemned the announcement as the 'final act of vandalism'
against an organization set up to protect the oil industry and
the security of supply to the oil industry.'" [NYT 3-14-85:D1]
A group of experts convened by the CIA in April expected
some price decline, "before starting to gather strength by the
1990s." [WSJ 4-23-85:1] James Akins said: "There is no fear in
OPEC of a price decline." In the long run, the price would rise
to the cost of synthetics. [OGJ 4-15-85:32] (He had been the
first to suggest the target, in 1970.) Daniel Yergin warned:
"unless there is a major technological development, at some
point the reduction in energy investment will come back to haunt
us, and market realities will again give way to geological
realities--the concentration of oil reserves in OPEC and in the
24 We lack space for the important developments in the
natural gas market, which pushed the price down during this time,
both in North America and in Europe. See [Adelman & Lynch 1986]
See Table VI.
Middle East. And that will eventually put the era of surplus
behind us." [NYT OpEd 7-8-85]
[TABLE VII: GAS PRICES]
The Norwegian oil minister, speaking in Kuwait, countered
"accusations" by saying Norwegian output would level off at about
700 tbd. [NYT 3-25-85:D5] (In fact,the 1985 average was 815, and
it continuesto rise, exceeding 2 mbd in 1992.)
Spot and futures prices increased in March and April.
However, trade opinion was still gloomy, expecting some decrease
in the near future.
The Saudi dilemma: retaliation invites general collapse By
May 1985, "three months of apparent restraint by [OPEC] members
... are giving way to serious breaches." Iran was particularly
aggressive in discounting. "About the only thing that is propping
oil prices is the Saudi willingness to take deep production cuts,
which have pared output to a 17-year low of about 2.8 mbd." [WSJ
5-16-85:5] There was a report that the Aramco companies had
requested price cuts, which had been refused, "in the belief that
any Saudi price cut would lead to a downward spiral in world oil
prices." [Financial Times 5-25-85:2] That was the card which the
other members were playing; Saudi output was believed to be only
2.5 mbd, as compared with its quota of 4.3 mbd. [Id]
At the end of May, Yamani called for official price cuts on
heavy crude oils, but not light ones, in order to promote the
sales of heavy crude (including the marker Arab Light). [WSJ 5-
30-85:14] It was the same old intractable issue of price
TABLE VII. NATURAL GAS PRICES: USA, W. EUROPE, JAPAN, 1980-1992
(Source: Cedigaz annual report 1992)
($/mmbtu)
W. Eur
USA border
YEAR border low high Japan
1980 4.42 3.00 3.70 5.01
1981 4.84 3.30 4.70 5.83
1982 4.94 4.10 5.20 5.74
1983 4.51 3.50 4.40 5.16
1984 4.08 3.50 4.20 4.90
1985 3.19 3.40 4.40 4.99
1986 2.53 3.20 3.60 3.98
1987 2.17 2.50 2.80 3.29
1988 2.00 1.90 2.50 3.22
1989 2.04 1.70 2.50 3.26
1990 2.03 1.80 2.50 3.60
1991 2.06 2.90 3.20 3.97
Jan 92 n.a. 2.40 2.80 3.60
differentials. Saudi willingness to continue to accommodate
others' overproduction "is wearing thin." But Yamani had warned
in similar terms in February, and nothing had happened. [PIW 6-3-
85:1] The Saudis called an emergency meeting in their summer
capital Taif. A senior OPEC official said "It seems quite
plausible that the Saudis are ready for a confrontation." [WSJ 6-
3-85:3]. They were not; King Fahd sent a warning message, but
they only offered arguments which others opposed. [WSJ 6-4-85:2]
[NYT 6-10-85:D1] [WSJ 6-10-85:26] Yamani now viewed the price/
production problem as more serious than what had produced the $5
cut in the marker price in early 1983. Production control was
necessary but not sufficient; "marketing practices [were] ...
undermining the pricing structure..." [PIW 6-10-85:1]
A week later, Yamani again warned that Saudi Arabia could
not continue at 2.5 mbd production (and only 1.6 mbd exports),
and demanded "at least" its quota of 4.35 mbd. Yet "he will
oppose any reduction in the OPEC price level because it would
only mean more discounting from a lower base." He also explained
how a properly run OPEC would cope with demand fluctuations, by
the price-raising ratchet:
"If you stick with the price...then everybody will be
selling a little bit below the quota.... Then prices on the spot
market will be going up because supply is less. Then I think we
would have to meet, increase the quota, and increase the [price]
ceiling."[PIW 6-17-85:1, SS]
The pressure on the Saudis was revealed by some financial
data. Playing the swing producer had cost them $2 billion in June
alone. In 1983-84 there had been a $22 billion drawdown of
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foreign assets, which now stood at $90 to $100 billion, of which
"$65 billion is reasonably liquid." [PIW 7-8-85:5] Presumably
most of the non-liquid $25 to $35 billion was in "loans" to Iraq.
We cannot tell how much of it found its way to Saddam Hussein's
treasure trove, reckoned in the billions, which enabled him to
bear the embargo in 1991-92. [NYT, 7-27-92:A7; 7-31-92:A8]
By the end of June, "a growing number of oil analysts"
expected a price as low as $20 by year-end. Traders did not
expect the cartel to splinter, despite acrimonious rhetoric, "and
they tend increasingly to doubt the threats of Sheik Yamani."
[WSJ 6-28-85:1] That was the problem: OPEC members doubted also,
or they felt simply unable to act together to accommodate Saudi
Arabia to ward off disaster. Along with others, even the Aramco
companies "have abandoned their long-term contracts." [WSJ 6-28-
85:13]
In mid-July the Saudis were still insisting on some
"guaranteed minimum level" of production, said now to be 3.5 mbd,
well below their earlier demand for full 4.35 mbd quota. But a
special meeting ended in failure. Sheik Otaiba of the UAE guessed
that 75 percent of OPEC oil was being discounted. [NYT 7-8-85:1]
"Saudi Arabia, increasingly desperate...[is] prepared to
increase their oil production from the current two million
barrels a day to as much as nine million barrels a day by year's
end unless other members...agree to renounce all forms of
discounting prices and cheating on production quotas. ...[This
was] the most blunt of Saudi threats that have been made in
recent months. ...Most OPEC members refused to accept production
curbs, in part because many of them have come to disregard the
Saudi threats as a bluff." [WSJ 7-10-85:2]
We may note in passing the Saudi claim of 9 mbd capacity,
which seems not to have been generally accepted.
Spot prices were generally $2 to $4 below official. Japan,
Sweden, and the Netherlands, called for a "dialogue" with OPEC;
others, including Britain, Norway, and the United States,
rejected it. [WSJ 7-10-85:2][NYT 7-10-85:D1]25
An OPEC consultative committee claimed that their "agreement
in principle to end marketing 'malpractices' represents a
significant advance in OPEC's slow campaign to defend oil
prices." [PIW 7-15-85:3] This was a confession of impotence to
rein in overproduction.
The official truth about Saudi Arabia had been that the
Western-schooled technocrats wanted less production, in order to
conserve the resource; only the government's desire to help the
USA and the West had prevailed. Reality was now briefly
glimpsed.
"More and more of these educated and increasingly vocal
Saudis have come to feel that the country should forget OPEC, cut
price and sell more oil.... Behind this view...are serious
concerns that Saudi Arabia's political and economic weight in the
world are being undermined by its decline as an oil exporter.
Arab diplomats note in interviews that Saudi Arabia's political
clout within the Arab world, which rests solely on its wealth and
its generosity in foreign aid, is waning." [WSJ 7-19-85:1]
The search continued for a "magic formula to squeeze quart-
size oil supplies into the pint-pot of demand." The Saudis said
they had been negotiating with both the old Aramco partners and
25 There was a general decline in the readiness of the
industrial nations to support commodity prices. Secretary of
State Kissinger had called in 1975 for a worldwide system of
price support through North-South cooperation. Attitudes had
greatly changed. An American official said: "We're fed up with it
and now the Soviets are fed up with it." [WSJ 10-2-85:34]
others to move more Saudi oil. But their threats to OPEC
continued to be viewed as bluff.[NYT 7-22-85:D2]
"In OPEC there is growing dissatisfaction with its current
strategy of defending oil prices through production restraint. As
a result, radical and risky changes in policy direction aimed at
making the defense of OPEC's market share the number one priority
are now being discussed seriously in several quarters.... [Some
want] head-to-head market confrontation...matching but not
undercutting non-OPEC prices. [PIW 7-22-85:1]
Another special meeting in July came to nothing, and six
members--Algeria, Ecuador, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, UAE--were
reported not even permitting the auditors to enter. [NYT 7-28-
85:D1]
"[A] majority of OPEC delegates [were] convinced that a
threat by Saudi Arabia to unilaterally boost production and touch
off a price war was only a bluff. By sponsoring [a] proposal to
adopt such small price cuts, some delegates said, the Saudis
effectively had backed down. [Previous hints were now more
bluntly expressed.] Within OPEC, the Saudis increasingly are
viewed as the rich landlord in a slum. Resented for their wealth,
the Saudis are seen as preying on poor members who can't afford
to sacrifice much more of their revenue by cutting prices or
trimming production. ...On at least three occasions this year,
the Saudis retreated just as their threats were beginning to
bite...The upshot is that most OPEC members now believe the
Saudis are bluffing."[WSJ 7-26-85:3]
Perhaps because the Saudis' threats of retaliation were not
feared, spot prices actually improved, and by end-July were only
about $1 below official. One helpful factor was a flareup of the
Iran-Iraq war. There were heavy attacks on the Iran export
terminal at Kharg island, which "may be Iraq's own way of 'making
room' for its incremental exports this autumn, without weakening
prices." Iraq exports had already increased, trucked out through
Turkey and Jordan, and sold at deep discounts. These supply
worries seemed to bolster the spot market, which approached $28,
close to the marker. [PIW 8-26-85:2] However, Nigeria moved to
reduce taxes on equity operations, which amounted to a price cut
to those companies. [WSJ 8-26-85:2]
When the Saudis announced that production would at some
time double to quota level, 4.3 mbd. [WSJ 8-1-85:4], nobody
bothered to comment. Yamani stated in mid-September that this
would happen by winter. "The Saudi move, which had been
threatened but disbelieved for several months, amounts to the end
of an era." [WSJ 9-16-85:1] But some still thought he was only
bluffing for an October meeting. [NYT 9-16-85:D1]
Prices in the last quarter rose, propelled by new air
attacks by Iraq on Kharg Island, which stopped Iran exports
completely. Coincidentally, the Soviet Union "apparently beset by
production problems", temporarily stopped exports. And Saudi
Arabia said it would accept no new customers for two weeks. An
oil trader said: "In my experience, I've never seen a set of
circumstances as bullish as this. Just everything is going right
if you want to see prices rise." [NYT 9-27-85:D] [WSJ 9-27-85:33]
Everything continued right for several weeks, as fear of
supply losses drove up spot and futures prices. At another OPEC
meeting in October, Saudi Arabia repeated that it had abandoned
its role as swing producer. [WSJ 10-7-85:3] But prices continued
to rise.
The Saudis draw back for a jump The Saudis arranged, at
first only with the former Aramco partners, for additional output
to be priced at the spot product value of the barrel, less
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refining and transport cost. This was the f.o.b. "netback
value." "Predictably, reports of the Saudi netback sales are
already drawing bitter criticism" from Venezuela, Iran, and
others. Some term buyers were demanding discounts for "security"
of outlet. [PIW 9-16-85:1,2] It had taken them a long time to
learn that sellers' access to outlet was more important than
buyers' access to supply.
The Saudis tried to minimize market disruption, by
distinguishing between incremental sales at netback value "and
continuing sales at official prices." This was what Mabro and
others had urged in 1983. (Above, p. 58) It did not work.
Customers resisted segregation, and Japanese customers were
outraged since "the new formula is for Atlantic destinations
only." [PIW 9-23-85:1] By mid-October, the Saudis were selling to
other than the Aramco partners. They had already built Atlantic-
area stockpiles, now to be drawn upon. [PIW 10-18-85:1]
By end-November, all geographical discrimination was on the
way out. Saudi Arabia was selling generally at netback, or at
spot crude prices, which might exceed netback values. More
importantly, they were converting existing officially priced
contracts into netback deals, and the Japanese customers expected
to be included. [PIW 11-25-85:1]
By now, oil companies had given up "trying to produce an
internally consistent supply/demand balance for 1986." More than
1 mbd of supply was "in limbo", i. e. without visible outlet.
[PIW 11-25-85:1] Yet all this time, spot prices were increasing,
as the result of low inventories.
At end-November, Saudi Arabia and OPEC suspended official
prices. The targets of the action were the UK, Norway, and the
OPEC majority:
"Other ministers [as well as Yamani] advocate price 'shock
therapy' sooner rather than later as the only way to halt the
erosion of OPEC market power.... The idea is for a seasonal
production pact with non-members, discreet enough to avoid
embarrassing ... Britain and Norway, but concrete enough to
persuade OPEC's maverick majority to start producing within their
quotas ....Evident failure to phase out 'marketing malpractices'
as promised at midyear...augur ill for attempts to agree on new
pricing norms." [PIW 12-2-85:1]
At the meeting, OPEC was said to be "no longer even
pretending to be a cartel.... Instead, it is preparing for a
price war against rival producers outside of OPEC." [NYT 12-9-
85:1] (Cartels have been know to cut prices to enforce
decisions.) The meeting called for "a fair share in the world
oil market," whatever that meant. They were frustrated by non-
members' lack of restraint. [WSJ 12-9-85:3]
"Differences emerge over the degree of commitment to engage
in a bruising battle for market share if non-OPEC exporters are
unwilling to limit output. The hardline group, including Saudi
Arabia, asserts that the Geneva action is a concrete 'first step'
and not a bluff. ... Yamani specifically singled out the UK as
the 'number one target'. ... [A committee would] "examine ways of
putting pressure on non-OPEC producers to restrain output, as
well as look at alternate pricing formulas." [PIW 12-16-85:1]
December prices were down, not only on spot markets but on
export shipments. During 1982-1984, Saudi prices had been within
50 cents of "Arab OPEC" and "total OPEC." Their prices during
the first 11 months of 1985 are unknown. But for December they
were $5 below "total OPEC." Officials in Britain, Norway, Egypt
and Mexico blamed the cartel and disclaimed cooperation. The
78
London Economist said that "OPEC oil ministers have made it clear
that Britain is their main target." Economist 12-14-85:57] For
reasons stated earlier (p. 69, 77), this target made no sense.
The ball was in another court, where the players were unaware of
it.
"American congressmen are now making their umpteenth attempt
to reduce the $200 billion budget deficits... Congress could find
salvation in the oil market. ... The taxman could simply stand
between the wellhead and the petrol pump, scooping every fall in
the price of crude without raising the cost of American
motoring.... The dismal science rarely gives politicians what they
most want, painless solutions to their problems. It is doing so
now..... If Congress does not go for a petrol tax soon, it will
have missed its best chance of returning the world to cheap oil,
slow inflation, low interest rates and rapid growth." [Economist
12-14-85:16]
The great missed opportunity is still being missed.
THE RANKS COLLAPSE AND REFORM: 1986-1987
In 1985, the average "total OPEC" export price, less
volatile than the spot price, peaked at $26.81 in April. As late
as November, even with netback deals sprouting, it was $25.68.
The Saudi export price is not available before December 1985, but
in that month it was down to $18.48, followed by $12.75 in
January, while the "total OPEC" average was still $21.02. The
Saudis had stolen a march on all of OPEC. Their May 1986 price
was down to the all-time low of $7.91.
The seductive netback as price hedge For buyers, a netback
price was more attractive than a fixed spot or contract price of
the same amount. Netback was a costless hedge against price
changes. In the two months or more between the date of loading
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and the date of sale of the refined product, if the product price
rose the refiner's crude cost also rose. But if, as many
expected and all feared, the prices of crude and products
declined in the two months' interim, the refiner's crude cost
would drop also. The fear of the slim refining margin being
turned into a heavy loss was gone. The crude oil seller assumed
all the risk.
Netbacks also had another, more subtle, price-lowering
effect. Previously, an autonomous drop in the product price level
would shut down some high-cost refining. The result would be
lower output of refined products. (The stubborn legend is that
because variable costs are a relatively low proportion of total
costs, refinery output does not respond to higher crude oil costs
or lower refined-product prices. But this confuses the single
unit with the whole plant and with the whole industry. Oil
refining, like oil production and almost all other industries, is
an industry of increasing cost because it is an array of plants,
from lowest- to highest-cost. And within each plant there is an
array of units.)
The lower product price would normally cause some refining
throughput cutbacks. The lower volume of refined products slowed
or stopped the product price decline. Lower product output in
time became less crude purchased, and this depressed the price of
crude. Thus the lower product price worked through to the crude
level, gradually and not completely. Some of the effect-was
absorbed by the refiner.
But with a netback deal there was no slowdown of the price
decline as it was transmitted through the refining industry. The
refiner became indifferent to a lower product price because he
knew that it would be immediately offset by a lower crude price.
The lower prices were a deliberate tactic "to scare up
cooperation" from non-OPEC producers. "Yamani, who previously
described the paper and futures markets as 'purely
psychological', added to the havoc last week by speaking of a
'downward price spiral...to less than $15 a barrel." [PIW 1-27-
86:1] The result was that physical spot markets nearly dried up
"because buyers and sellers are too far apart on prices and
terms." [PIW 2-3-86:1]
Pain inflicted Some producers soon cried hold, enough.
"Political pressures ... are beginning to mount... But Arab Gulf
producers show no willingness to ease pricing tensions by an
early accord on lower production ceilings." Iran, Libya, and
others called for an emergency OPEC session, but Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait refused. "'Let them all stew', says one high Gulf
official." [PIW 2-3-86:1] Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were not moved
by threats of terrorist violence against them. [WSJ 2-4-86:3]
Most OPEC members wanted non-member producers to cut along with
them, naming Britain, Norway, the Soviet Union, Egypt, and Oman.
[WSJ 2-5-86:3] There are many such reports, yet the largest non-
OPEC producer, the USA, is never mentioned. [WSJ 2-5-86:3] A week
later the policy, of letting prices go in order to regain market
share, was still in place. [PIW 2-10-86:1]
Britain was urged, and even expected by some, to join with
OPEC, because its high-cost oil would be shut down. Yet this was
obviously wrong. Operating cost in the North Sea was roughly $5.
As for the government's reaction, the loss of oil revenues as
part of the national income was very much smaller in Britain (or
even Norway for that matter) than in the OPEC nations. Many
believed (wrongly, as we have seen) that $15 was "below what's
required to replace reserves," and that the persistence of such a
price "will erode non-OPEC output enough by 1990 to put OPEC back
in the driver's seat..." [PIW 3-24-86:1]
In Saudi Arabia, unlike the rest of OPEC, there were
immediate large revenue gains, "[W]ithin Saudi Arabia the policy
of maximizing production and pumping more money into the economy
enjoys great popularity and will be hard to reverse." [WSJ 2-11-
86:1] Saudi Arabia was earning more at lower prices.
In early March, the Saudis and Kuwaitis were still standing
fast against "a majority of OPEC members ... seeking ways to
persuade [them] to call off the fight for market share." [PIW 3-
3-86:3] So much for another legend: how Saudi Arabia does not
dare resist "pressure" from its partners to pump less.
The Persian Gulf producers said that prices had fallen to
"unacceptable levels and only cooperation between all producers
inside and outside OPEC" could improve matters. [NYT 3-11-86:D11]
But later in March, "even the Saudis [are] becoming concerned
about the rapidity and depth of the current price plunge." [PIW
3-17-86:3] Yamani's position was seen as diminished; he was
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blamed for having previously cut Saudi production to prop up OPEC
prices. Discounting by netbacks was said to be a reversal of
Yamani. [WSJ 3-14-86:30] But such inside-dope stories about a
closed society should be put aside. The Gulf producers were
simply distrustful of their colleagues. "The Saudis believe the
pain of reduced oil revenue should be extended through the summer
to encourage adherence to any future OPEC limits on production."
[WSJ 3-18-86:3]
As usual, the long run was rosy. "By 1990, perhaps sooner,
the stage will be set for a new run-up in the oil price."2 6
In March 1986, the objective was said to be re-establishment
of the $28 marker price. But there was no known plan to
accomplish this. [NYT 3-22-86:35] The Iranian Oil Minister blamed
the United States for trying to destroy OPEC "'because it is an
organization belonging to the third world.'" He proposed cutting
output from 17 to 13 mbd. Sheik Otaiba of the UAE said he shared
Yamani's view "that some countries had not suffered enough
financially to assure strict production discipline." [NYT 3-23-
86:9] After sitting for nine days, another meeting quit on March
24, having done nothing. Prices, which had stabilized since the
start of the month, fell again. [WSJ 3-25-86:50]
26 " ... This run-up might start as early as 1988 as the
oil exporters see this excess capacity noticeably shrinking....
The fundamental forces described here--both those of the market
and those of geology--make it prudent for us to look across the
narrow 'valley' of lower-cost oil to the likely high-price
'cliffs' on the other side." [Henry M. Rowen, in WSJ OpEd 3-21-
86]
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Mr. Bush speaks on All Fools' Day The US Government was now
heard from. On April 1, Vice President George Bush "said he
would tell Saudi Arabia that the protection of American security
interests requires action to stabilize the falling price of oil."
He would "be selling very hard" on his forthcoming visit. [NYT 4-
2-86:1] But of course: "We're not going on a price-setting
mission." Hypocrisy so blatant was almost refreshing. It was
scorned by editorials in the New York Times (April 2) and Wall
Street Journal (April 3), among others. His mission was to
persuade the Saudis to "stabilize--or even increase--the price of
oil by cutting production." [NYT 4-3-86:Al] [PIW 4-7-86:3] But
hypocrisy aside, what did Mr. Bush accomplish?
The Saudis were trying to influence OPEC and non-OPEC
producers by inflicting pain. When Mr. Bush said that they were
indeed inflicting much pain, this encouraged them to inflict
more. Accordingly, their May output was actually higher than
March and April. That was clearly the view in OPEC.
"Many delegates [to an OPEC meeting] saw these observations,
later awkwardly retracted by the White House, as a sign that
OPEC's drive to win market share by letting oil prices fall is
reaching its goal. 'It is clear the U.S. advocacy of free market
pricing for oil has cracked', said an Arab delegate who asked not
to be identified. 'We must continue to push the price war
further. The pain must go on to get real cooperation from non-
OPEC members', he said." [WSJ 4-15-86:3]
Thus if Mr. Bush had any effect, it was the contrary of what
he intended. It was much like Undersecretary of State Irwin in
Tehran in January 1971, telling the Persian Gulf producers how
much harm they could inflict by cutting back output, which of
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course encouraged them to threaten more and to do more. As Karl
Marx might have said, the Irwin visit was tragedy, the Bush visit
was farce. Mr. Bush continued the solemn foolery of US-Saudi oil
"dialogue," which continued throughout the 1980s, as it had
through the 1970s. (Washington Post, 7-21-92:1, citing documents
obtained under the Freedom of Information Act.)
In March, OPEC had met with five non-OPEC producers [PIW 3-
17-86:3] and asked them to cut back, but it had not settled its
own output. [PIW 3-24-86:1] By April they could still say they
were hopeful over statements by "high US and Japanese government
officials", and by "Norway's willingness to allow production to
shut in even temporarily", particularly since there would shortly
be a new government there, "a socialist alliance more sympathetic
to OPEC." [PIW 4-14-86:5] But in the end there was no cooperation
from Norway or Britain, and a disconcerting discovery: that when
taxes and royalties were price-dependent, the tax decline helped
offset low prices [PIW 3-24-86:1]
Netbacking continues Saudi Arabian revenues were up from
late 1985 because of higher sales at lower prices. And "reserve
drawdowns, borrowing and budget cuts [don't] seem to be shaking
the popular support for the Saudi government's decision to pursue
an aggressive oil-production policy despite the fall in oil
prices." 27 [WSJ 4-8-86:34] Indeed, some of the royal family were
27 Foreign "liquid and semiliquid assets" had been estimated
at about $110 billion in early 1983, $55 billion by end-1985, and
due for another drop of $15 billion by end-1986. [WSJ 4-7-86:3]
Another estimate put total assets at about $80 billion, bank
deposits plus short-term investments at $50 billion. In addition,
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reported as thinking Minister Yamani should have acted sooner to
increase production. [NYT 4-13-86:F6]2 8
At an April OPEC meeting the majority favored cutting output
to 16.7 mbd, but even this was opposed by Libya, Algeria, and
Iran; and the meeting did nothing on quotas. [PIW 4-21-86:3]
Yamani denied that any output ceiling had been set. Non-OPEC
producers had first
"to trim a million barrels a day... before OPEC tries to cut
its own output when it meets...in June. He said low oil prices
will eliminate another 1 mbd of high-cost oil. Then OPEC might
remove a third mbd or so. That, he said, would take care of an
excess 3 mbd.... 'But if we don't get anything from non-OPEC,
nothing will happen.'" [WSJ 4-23-86:2]
In May, it became clear that other OPEC nations were not
only maintaining output, they had actually undercut the Saudi
netback prices. In response, Saudi Arabia offered a cash
discount on every barrel of oil bought that month in excess of
the previous month.
Futures prices had been rising, but now fell again. As the
trade saw it, the Saudis would do everything necessary to keep
their market share.[WSJ 5-6-86:5] Last summer's output of 2 mbd
was intolerable. "The country's prestige evaporated along with
there were loans impossible to collect quickly (to the IMF or
World Bank) or perhaps ever (to Iraq), and equity investments.
But much could be done by cutting spending.[WSJ 4-8-86:34]
28 In April 1986 the USA bombed Tripoli in Libya. The
merits of the attack are not our concern. But Italy and West
Germany were reluctant to approve it or join in anti-terrorist
measures, because "Libya remains their largest supplier of crude
oil." [NYT 4-14-86:A6]; Japan, because it is "a major importer of
Middle Eastern oil". [NYT 4-29-86:6]
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its oil revenues." Yamani said the "eventual" price goal was $28,
"but not in a year or two"; the interim goal was about $18.
Iran's oil minister "roared: 'We will tell them it is a U.S.-
Saudi conspiracy against the poor of the world.'" [WSJ 5-13-86:1]
Nobody laughed.
By May, with no sign of the Persian Gulf alliance relenting
[PIW 5-12-86:1], many were wondering how low the price could go,
or was likely to go--two separate questions."2 The new socialist
government of Norway said it would consider limits on oil
production, provided OPEC set a total and distributed it among
members. [WSJ 5-15-86:7] One development was quite threatening,
however: various industrial and less-developed countries were
raising taxes on oil products, thereby pre-empting OPEC revenues
at the source. If this became more widespread, it would frustrate
OPEC hopes for higher demand. [WSJ 5-28-86:39]
In June, an OPEC meeting started with an experts' report
recommending more pressure on non-OPEC producers, none of whom
appeared to be ready to cut production significantly. Many
suggested that higher prices were also the responsibility of
"bankers and nations interested in world financial stability"
[WSJ 6-26-86:10] The immediate target was a price between $17 and
29 "One academic economist calculated the floor would be
about $8 a barrel in the short run and $5 over the longer
term.... M. A. Adelman of MIT warned...that oil prices could sink
to $5 and remain there for the next 10 years--though he assigns
that a low probability. Prices are more likely to fluctuate
between $5-$25, mainly in the $10-$15 range, he said." [PIW 5-5-
86:1]
$20, and ultimately $28, but most of the members continued to
resist production cuts--while prices hovered around $13 and some
Persian Gulf crudes were below $10. [WSJ 6-27-86:4] By the end
of the meeting, the majority were willing to cut production, but
Iran, Libya, and Algeria held out. [NYT 6-29-86:6] The meeting
could not agree. [NYT 6-30-86:D1]
"A shrinking majority...led by Saudi Arabia" thought it was
impossible to parcel out a smaller total, hence impossible to cut
total production. Moreover, "Saudi Arabia believes that the
price war eventually will eliminate much oil from non-OPEC
producers, such as Britain and the U.S., because their oil is too
expensive to produce." The exit of this oil would make room for
more OPEC production. [WSJ 6-30-86:7] It is hard to believe such
a report. But the Saudis raised production to 6 mbd at the
beginning of July. [NYT 7-17-86:D16] For once, this was actually
above their quota.
The July-August meeting stops the price decline The next
meeting was late in July. It was urgent: some spot sales of Saudi
Light were rumored to be $6.08, although the reported spot prices
was $7.70. Yamani first proposed a production ceiling of 17.6
mbd, about 2 mbd less than current production. But the minority
wanted a cut to 14.5 mbd, and much higher prices. [NYT 7-29-
86:D1; NYT 7-30-86:D3]
"Nearly all delegates appeared genuinely panicky over the
prospect of OPEC oil prices sinking closer to $6 a barrel. The
chief fear among delegates is that with prices so low,
industrialized consumer countries...may ... impose taxes and
tariffs on oil, effectively holding consumption." [WSJ 7-30-86:3]
This of course was what the Economist had advised in
December (above, p. 78). After a week, there seemed to be
deadlock. The delegates had apparently learned, however
unwillingly: "The total volume of non-OPEC output shut in purely
on the basis of production costs is likely to remain surprisingly
small [PIW 7-21-86:1; emphasis added] If the reader credits Table
IV above, he will understand. Earlier in the year, the
predominant industry view was for prices to be at $18 - $20 by
year's end, but no longer. There were steep cuts in planned
capital expenditures. [NYT 8-4-86:D1].
The split continued between the Gulf producers and the
others. It was apparent that there would be no help from non-
OPEC governments. OPEC had long ceased to make threatening
statements.
"Partly, many experts say, the problem is OPEC's seeming
inability to do without instant gratification. ... The ministers
are seeking to achieve cuts in their individual crude oil output
to dry up a glut of oil on the world market and push prices to a
level that would more than compensate for the cuts in volume they
would have to accept. But while the ministers agree on the
principle, they appear unable to trust the reckoning. 'Two
barrels is something I hold, it's real,' a source close to
delegates said. One barrel for a higher price is a promise. So I
hang on to what I have.'" [NYT 8-4-86:D1]
As hard to take was the distrust and suspicion. Delegates
interpreted conciliatory proposals as expressions of weakness. A
popular explanation was a Saudi-Kuwaiti conspiracy to bankrupt
Iran and let Iraq win the war. This is more excusable in
Ministers under stress than in Western writers. [Milton Viorst,
NYT OpEd 8-5-86]
A new production agreement in August was regarded as
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"temporary and fragile", and covered only the months of September
and October. The new limit was set at 16.8 mbd, compared with a
current output of 20.5 mbd. Saudi Arabia and Iran resumed their
old quotas, others cut mildly, and Iraq was permitted to produce
ad lib--which meant in effect their current output. [WSJ 8-5-
86:3] [NYT 8-6-86:D1] [NYT 8-7-86:D3] [PIW 8-11-86:3] Therefore
Iran no longer needed to insist that it must receive twice as
much as Iraq.
The agreement turned the market around. By end-August, the
new OPEC cutbacks were taking hold, and buyers were being turned
away. [PIW 9-1-86:1] The Norwegian government said it would
reduce exports by 10 percent, to help "'stabilize oil prices at a
higher level.'" [WSJ 9-11-86:4] China, the Soviet Union, Mexico,
Egypt, Malaysia, Oman, and Angola each made a similar pledge.
[NYT 10-3-86:D1]
Yamani announced a six-year (i.e., 1992) goal: 20 million
barrels daily of OPEC exports at $20 per barrel. [PIW 9-15-86:1]
His forecast of production was right on target, but $20, adjusted
for the increase in US GDP-IPD during 1986-1992, would have been
$25.30 in 1992. The actual average OPEC "basket" was $18.41 in
1992, and the average on export to the US was $17.87.
But although the August and October meetings were in a good
hopeful climate, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait demanded a new set of
quotas, which would be tied to a schedule of prices based on a
fixed marker around $18. The two demands were inter-related,
since raising the price up to the target level would require
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further output cuts. [WSJ 10-7-86:7] Iran, however, favored the
easier course of simply extending the August agreement.
Temporizing was natural to them because they could not tell,
after another Iraqi raid on Kharg Island export terminal, whether
they could export more. [NYT 10-10-86:D1]
Most members wanted to retain current quotas, the line of
least resistance, but Kuwait demanded an increase in their quota,
which they had cut more than any other member. [WSJ 10-13-86:3]
Both they and the Saudis wanted higher quotas, based 50 percent
on reserves, 20 percent on producing capacity, and 10 percent on
population. [WSJ 10-14-86:2] [NYT 10-14-86:D1] [NYT 10-18-86:35]
The Saudi cabinet had publicly stated they would not accept
a renewal, but on October 18 they did, with the target set at
$18. [NYT 10-19-86:A1] Kuwait assented for the time being. [WSJ
10-22-86:2] Their minds had been concentrated by sharp declines
in futures prices.
Yamani dismissed at end-October For Minister Yamani it was
a last hurrah, since he was dismissed at the end of October. The
press accounts were vague, and we cannot rely on any. Yamani
allegedly "opposed immediate steps to raise oil prices, [arguing]
that raising oil prices is incompatible with the quest of many
OPEC members, including Saudi Arabia, for larger market shares.
The pricing committee will have to reconcile these contradictory
objectives." King Fahd called the stated $18 - $20 target only a
"first stage" of the advance to higher prices. [WSJ 11-11-86:2]
This is supported by another account, which states also that the
King demanded both a higher quota and a higher price. It also
mentions Yamani's opposition to barter deals which enriched some
princes but endangered prices. The King thought they could be
kept secret. [PIW 11-24-86:1]
Yamani was reported "under strict orders from King Fahd to
refrain from any comments on the kingdom's oil policy if he
wishes to retain his freedom of movement." [WSJ 1-11-87:A2]
Later, an editorial in The Economist [6-27-87:13] thought Saudi
Arabia was better off exporting more at a lower price. "Sheikh
Yamani was sacked because he recognized this." (The editorial,
incidentally, is an excellent brief summary of the Saudis'
investment-expenditure plight.) Prices wobbled somewhat on
Yamani's departure, but revived. Kuwait supported Saudi Arabia in
seeking higher prices, but also without suggesting how to cut
production. [WSJ 11-12-86:3]
The American Petroleum Institute now suggested that the
United States Government establish a base price for oil through
an import fee, which would take effect when the price fell below
a certain level. This would penalize OPEC for lower prices and
reward them for higher prices. There was never an indication that
the USA would join in any production-limitation. The Reagan
Administration was in a difficult position, particularly since
the knowledge of the "recent surreptitious efforts to re-
establish ties with Iran" were beginning to become known. [NYT
11-13-86:D1] Moreover, Saudi Arabia had provided cash for the
Nicaraguan contras, and the Administration felt indebted.
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More production cuts; stable prices in last quarter It was
also widely reported that the Saudi endorsement of higher prices
was part of a deal with Iran. [WSJ 11-14-86:12] This report
conflicts with the fact that the Iraq airforce, rebuilt with
Saudi-Kuwaiti money, had done heavy damage to Iran in August-
October 1986. But reports of a deal were superfluous. Both
parties wanted higher prices. The obstacle was the lack of
concerted production control.
All oil analysts agreed that a substantial production cut
was needed. [NYT 11-14-86:D17][NYT 1l-14-86:D1] True, the OPEC
pricing committee thought pricing discipline would of itself
increase by $3 the new marker of a "basket" of OPEC crude oils.
[NYT 11-15-86:1] [WSJ 11-17-86:2] To nobody's surprise, it did
not. And when King Fahd refused to cut production below quota,
there was a renewed price decline. [NYT 11-25-86:D1]
Iran's deputy oil minister now reversed course, saying his
country was willing to work with other members to cut production
to bring the price up to $18. [NYT 11-26-86:D13] The December
meeting should have been brief and rewarding. King Fahd, now in
accord with Iran, had also conferred with the chiefs of state of
Iraq, Libya, and Algeria. [WSJ 12-3-86:2] The arms-for-hostages
scandal in the USA, which in effect broke the arms embargo
against Iran, was also a help.30 A senior delegate said: "The
30 "U.S. officials root for higher oil prices, despite
possible ill effects. They hope the OPEC meeting's outcome will
raise prices into the high teens." [WSJ 12-19-86:1]
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Iranians will run this meeting without doubt, and everyone will
fall into line." The Saudis would make the biggest contribution,
by cutting output from the current nearly 6 mbd to 4.3 mbd. [WSJ
12-8-86:3]
But the meeting, which should have needed one or two days,
lasted eleven days. Iran, which had been willing in August to
disregard Iraq because it was about to "control" Iraq's
production by force, now confronted its failure. The delegates
could not agree on a scheme of production cuts. [NYT 12-14-86:3]
The Iranian oil minister "talked to reporters--like some wistful
Rommel recalling Montgomery--about the 'wisdom' of Sheik Yamani."
[NYT 12-15-86:D12] But oil markets were encouraged, and spot
prices rose, on a reported agreement that "quotas and cutbacks
remain the only option." [NYT 12-15-86:D1] The next day, they
"all but reached agreement on measures to boost oil prices
by sharing production cuts. Saudi Arabia, with other members'
support, urged OPEC to reduce production at a level below actual
demand. Thus OPEC hopes to starve oil markets by next March to
prepare the ground for yet another price boost." [WSJ 12-16-86:5]
But Iraq would not agree unless their production was equated
to Iran. [WSJ 12-17-86:2] Their quota of 1.2 mbd had been set in
1984, when Iran had badly damaged Iraqi export capability. But
export capacity had been restored, and was expected to rise to
above 2 mbd. Iran proposed Iraq be suspended for its
recalcitrance, but this was not taken seriously. [12-18-86:D2]
"Saudi Arabia, which supports Iraq's war effort with oil and
substantial war loans, has tried to use its leverage to persuade
Iraq to join the output accord. It has not succeeded so far."
Saudi "leverage" over Iraq was as potent as USA "leverage" over
Saudi Arabia. Yet "for an accord to push prices higher, there
must be some assurance that Iraqi output will not surge." [NYT
12-19-86:33] Iran now relented, since "its need for firm and
rising oil prices outweighed its desire to force Iraq into the
pact." [NYT 12-20-86:35]
The new agreement emerged on December 21. Everyone was to
cut back by about 5 percent, and first quarter 1987 output was
set at 15.8 mbd. It fixed the prices of 23 crude oils, including
the marker (Arab Light) at $17.52 and the surrogate marker (Dubai
Fateh) at $17.42. The ambiguity of August remained: Iraq was not
limited by quota, but it was assumed they would produce only
1.466 mbd, a cutback from the current 1.6 to 1.7 mbd. Members
also agreed "to phase out all oil sales contracts that are based
on a free-market pricing of oil." This meant the end of netback
pricing.
As PIW said, the production cuts would maintain the price
through the winter, the most favorable season; but "buyers are
still extremely reluctant to assume all of the commercial risk
... by accepting the new schedule of fixed prices." Both Saudi
Arabia and Iran were losers "in their bid to be seen as effective
leaders..., both overestimating their ability to influence Iraqi
oil policy. ...[This] may be highly damaging in the long run as
[Iraq] expands export capacity in 1987-1988." [PIW 12-29-86:1]
King Fahd had retreated from his price demand. Output
reduction he now thought was "the only way to absorb the surplus.
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... the price must not be less than $18." [NYT 12-27-86:32] As we
will shortly see, the next but not final stage was $20.31 At any
rate, the crisis was over. Figure 1 above shows how prices had
revived.
An Appraisal of OPEC in Retreat 1981-1986 We have examined
these six years in often tedious detail because it was the
cartel's greatest test. OPEC awoke from their dream of moving up
an inelastic demand curve to the point where the price of oil
would profitably be raised to equal the cost of synthetic liquid
hydrocarbons. The true limit to price was set by customer
substitution. It was not far above, but far below $34.
OPEC was like someone walking out on a reef, heedless of the
incoming tide. When the water starts lapping at his ankles, he
must now swim back all the way he walked out. Retreat is much
harder than advance.
OPEC could not manage an orderly retreat. In 1981, they
actually raised the price to $34 to conciliate all the members.
They lowered it to $32 in 1983, but were unable even to discuss a
lower price. Nor could they agree on the production cuts needed
to support any given price. But after the price decline turned
31 We note another interpretation: "Sheik Yamani was ... an
advocate of overproduction as a means of keeping world prices
down; but he was sacrificed, the experts say, when the Saudi
Government responded to heavy pressures from other oil producers
by cutting production and letting prices rise--an accommodation
to the demands of Iran, in particular." Tom Wicker, "The Saudi
Link", NYT OpEd 12-21-86. Surely Mr. Wicker did not misquote "the
experts": Saudi Arabia overproduced to keep world prices down,
not to profit themselves. Other producers forced them, against
their will, to join in raising prices. The story is illogical,
unsupported, and believed.
into collapse, they did put the cartel back together, and
regained about one-third of the price ground lost.
OPEC members were the victims of the consensus view [Figures
2,3], often referred to. Since the price was surely going to
rise, one need only hold ranks and tough it out in the meantime.
They waited for something to turn up, specifically the demand for
OPEC crude oil.
With the companies gone, the OPEC governments had to fix
production and set down market shares in black and white. Any
change in planned total output unlocked everyone's demands for a
larger share of the market, and the whole deal had to be re-made.
Market share was always the topic in chief at OPEC meetings in
1975-1977. There was a secret market share agreement in 1978,
aborted by the happy accident of the Iranian Revolution. But
even while still raising prices, at end-1979 they proposed a
"safety net" for members in trouble, and in the summer of 1980,
they had to make a "gentleman's agreement" on output, aborted by
another happy accident: the Iran-Iraq war. In March 1982 they had
made a loose allocation agreement, which was not well observed,
then the firm agreement of March 1983, which was not well
observed either.
Each cartel member wants to shove the burden of curtailment
on to others. Here small is beautiful and weakness is strength.
If a smaller cartel member cheats by producing more and
shading the price, the largest producer cannot retaliate. If he
does, the whole arrangement crumbles. The Saudis' share of OPEC
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exports fell from 47 percent in 1981 to 21 percent in 1985. They
obviously could not tolerate exports around 1 mbd. The others
knew this, but could not achieve an agreement to alleviate the
Saudis' plight.
The only Saudi weapon was to cut prices. But after awhile,
nobody believed their threats, and by mid-1985, their partners
were openly contemptuous. Indeed, even if another member believed
the threat, what was he to do? Unless everybody would cooperate,
it was not worth anybody's while. I would be glad to step through
the door--after you, dear Alphonse.
The Saudis finally put in place a mechanism whereby they
matched product prices, less a differential, everywhere. Thereby
they matched crude prices everywhere. Their offering prices went
automatically as far down as forced to. There was never any Saudi
"price war." They would meet any price, not beat it.
August 1985-December 1986 was a repeat of January-March
1983, when a Saudi threat had brought the rest into line and
produced an agreement in two months. Less than three years
later, it took them 16 months of actual price rivalry and a price
collapse, roughly from September 1985 to December 1986, to work
out a new market-sharing agreement. Nor have they ever been able
(except briefly in wartime) to get much higher.
UNWILLING PRICE STABILITY 1986-1992
A disappointing period Prices were relatively stable in the
next six years, 1987-1992. Omitting four months in late 1990,
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the monthly average Mideast Light f.o.b. spot price (using Dubai
Fateh as the continuation of Arab Light) was $15.97 and the
standard deviation only $2.05. In real terms, of course, this
represented a continuing decline. The complaints of "unstable"
prices after 1986 use "unstable" as a code word for "low." In
other words, the stability was involuntary. It resulted from OPEC
inability to get its members to act together.
These six years were difficult and disappointing. As we just
saw, before 1986, OPEC nations lived from month to month and
season to season, hoping for an upturn in demand, and instead
seeing it fall. But then following 1985, consumption in the world
market economies (ex OPEC) increased strongly, from 42.0 mbd to
49.6 mbd in 1991, an all-time record. (Table I) (The new world
market increased by a further 600 tbd, or 0.91 percent, to 1992.)
There were also helpful changes in supply. Production
declined in the USA. Mexico output was static. It could not
shake off the incubus of its national oil monopoly, and only
slowly repaired the waste it had committed. The North Sea
expanded only slowly. As the Soviet Union shivered apart there
was stagnation then decline. Elsewhere the shock of the oil
price drop chilled investment. Accordingly, aggregate non-OPEC
production barely increased from 1985 to 1992. But its failure
to decline was a great disappointment.
Accordingly, OPEC exports increased from 12.7 mbd to 21.8 in
1992, the highest since 1980. Furthermore, excess capacity in
OPEC gradually dwindled and disappeared. The apparent precision
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of the capacity numbers is deceptive; there is more to say on
them later. But natural decline, low investment; destruction by
war, neglect, undermaintenance, and cannibalizing--all
contributed. Excess capacity had nearly vanished by late 1992,
but perhaps Shakespeare had it right: "A little more than a
little is by much too much."
Stability in 1987 The price held from January through
early November. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq, had all notified
customers they were back on fixed-price contracts. [WSJ 1-11-
87:A2] Moreover, Norway, the Soviet Union, Mexico, and Egypt
announced their cooperation. [WSJ 1-14-87:3] One hears of no
actual steps taken, except that Moscow announced an export
cutback; someone ungraciously commented that they had reduced
exports during the year's first quarter in each of the last three
years, only to increase them later. [NYT 1-23-87:D2]
Early on, OPEC was considered to have succeeded with "the
simple combination of production cuts and fixed price notices."
But the differentials problem was still unsolved. It was not mere
stubbornness that kept them hacking away at it.
"Gaining term commitments from major companies to lift a
significant proportion of crude needs at fixed prices is seen
vital for OPEC success. For the buyer, the biggest stumbling
block in the fixed price approach is a built-in lack of market
responsiveness, but the special OPEC ministerial differentials
committee may help on this score." [PIW 1-5-87:1
There was a catalogue of malpractices "drawn partly from
OPEC documents." [PIW 1-19-87:7] But apparently they were
playing by the rules in early 1987. The price rise was the result
of "an OPEC-wide output cut of 1.5 mbd in the heart of winter."
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But this was in itself a test: as prices improved, the temptation
to sell a little extra could bring spot crude and product prices
down as the increment flowed through the refining system. [PIW 1-
26-87:1]
Term contracts, without fixed prices But the attempt to
rebuild term contracts did not succeed. A deal with the four
Aramco partners sounded like old times: it was "a multiyear
agreement...at the official government prices." [WSJ 2-4-87:4]
Much grateful surprise was expressed. [NYT 2-4-87:Dl] But--there
was no penalty for underlifting. [PIW 2-9-87:1]
Months later, "the most fundamental problem is the seeming
inability of producers to rebuild stable term supply
relationships with primary contract customers." Fixed prices did
not mean much with buyers free to change volumes at short notice.
Even the Aramco partners and the Japanese were reluctant to
commit more than a month at a time. Mobil Oil's former president
continued lyrical over "Mobil's key link to the world's largest
oil reserves beneath the deserts of Saudi Arabia." [WSJ 1-29-
87:A3] But the chairman of Chevron explained the "link": "It is
a long-term relationship, but one that returns nothing to our
bottom line." [PIW 11-16-87:1]
OPEC producers "could restore value to the old fashioned
term contract by keeping production low enough to push spot
prices modestly over official levels...." [PIW 5-4-87:3] A
month later, fixed-price contracts "for specific time periods are
starting to make a comeback", although "arms-length crude sales
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by OPEC members at official prices still are a relatively small
share of their total exports." [PIW 6-15-87:1]
Thus despite higher prices, the first half of 1987 was
uneasy. A hopeful note was the promised cooperation of non-OPEC
producers. The new Labor government of Norway said it would cut
production in support; Japan, Sweden, and the Netherlands were
known to share their fear of another price collapse. [WSJ 4-10-
87:4]
Early on, the Saudis were again taking the brunt of the
cutbacks. [WSJ 2-11-87:3] [PIW 3-16-87:1] In March, they were
down to 2.5 mbd, uncomfortably close to the August 1985 trough.
[WSJ 3-20-87:14] But then exports revived. Saudi Arabia seemed
increasingly committed to a $20 price by year-end, and to 1988
prices up to $22. Other members liked that; Kuwait was opposed.
[PIW 4-27-87:3]
Iraq expands; Saudi Arabia again swing producer "The wild
card, of course is Iraq, which scorned the December agreement and
is running some 430 tbd [or 29 percent] above its deemed
allowable." [PIW 5-25-87:1] Their foreign debt was reported at
$50 billion, half of it to Arab states. "A grim picture..." [WSJ
2-12-87:29]--but more is known today of the useful ways in which
the $50 billion had been spent. 32 By June, Iraq was still
32 In 1986, "Renewed Relations with Iraq Fall Short of U.S.
Expectations," WSJ 3-17-86:24. "'We hope for it. We still hope
for it,' says a State Department official." A year later:
"Proponents [of a Deputy Secretary of State's] trip [to Bagdhad]
say Iraq's support for terrorism is relatively minor, and that
better relations with Washington have moderated Iraq's behavior
considerably." [WSJ 3-31-87:33; emphasis added.]
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exempted from quota limits and planning new pipeline capacity for
shipment through Turkey, and also Saudi Arabia. Their year-end
export capacity was expected to be 2.6 mbd, not their 1.466
"deemed" quota. Saudi Arabia "appears to be trying to restrict
oil exports from Iraq" [NYT 2-8-87:A7] and were in position to do
so because of the shipments through their territory to the Red
Sea. But they did not dare speak roughly to Iraq, which kept
expanding and thumbing its nose.
By mid-May 1987, the mood was upbeat:
"All 13 members of OPEC are impatient to reap the fruits of
a year's discipline that successfully reversed the spectacular
price collapse of 1986. ...[Aside from Iraq] there appears to be
little else to spoil OPEC's largely bright outlook and pride in
having calmed world oil markets. ... In April, the Saudi oil
minister, Hisham Nazer, successfully extracted a promise from the
U.S. to stop its 'OPEC bashing', in the words of a senior U.S.
administration official, a move that constitutes a major , but
quiet reversal in Reagan administration policies." Furthermore,
Mr. Nazer...has persuaded major non-OPEC oil exporters...and a
large segment of the U.S. and international oil industry to join
OPEC's drive for slow, steady price improvement." [WSJ 5-18-87:2]
As usual, nobody stated just what was the "major reversal"
of US policy. In the event, non-OPEC producers did nothing, and
prices did not rise. Abu Dhabi, like Iraq, was producing over
quota, and a "disjointed" differentials structure meant there was
33 "Saudi Arabia has secretly contributed billions of
dollars since the early 1970s to movements and governments in a
dozen countries... particularly in areas where the executive
branch has been unwilling or unable to gain Congressional
support. ... The Saudi ability to finance foreign policy efforts
promoted by Washington has declined recently with the slump in
oil prices, but as the payment to the Nicaraguan contras
demonstrates, Riyadh remains willing to provide cash at key
moments." [NYT 6-21-87:1]
103
constant temptation for many to cheat. Only Saudi Arabia turned
away customers. [PIW 6-8-87:3] Indeed, it "is resigned to acting
as swing producer this year to support the $18 price, so long as
volume cheating stays within narrow bounds."
In the longer run, it was judged that Saudi integration into
refining overseas would save them from the fate of being swing
producer. [PIW 6-29-87:1] There is force in the argument:
downstream integration is permanent built-in netbacking, as their
neighbor had shown: "Kuwait continues to sell its full production
quota regardless of OPEC's gyrations, disagreements and fights
over the official price." [WSJ 6-25-87:1, emphasis added] But
partial downstream integration was only a partial solution for
Saudi Arabia. The closer they came to producing their quota, the
less was left over for others.
The mid-year meeting had to cope with the prospect of "a
delicate market balance on the horizon." [PIW 6-29-87:SS1] The
new production accord, for an ostensible 16.6 mbd in the second
half, "has set the stage for a hike to $20 in 1988--if discipline
is preserved." As usual, the object was to starve the market: the
ceiling "was deliberately pitched at a level below projected
demand" to force up the price. But some in the trade feared just
that: "creating upward price pressures that individual members
will find difficult to resist, with the end result excess
production and lower prices.34 If so, OPEC had to walk a tight
34 Kuwait minister Al Khalifa Al-Sabah showed again why
he was the most unpopular of ministers. He was asked: "Some
members believe this agreement will stabilize the market and make
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rope, and with the same safety net: "Saudi willingness to act as
swing producer would again become crucial." [PIW 7-6-87:1] It
was already crucial; the Saudis continued to refuse customers.
[WSJ 7-17-87:5]
Rosy long term The experts were as reassuring as ever on
the long term. As WSJ summarized them: non-OPEC output "has
finally declined", and would continue to drop as fields dried up.
Thus the world "is becoming ever more dependent on OPEC oil", and
the "trigger point" for a crisis was when production exceeded 80
percent of capacity, a point "approaching rapidly." Hence there
"will be a shift back to the Middle East" which would
increasingly affect "the geopolitics of oil." [WSJ 8-2-87:1] "If
supply and demand are left to the market, it will take only a
decade for the Saudis to become the swing producer, able to
control the world price by regulating the flow from their own
wells. [The price could approach $200 per barrel.]" [NYT Ed 8-13-
87] OPEC could endure their waning influence in the third world,
along with socialism, commodity agreements, and the rest of the
New International Economic Order. [NYT 8-2-87:E2]
Peter Odell thought supplies were ample. "OPEC is an
organization to be protected and cossetted, so in effect, firmly
incorporating into the Western system a group of countries which
have hitherto enjoyed scant respect." [Odell 1987]
the world safe for term contracts of longer than three months. Do
you agree? A. If spot is above official, no country is going to
sell on term contracts. Any country ... is going to increase its
spot volume. We know from experience." [PIW 7-6-87:SS1]
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Prices held: Saudis repudiate swing role As the summer wore
on, Gulf f.o.b. prices were steady around $17-$18. OPEC
overproduction "is casting a shadow over the group's hopes of
raising official prices later this year." Cooperation between
Iran and Saudi Arabia was unaffected by the riot by Iranian
pilgrims in Mecca. "OPEC's two largest oil producers still need
their rapprochement on production curbs to support the $18
benchmark price." [PIW 8-10-87:1] Saudi Arabia lodged a formal
complaint with OPEC's president about substantial overproduction
by other OPEC members, which might be interpreted as a warning.
[NYT 8-4-87:Al]
Yet prices were firm. "Most companies still seem happy to
take more oil than they really need." Partly this was continuing
tension in the Gulf because of the Iran-Iraq war, partly that
"many companies are still betting that OPEC...[will]...raise
official prices in December, and want to build stocks ahead of an
increase." [PIW 8-17-87:1]
Since Saudi Arabia's complaint had not worked, they sounded
a "warning": letting it be known that they were going slightly
over quota. [PIW 8-24-87:1] When the price fell below $17, the
Saudi monarchy denounced "criminal gangs" at the Mecca riots at
"a bitterly anti-Iranian news conference." [NYT 8-27-87:D1] A
very high-ranking Saudi personage said they would "'demolish
[Iran] politically and Islamically.' Western diplomats here are
now exultant as they busily cable their home offices about the
Saudis' 'sea change' and 'new activism'." [NYT 8-29-87:A1] Some
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non-diplomats were unimpressed." Iran made no reply, but in
early September attacked the Saudis for not doing more to hold
down production by Kuwait, the UAE, and Iraq. [NYT 9-11-87:D3]
Minister Nazer ruled out any Saudi swing producer role, and
said his country would allow "field supervision of its
production, providing that all the exporters agree to an on-site
monitoring system." He would not pressure his neighbors directly,
not even Iran. [WSJ 9-14-87:5]
The fears of a price crash died away. By September the
higher prices gave both confidence and disquiet:
"OPEC's successful defense of its $18 reference price so far
this year is giving the group confidence...[and] a consensus is
building ...that the price should move to $20 in 1988...
Higher prices... are seen shattering OPEC's hard-won
cohesion--which is already being stretched to the limit. While
OPEC can probably hang together when there are hopes of volume
gains for everyone, pressures on swing producers are likely to
become intolerable if they must defend higher prices that
continuously erode OPEC's shrinking market share." [PIW 9-7-87:5]
Not only did the higher prices bring problems, attaining
them did too:
"OPEC producers and their customers are trying to preserve
the term supply relationships they revived earlier this year,
despite the price and supply pressures now evident in oil
markets... The common denominator for maintaining OPEC discipline
35 Karen Elliott House of the Wall Street Journal wrote:
"They are busier than ever trying to buy insurance policies from
every peddler. ... The Saudis are putting up a brave front, but
there's little evidence they've stiffened their spines. ... While
talking of standing up to Iran, the Saudis secretly sent the
Algerian foreign minister to plead for their safety in Tehran.
... While American newspapers describe Saudi largesse on behalf
of William Casey's covert operations in the Middle East, that,
too, is only part of a larger Saudi strategy of making payoffs to
every piper in the region...There's probably little America can
do that would give the Saudis the courage to stand up for their
own self-interests." [WSJ 10-8-87]
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is still likely adherence to official prices, since it lets
market forces determine who gets cut back." [PIW 9-21-87:1,
emphasis added]
There was the rub. If each seller held to official prices,
output allocation was left to the chances of the market. Random,
seasonal, and longer-run changes, made winners and losers. Some
losers would not endure it, but would cheat.
Hence a September oil ministers' meeting was gloomy. Iraq
still rejected any quota less than Iran's; they must have enjoyed
stating their desire for money as sovereign hauteur. And they
were working to equal or even exceed 1979 export capacity of 3.3
mbd. But they were at least open about it.
More widespread and frustrating was the lack of
accountability. In August, the Saudis had "strongly criticized
the effectiveness of OPEC's efforts to track members' output and
sales." [PIW 8-10-87:1] Now a special meeting of five ministers
refused to single out any given country for blame, "and they
admitted they don't really know how much more oil is being
produced than called for." [WSJ 9-11-87:2] Moreover:
"Proposals to set up permanent on-site production and export
monitoring in all OPEC countries are seen by some ministers and
officials as futile ... A previous $3-million exercise by Dutch
auditors was thwarted by individual members' lack of cooperation,
not by the auditors' lack of oil expertise." [PIW 9-21-87:5]
Saudi Arabia's downstream investment "is increasingly seen
as the only way for [it] to jettison its unwelcome role as the
world's main swing producer", as Kuwait had already done. [PIW 9-
28-87:3]
By late September, production was falling, but not in
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response to any plan. With over-full inventories and lower
demand, the Gulf producers, especially Saudi Arabia, held price
and lost market share. [WSJ 9-28-87:4] When Exxon indicated its
preference for "flexibly-priced Iraqi crude", Saudi Arabia,
"OPEC's ever more reluctant linchpin", might be forced to go 10
percent below its 4.35 mbd quota. [PIW 10-5-87:1] But the Saudis,
to underline their refusal to act as swing producer, let it be
known that they had been at least discussing more discounts, in
return for more volume from the Aramco companies (Exxon, Mobil,
Texaco, Chevron). "The mere possibility ...sent shockwaves
through OPEC and across the oil markets last week." [PIW 10-12-
87:1] The report of an actual deal restoring netbacking [PIW 10-
19-87:1] was later denied. [PIW 11-23-87:1]
Then a string of misperceptions: concern about
overproduction was "fading fast" and companies were building not
depleting stocks. [PIW 10-26-87:1] There was even "a drift in
OPEC toward a $1 to $2 increase", since world oil markets had no
difficulty in soaking up higher volumes [PIW 11-2-87:1, 2]. "The
oil markets are looking healthier." [PMI 11-4-87:1]
Within a few days, spot prices were down sharply, markets
were "unraveling", and "the central question is how vigorously
Saudi Arabia will defend its 4.35 mbd output quota." [PIW 11-9-
87:1] They "continue[d] to renounce the swing producer role." The
Gulf producers were all discounting. [PIW 11-16-87:1] Yet Saudi
Arabia did try to hang on to official prices, and there were no
netback deals. [PIW 11-23-87:1] But the data gap grew worse.
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During the third quarter, the official ceiling was 16.6 mbd, the
OPEC President estimated 17.8 production, IEA made it a round
19.0, and one consulting firm said 19.2. Atop the usual
statisticians' delights of definition and location were various
shifts and excuses, each country firmly convinced that it
deserved a higher quota. [WSJ 11-24-87:1]
By end-November 1987:
"Several oilmen who were in senior positions then are
becoming increasingly alarmed at the uncanny parallels between
events today and those of two years ago. [OPEC production is] far
above official quotas...and price discounting has become more
widespread. Those were exactly the factors that both markets and
OPEC producers resolutely ignored in 1985....Saudi Arabia also
knows that its readiness to bear the brunt of OPEC's volume
earlier this year is at odds with public renunciation of any
swing role." [PIW 11-30-87:3]
As in early 1985, when the Saudis talked tough and acted
soft, they got no respect. Doubtless hoping he would be believed
this time, Minister Nazer, Yamani's successor, repeated that "we
would never be the swing producer, neither now or any other
time." [PIW 12-21-87:SS3]
OPEC producer statements were free of panic, but "the
previous apparent consensus for a $2 a barrel price hike has
evaporated, with only Iran now pushing for a $20 benchmark
price." [PIW 12-7-87:1] Iran demanded a $2 increase, and
"accused the Arab members of OPEC ... of trying to keep down the
price of oil to hurt Iran. ... The Gulf producers had
deliberately glutted world oil markets to pressure Iran's
economy." [WSJ 12-2-87:2] This was far fetched, for the penalty
to the Gulf producers would have been many times the damage to
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Iran. They could have achieved the same result, much more
cheaply, by stepping up their payments to Iraq.
At the December meeting, Iran threatened to double its
production if its demand for a higher price was not met. This
threat was so empty, it upset nobody. [NYT 12-10-87:D1] [WSJ 12-
10-87:2] More bothersome was the persisting lack of basic
information. "National political positions ... fill the vacuum
created by the lack of hard data." Inventories were believed
higher than a year ago by some, lower by others, unchanged by
still others. Moreover, the "amount of oil at sea and where it is
headed are issues of increasing interest", but no knowledge. [PIW
12-14-87:1] Minister Al Khalifa Al-Sabah of Kuwait said "the
auditors--to put it mildly--got the runaround from various
countries." [PIW 12-21-87:SS3]
The ministers "acknowledged that if they could not reach a
credible agreement to limit output, world prices would crumble."
[NYT 12-10-87:D1] They expected to do it in two days. [WSJ 12-10-
87:2] In four days, they had agreed only to rebuff Iran, despised
for its hypocrisy in discounting while calling for higher prices.
Saudi Arabia again rejected a swing role. [NYT 12-13-87:1] The
Iranian minister returned to Tehran rather than accept what was
offered. [NYT 12-14-87:D1] The meeting then reached what was
called a "flimsy" agreement: keep the nominal $18 basket price
and the 16.6 mbd limit--except that there was no limit on Iraq,
whose minister "pledged to produce all the oil it can." [WSJ 12-
15-87:3] No action was taken on quota monitoring. [NYT 12-15-
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87:D1] Prices were expected to drop, and they did, even as
"ministers...headed home vowing to cheat no more." [WSJ 12-16-
87:16] Arab-Iranian enmity was blamed, but cannot have been
important, because Iranian price discounts would have been a
minor irritation if the others had not matched them. An output
cut would have raised or at least maintained prices. OPEC could
not do it. It was significant that the Saudis had to keep
repeating "emphatically ...their resolve 'never again' to reduce
their market share to save oil prices. ... 'The ball is
everyone's court, not just ours.' " They had stayed inside quota,
while Kuwait, the UAE, and Iraq had "exceeded their quotas by
absurdly large amounts." [NYT 12-17-87:D1] The Saudis, now as
earlier (and later) had to keep repeating their refusal to cut
back because the others could suggest nothing else.
Spot and futures prices fell by several dollars, but the
gloom continued to be confined to the short term. Lower prices
would mean fewer discoveries and more consumption. "Eventually,
and certainly by the mid-1990s, OPEC's excess capacity will have
drained, oil analysts generally agree. That means that with only
slight adjustments in its production levels, OPEC will be able to
manipulate world oil markets at will." [WSJ 12-21-87:6, emphasis
added]
1988: Prices decline again; supply grows The price dropped
in December 1987 and January 1988 to the lowest point since
October 1986. There was no panic, and there had been some re-
thinking. At end-January, there was said to be "a new OPEC
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strategy...a subtle but important shift in favor of volume
restraint coupled with a more permissive attitude toward flexible
pricing." [PIW 1-25-88:1]
This was not new at all, but the emphasis was important.
Perhaps we might paraphrase it: forget the differentials, which
cannot be controlled. Obey the volume limitation. Sell no more
than your quota, any way you can. That way, prices may
fluctuate, but the average market level will not change much.
Supply conditions and capacity expansion There was some
acknowledgment of supply conditions. A Mobil executive said
companies could live with a $15 price "for years to come." [PIW
2-1-88:5] Shell's worldwide coordinator for exploration-
production said "oil companies are accepting that they can't
count on higher prices to stimulate the currently low global
drilling pace.." [PIW 4-18-88:3]
Two advances in technology were now being widely discussed.
One was "3D"--three-dimensional computer models of oil field
structures, once limited chiefly to large offshore fields, but
now available for even small fields onshore or offshore. The
other was horizontal drilling, which was also the perfection of a
technique --"deviated drilling"-- first practiced offshore.
[Lohrenz 1991] And the International Energy Agency began to
change its supply estimates, which "may go a long way toward
reducing criticism within the industry that the IEA has been
consistently understating the amount of oil actually available,
particularly missing large volumes of world supply from non-OPEC
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sources." [PIW 2-15-88:3]
The big OPEC producers made a real effort, and mostly
succeeded, in staying within quota, and were helped by increased
demand. The Saudis had made their point: "the unwillingness of
any member or group of members to act as a swing supplier is
giving rise to a search for alternative mechanisms for correcting
sharp price movements." [PIW 3-7-88:3] The price increased from
the January 1988 low and held stable through the first half.
There was a new effort to bring in non-OPEC producers, and
much publicity surrounding a meeting in May 1988. But it came to
nothing. The non-OPEC countries were unfavorably impressed by
OPEC's inability to control Iraq. The output reductions they
offered, totalling 183 tbd, only one percent of OPEC output, were
too small even to acknowledge. The non-OPEC producers felt
aggrieved by the ungracious manner in which their proposed
contribution was decried." [PIW 5-9-88:3] Months later, the
brushoff still rankled.[PIW 10-17-88:2]
Quota impasse, and sagging prices Rising Iraq production
was an increasing threat, because of "a spot-linked pricing
system that is geared to specific markets and quite flexible."
It freed Iraq production from OPEC constraints, and output [is]
near physical limits." [PIW 5-30-88:3, 18]
The June 1988 meeting faced the "basic disagreement over a
credible and equitable production sharing system [which] is at
the heart of the current OPEC impasse." But the immediate
question was what to do about production quotas for the second
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half of 1988. [PIW 6-6-88:1] They could do nothing, and waited
for something to turn up. And consumption did turn up. [PIW 6-
13-88:1] The June meeting simply extended the quotas. [PIW 6-20-
88:1] But prices began to sag, not helped by Abu Dhabi "no
longer making any pretense of abiding by its quota", and Kuwait
also increasing. [PIW 7-4-88:3] So did Saudi Arabia. [PIW 7-18-
88:1]
Iran-Iraq war ends: expansion plans At the end of July
1988, the eight-year Iran-Iraq war finally ended. Prices
actually revived on word of peace. [PIW 8-1-88:3] Both countries
were expected to try to increase production rapidly. But there
was a spreading realization of how badly the Iranian oil
production facilities had deteriorated. [PIW 8-8-88:1] Iraq had
hired French and Italian firms to develop new fields; they would
be paid in oil. Producing capacity was slated to rise to 4.5 mbd
"over the next few years." "Sixteen years after oil
nationalization, Baghdad is actively seeking participation of US
firms in oil exploration and development." They would not offer
equity terms. But one way or another they would triple the
number of operating rigs, from the current 25-30 to 90 by 1991."
[PIW 5-30-88:3, 18] The oil minister who released this news
visited the United States shortly thereafter [PIW 6-6-88:1], but
without known results. He also indicated that Iraq had 4 mbd
producing capacity, but would only have 3.35 export capacity by
the end of 1989.
Precise numbers mislead, but Iraq producing capacity was set
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for a strong increase. In 1980, they had drilled 40 oil wells,
and 67 wells of all types. Numbers for the next seven years were
suppressed, and probably near zero, but in 1988 they were 88 and
102, and in 1989 137 and 178. Since there were only 378 operating
wells at the end of 1988, it is clear that a very large addition
to capacity was underway. But Iraq was still in financial
straits; this expansion would obviously take more effort. [PIW 8-
22-88:7]
Jennings and Ali Jaidah sum up J.S. Jennings of Shell,
forecast that demand would grow more slowly than expected, that
non-OPEC output would maintain itself, hence the rise in OPEC
exports would be modest.
"In such a world, OPEC, in order to defend an $18 price,
would have to continue to live with a quota system for much
longer than many of its members expected, and, with the passage
of time, internal stresses within the organization could well
intensify." [PIW 8-29-88:2]
Mr. Jennings accepted the industry assumption and hope:
rising demand would lift all the boats, and make unnecessary the
constant dangerous exercise of price fixing and production fixing
and allocation. But even when the supply of OPEC oil dropped
rapidly, they could not evade the need for constant collusion.
An important statement was made shortly thereafter by Ali M.
Jaidah, former OPEC secretary-general. (Annual Oxford Energy
Seminar, reprinted in [PIW 9-12-88:SS]. He repeated the usual
error that "because of the large discrepancy between investment
costs and extraction costs in oil upstream and the very long time
lags in energy investment, some sort of price regulation is
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required."36  "The ever-powerful oil companies" had regulated for
a time, but then became "greedy and improvident. They could not
resist the temptation to sell oil to newcomers outside the cartel
for the sake of the odd buck." Hence OPEC had to replace them as
price controller. But OPEC too became "greedy and improvident" in
1979-1980, and insisted on keeping prices at 1981 levels. For the
present:
"We hear senior managers of oil companies haranguing OPEC,
preaching to the organization that the state of the oil world,
however depressed, will undoubtedly improve in a few years. They
seem to say: Please remain strong and confident, we are going
through a difficult period just now, but the wheels of fortune
are bound to turn in your favor soon. Please hold tight until
then and you will be in control once again. ...
I just cannot understand how this low price can sustain
investment in high-cost oil areas.... Somebody, somewhere, must be
losing his shirt.
Price decline at end-1988 At any rate, prices slid from
June through September, Saudi Arabia as usual being slow to match
price cuts but ready to move in time to defend its market share.
"The policy that it won't be swing producer has almost approached
religion." [PIW 9-12-88:1] As they had done the previous year,
they formally told the OPEC price committee that they were
deliberately exceeding their 4.35 mbd quota as a warning to
violators.. [PIW 9-19-88:1] At this time, BP managing director
Robert Horton made a plea for OPEC production discipline and an
$18 price. [Id.] Venezuela, long a pillar of OPEC, let it be
36 Less pardonable (because easily checked) were two false
statements: that "Professor Adelman wanted to see ... 10c a
barrel of oil", and that a UN report on the price of oil "never
saw the light of day because the ever-powerful oil companies
succeeded in suppressing it." In fact, it had been published: [UN
1955].
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known that they were trying to obtain "special status in the US."
[PIW 9-26-88:1] It was not clear what they meant by this, but it
was known that within PDVSA some were in favor of having an exit
route ready in case OPEC rapidly crashed.
Observers noted a now familiar paradox: the members could
not agree to do what was feasible and profitable:
"While OPEC as a group clearly could boost oil prices and
increase short-term revenue by cutting output, the current
standoff among members is almost a case of who will blink first.
... Ironically, if market anticipation of...a compromise arrests
or reverses the price decline over the next few weeks, such a
rebound may actually lessen the odds and the urgency of concrete
action." [PIW 10-10-88:4]
But the urgency was manifest in a special meeting in late
October, which prepared the agenda and probably the tentative
agreement for a full meeting for November 21. Iran seemed ready
to concede parity to Iraq, since its refusal simply let Iraq
produce at will; and Abu Dhabi (UAE) seemed ready to cut back
also. [PIW 10-31-88:1] Iran planned to expand capacity to 3.1 mbd
in 1989 and to 3.6 in 1993, mainly through the long-delayed gas
injection projects. [PIW 11-14-88:1] Iraq aimed to raise export
loading capacity to 6 mbd by end-1989; current production
capacity was 4 mbd, and they were aiming at 5 to 6 million in the
1990s. [PIW 11-21-88:1]
In the meantime, output surged, with fourth-quarter OPEC
output looking to be around 21 mbd, "about 2 mbd more than
forecasters were expecting just a couple of months ago." [PIW 11-
7-88:1] Much of the increase was from Saudi Arabia, producing 6
mbd, the highest in years, and said to be only 0.5 mbd short of
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its actual capacity, far down from the 10 mbd of years ago. [PIW
11-14-88:1] Yet prices had revived; inventory changes somehow
were not showing.
The November 1988 meeting was difficult. "The big underlying
worry...was the threat of soaring production from Iraq by late
next year." [PIW 11-28-88:1] Yet the meeting was a success. A
new ceiling was set at 18.5 mbd, which with expected leakage
would equal 19.0. This was 2.4 mbd over the last program, and
allowed everyone to get more than previously. Iran gained more
than most, as compensation for giving equality to Iraq, whose new
quota of 2.64 mbd was far above their old quota, but hardly more
than the 2.60 they actually produced in 1988. [PIW 12-5-88:1]
Nothing was said about the price; Saudi Arabia shocked all
present by suggesting a $15 floor, but this was quickly
withdrawn. The real lesson was that a formal price did not matter
all that much. Spot and spot-linked prices (i.e., practically all
prices) promptly rose.
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EXPANSION BRINGS CONFLICT IN 1989-199039
OPEC output kept increasing, but there was no easing of
tension among members over market share. In fact, it led to war
in August 1990. Cartels find it hard to cope with change, even
favorable change, because division of revenues is a zero sum
game. Higher revenues mean a fresh contention over sharing out
the gain. The greater the stakes, the greater the zeal to
increase one's share.
[TABLE VIII - OPEC CAPACITY 1979-1992]
Capacity expansion and its obstacles The output expansion
brought investment to the fore. There had been a great decline in
measured OPEC capacity, from 39.2 mbd (crude oil only) in 1979 to
about 27.4 at end-1989. [PIW 3-12-90:6] These capacity numbers
are very imprecise, but the calculation in Table IX are confined
to an orderly period of almost constant growth, 1955-1980.
The decline rate, four Gulf producers A reservoir or set of
reservoirs is always subject to two opposing forces: additions
through drilling and connecting new oil wells, and enhanced
recovery facilities, versus the natural decline for any output
rate. The decline rate is a very important variable, difficult
to calculate. Table IX approximates it for four large Persian
Gulf producers.
39 There have been many econometric studies of OPEC
behavior. I found most useful [Griffin 1985] and [Dahl and Yucel
1991].
TABE VIl. OPEC CAPACITY, SELEC~D YEARS 1979-1992(crude oil millions )
end end pro Actualend1992 June
1979 1983 1989 1990 1992 PIW CGES 1993
1084 1130 7.75 8.50 9.00 8.70 9.00 9.00
6.99 3.00 3.10 3.25 350 3.60 3.70 3.90
4.00 1.50 3.10 0.50 350 0.40 -- 050
334 280 240 0.10 2.70 1.35 130 220
2.50 289 2.20 240 250 240 250 2.40
0.65 0.65 0.40 0.40 0.45 0.60 0.40 0.45
2832 22.14 18.95 15.15 21.65 17.05 17.10 18.45
2.40 250 260 2150 320 20 250 250
250 240 1.80 1.90 220 1.95 200 2.00
1.80 1.60 1.25 1.50 1.40 1.45 1.50 1.45
230 200 1.50 1.50 150 1.50 1.70 150
1.23 1.10 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.80 0.80 0380
023 0.25 0.31 0.30 037 0.33 0.40
025 0.2 0.27 0.30 030 0.33 0.30 033
10.91 10.05 8.48 8.80 9.82 8.85 9.20 838
TOT OPEC 39.23 32.19 27.43 23.95 31.47 25.90 26.30 27.03
79 55 82 98 na 97 97
na na 1.98 na 216 na a
CHANGE CGES PIW CHANGE
1989- 1992 1992 1990 1989to
1993 poj proj poj 1995(exra) 1993 midl993 1995 (proj)
115 93 9.0 10.00 225
0.8 4.5 3.75 3.75 0.65
0.4 4.00 0.90
-02 2 2.25 3.2 0.80
01 2.6 2.4 2.70 030
0.05 05 0.45 055 0.15
-05 18.90 1830 24.20 5125
COUNTRY
S. Araia
Iran
Iraq
Kuwait
UAEQatr
Tot Gulf
Venezuela
Nigeria
Indonesia
Uibya
Algeria
Gabon
Tot non-Gulf
-0.4 28.60 2735 34.7 7.34
oa na na na na
na 2.45 na na na
* Neutral Zone capacity is equally divided between Saudi & Kuwait
Source: Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 3-12-90:6,7; 1-7-91:7; 11-2-92:9; 2-22-9392:9; 2-22-93:10
Estimates for Iran, aq, and libya in 1995 are nid-pcints of ranges.
Altemative estimates for 1992, and one estmate for 1993, are from
Centre for Global Energy Studies, Global Oil Repor vol. 3,
no. 5 (Sept&-Oct 1992), p. 45. Second estimae for mid-1993 from
PIW 2-1-93:7
* Feb 1993 Ecuador no longer a member of OPEC
2.7 23 350 0.90
21 2.1 250 0.70
1.4 15 130 0.05
1.9 15 1.75 015
0S 0.8 0.85 0.10
0.4 035 037 0.06
03 03 030 0.03
9.70 9.05 1057 2.09
Pcttilized
Natural gas
liquids, conm
densae
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[TABLE IX - DECLINE RATES]
Line 1 shows 1955 output. Since there was then no
restriction on output, this approximates capacity. Over the next
25 years, to end-1980, we follow the same procedure as in Table
IV: credit each newly completed well with the average output per
well during the year of its completion, which aggregates to the
total gross additions to capacity over 25 years (line 2). With
no decline, capacity would have been as shown in line 3. But
capacity was estimated by PIW at a lower number (line 4). The
loss is shown in line 5. Its percent of the aggregate output is
our best estimate of the average decline rate.
In theory, the decline rate approaches the ratio of output
to reserves. That is, reserves are defined as cumulative output
starting with current output. In infinite time;
R = T Q e - dt= Q/a, and a = Q/R.
This ratio is shown in line 7, and is consistently lower
than the estimated decline rate in line 6. This is evidence that
the published reserves of these countries, and indeed of nearly
all countries outside North America and the North Sea, include
reservoirs or strata which are not actually being depleted. The
bottom line indicates the possible overstatement of reserves past
the strict standard we use; it ranges from 15 percent to 102
percent.
TABLE IX. ESTIMATED DECLINE RATES FOR PERSIAN GULF PRODUCERS, 1955-1980
(Output and capacity in TBD)
OUTPUT IN 1955
CAPACITY ADDITIONS
1956-1980
TOTAL END 1980
ACTUAL END 1980
LOSS 1956-1980
PERCENT OF AGGREGATE
OUTPUT LOSS
AVERAGE PRODUCTION/RESERVE %
POSSIBLE RESERVE
OVERSTATEMENT
KUWAIT
1092
2525
3617
2800
817
1.58
1.20
1.31
SAUDI
ARABIA
965
13379
14344
11300
3044
2.89
1.65
1.75
IRAQ
675
5064
5739
4000
1739
4.41
2.18
2.02
ABU DHABI
(1962-1980)
16
2474
2490
2100
390
2.34
2.04
1.15
Method: Line 3 = line 1 + line 2
Line 5 = line 3 - line 4
line 8 = line 6 / line 7
Sources: lines 1, 2, 6, 7, from Adelman & Shahi,
Working Paper MIT-EL 88-008WP (May 1988), Appendix A
Line 4, PIW 2-23-81:9
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Moreover, if our earlier suggestion was correct, that newly
drilled wells tend to be bigger producers than average old wells,
the true decline rate is higher than as estimated in Table IX.
For the same reason, capacity is really cheaper to install than
we have calculated, e.g., in Table IV. This must be left for
later research.
After 1980, output was severely restricted, lessening
pressure on the reservoirs. Production per well might be reduced
in fact or only in appearance, counting wells shut in all or most
of the year. There is no good reason why the average production
per newly drill Saudi well fell from 14,000 in 1980-81 to 5800 in
1991.
How much to blame on less productive investment, how much on
neglect and undermaintenance will probably never be known; the
days of open discussion (operation by multinational oil
companies) are long gone. But of course equipment rusts and
breaks. Wells need downhole cleaning by acidizing, fracturing,
and workovers (partial redrilling). Hence maintenance and
workovers are classified as direct operating expenditures not
capital expenditures. [API:SOGE: "Notes and Instructions"]. We
may understand more as new capacity is put in place in 1993 and
later years.
[TABLE X - OPEC OIL WELLS DRILLED]
Collapse and revival of OPEC drilling In Venezuela,
drilling had dropped very far by 1976 because of impending
TABI. X OIL WELLS DRILlED BY OPEC MAIN PRODUCERS
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
362 366 246 202 334
55 46 65 112 111
47 44 33 27 98
183 167 57 147 49
74 37 31 37 39
51 61 95 98 120
24 34 36 37 35
0 I 0 5 0
177 150 101 79 117
355 350 410 360 340
132 1259 1074 1104 1243
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
796 565 382 184 134
NA NA 7 14 14
NA NA 18 21 14
70 39 31 34 35
91 116 133 93 60
NA NA NA NA 12
NA NA NA NA NA
18 6 10 54 19
114 62 82 17 9
454 459 413 350 373
1543 1247 1076 767 670
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
598 720 724 814 1074
105 81 76 94 70
134 138 149 119 74
33 49 34 144 49
24 34 49 75 79
49 NA NA NA NA
36 46 40 NA NA
0 0 30 3 5
46 55 119 88 70
334 276 354 397 361
1359 1399 1575 1734 1782
1988 1989 1990 1991
217 238 313 679
18 16 32 27
NA NA NA 59
NA NA 53 107
52 52 63 78
12 12 12 40
88 137 NA NA
13 10 7 20
7 20 71 124
305 408 442 512
712 893 993 1646
SoIutc World (hl, Inernational Outlook' annual issue.
NA' for Iran 1979-1986and Algeria 1983-1984
tans nWadcv cro, Iraq fell by about half.
VENE111, A
AI(;IRIA
LIBYA
NK(;FRIA
UAE
WAN
IRAQ
KUWAITi
SAUDI ARABIA
INDONESIA
VENF1,7I1LA
AIl(;ERIA
LIBYA
NIGEIRIA
CAE
IRAN
IRAQ
KUWAIT
SAUII)I ARABIA
INIIY)NISIA
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nationalization. With no inducement to add to inventory,
continuing production drained reserves. Yet the conventional
wisdom was that Venezuela was an old played-out province. In the
first years after nationalization, PDVSA (Petroleos de Venezuela
Societa Anonima) spent heavily and turned the reserve picture
completely around. There were few major discoveries until late in
the decade, but a great expansion of old fields, just as had
happened earlier in the United States.
The unusually high decline rate in Venezuela, about 22
percent per year, of course slowed down the net capacity growth,
which was nevertheless substantial. But after 1982, years before
the 1986 price crash, there was a drilling collapse for lack of
money. Drilling nearly ceased in 1986-1987: for the six years
1985-1990 inclusive, completions were back to abysmal pre-1977
levels. There was much talk of expansion; it was a real
achievement for PDVSA even to have maintained capacity. In part,
this was PDVSA success in finding new high-quality fields, which
were most worth developing, and for which they needed infusions
of capital and expertise which they lacked.
In Africa, drilling declined through the 1970s, then
severely after 1981. Algeria was particularly hard hit, probably
because it had no private oil production, which helped in Libya
and more in Nigeria. (Usually the NA entries mean zero or near-
zero.)
The Persian Gulf shows the most diversity. In Kuwait,
because of small numbers, annual figures do not mean much; the
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occasional blip indicates completion of wells partially drilled
in earlier years. In 1973-1980, there were 4.5 completions per
year; in 1981-83, 8.7 per year; in 1984-86, 23.3 per year; in
1987-89, 14 per year. Occupation and war stopped drilling from
August 1990 through late 1991, which makes the annual total the
more impressive.
Iranian drilling grew swiftly in the mid-1970s, then went to
near-zero after the Revolution. Iraq slowly increased to the eve
of war with Iran in September 1980. For the next eight years, in
both belligerents, there were some years with no data on wells,
and probably completions were very few, in some years none.
After the war, it took three years before Iran staged a
strong revival in 1991. But Iraq forged ahead swiftly, with 130
oil wells in 1989, and perhaps a million bd capacity added by the
eve of the occupation of Kuwait.
Drilling in the UAE40 climbed impressively as Iran and Iraq
dwindled during their war, declined somewhat, then increased
again as Iraq and Kuwait were removed. Alone in OPEC, their 1989
production exceeded 1979, and they kept expanding.
Saudi Arabian oil completions fell from 177 in 1973 to 79 in
1976, and stayed very low through 1985, with temporary peaks at
three-year intervals. Then came near-collapse: in the four years
1986-1989 there were only 13 oil wells per year, and not until
40 The United Arab Emirates is composed of Abu Dhabi (1.1
mbd in 1988), Dubai (0.4), and Sharjah (0.04). References are not
always clear, but since Dubai and Sharjah grew only slowly,
changes in UAE production and capacity are nearly always due to
changes in Abu Dhabi.
124
1991 did they reach 124.
These are the publicly available data. Their instability
gives us a bare hint of what we do not know about under-
maintenance, neglect, cannibalizing, and war damage.
Barriers to capacity expansion By 1987, one sees occasional
references to restoring OPEC capacity. In 1987, I expressed
confidence that OPEC members would always provide an excess.
[Adelman 1987] Beginning in 1989, members' announcements of
programs become too numerous to mention. But it soon became
apparent that the programs were going slowly, or were reduced or
postponed, etc.
Insufficient funds? There have been many complaints of
insufficient funds. This is odd. The frequently-mentioned $60
billion needed over 5 years to provide an additional 5 mbd, i.e.,
an OPEC average of $12,000 per daily barrel of new capacity
deserves only to be laughed out of court.41 It is not much below
the USA or North Sea requirements. But $12 billion a year was
only nine percent of 1992 OPEC revenues. [PIW 1-11-93:3] During
1976-1987, OPEC Middle East-Africa capital spending on oil and
gas production was an average 1.7 percent of oil revenues, and in
41 One gropes for some way to reconcile this fable to the
real world, like using archeology on Homer's Iliad. Was the
"average" weighted or unweighted? A net rather a gross capacity
increase? The significant thing is that those putting forth the
numbers did not think it necessary even to suggest such problems,
let alone work them out. The only oilman who publicly endorsed or
repeated the fable was Robert Horton, chairman of BP. He was
later forced out by the non-executive directors, who felt "that
he had lost credibility with analysts and investors." [PIW 6-29-
92:7]
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only three years did it exceed 2 percent of revenues. Yet
production alone makes those revenues possible.
[TABLE XI: OPEC O&NG CAPEX/OIL REVENUES]
In my opinion, the complaint about money is a valuable clue
to the real problem: the weakness of state-owned industries.
Even after the collapse of Socialism, most of the world's oil
continues to be produced by socialized enterprise.
The Flabby National Dinosaurs The state petroleum
companies, OPEC and non-OPEC, are of course a varied lot, most
but not all sloppy and corrupt. But what they all have in common
is a weakness in financing investment. It is hard to find a
national company which has not been strapped for investment
funds.
Private investment is created and limited by expected
profit. If there is money to be made, money will be found, if
not by one company then by another., and by one means or another
- some form of equity or debt. Expenditures will be limited to
those projects which earn an acceptable rate, since there is an
opportunity cost--what the funds would earn elsewhere. If an
activity loses money, its life expectancy is poor.
But a national company does not have its own assets subject
to its own control. It cannot draw up a rational investment plan
to maximize asset value. Development funds go to create jobs,
contracts, and payoffs, not for maximum return. But there is an
even closer constraint. In a government, one must build a
4 4
TABLE XI OPEC OIL PRODUCTION AND CAPITAL EXPENDITURES
MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA, 1976-1987
YEAR 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 19817 TOTALS
MIDDLE EAST
TOTALRIGS 190 192 189 143 175 170 200 206 191 201 178 139 2180
OPEC RIGS 125 132 131 89 102 91 114 112 98 94 70 51 1209
PERCENT 66 69 69 62 58 54 57 54 50 47 39 37 55
AFRICA
TOTALRIGS 138 173 175 200 219 212 209 150 105 118 97 90 1886
OPECRIGS 122 153 149 166 180 160 151 102 70 82 74 66 1475
PERCENT 88 88 85 83 82 75 72 68 67 69 76 73 78
ME+AFR CAPEX ($M) 2375 2290 2250 3120 4100 4820 6130 5970 4530 4010 3160 2770 46125
OPEC RIG PERCENT 75 78 71 74 72 66 65 60 56 55 52 51 65
OPEC ME+AFR CAPEX ($M) 1788 1788 1731 2320 2935 3161 4361 3589 2520 2212 1655 1415 29480
OPEC ME+AFR REVENUES 118565 129627 123916 187193 254952 234952 182784 140668 1291 9 117019 74882 92138 17817514
CAPEXRESPCT 1.51 1.38 1.40 1.24 1.15 1.34 239 255 1.95 1.89 2.21 1.54 1.65
SOURC(ES: Rip operating, Inemational Petrdeum Encyclpedia
(original source, BaI Huges Cop.). Reveoues, fromOPEC
Annual Satisical Bullein. Calial Ependites, from OCase
Manhatlan Bank, Capital Expendles of dhe World Petroleum Indusury
(no finer br~akdown available, publication ceases after 1987)
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political coalition to get a share of expenditures. In an OPEC
country, oil revenues are a cash stream, into which all groups
try to dip. Oil investment must get in line along with all other
claimants. Each claimant tries to be a free rider, getting the
benefit of oil investment while others cut back their demands.
Oil earnings are needed for consumption, subsidies and armaments,
which tend to expand without limit.
Between 1974 and 1982 Arab oil producers spent 35 percent of
their oil revenues on their militaries, many times what they
invested in oil production. During the next eight years the
proportion increased. [Sadowski 1992, p. 8] (See also the
comprehensive study of Saudi Arabia by [Askari 1990].) Much OPEC
history is summed up:
"Algeria's revenue was used to keep the new privileged class
comfortable. Investments in schools, housing, medical care,
agriculture, and even the vital oil industry have stopped."
[Yussuf Ibrahim, in NYT 1-19-92:E3]
Some kinds of over-investment cannot be blamed on
nationalization. Fixing domestic product prices artificially low
stimulates demand and "requires" refining-marketing investment.
Petrochemical investment feeds the national ego and drains the
economy. This leaves even less money for production.
Finally, the lack of engineering/management expertise
aggravates the lack of money. True, during the international
companies' tenure, host-country nationals had for years filled
the lower ranks, and also had many higher-ranking jobs. But
working teams, and what the military calls doctrine, were harder
to create. Much of the basic thinking in exploration,
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development, and reservoir management had been done, and the data
stored, in far-away central corporate offices. Replacing them
was bound to be slow.
The nationalizing governments would not or could not take
the time. Foreign individuals and corporations were expelled
from Iran and Iraq, and native-born technicians might fare worse.
In Kuwait, advanced know-how seemed superfluous, with vast low-
cost oil fields in steady operation. Saudi Arabia was unique in
keeping Aramco as a hired management team, and only slowly easing
out the expatriates. Its good sense has paid off. In Venezuela,
there was constant tension between the PDVSA management,
respected for its competence and honesty, and government plans
and expenditures.
Bring the foreigners back? The problems of both money and
expertise could be solved by bringing in foreign companies. In
addition to the old multinational majors, there are many
newcomers. Entry into world oil has become far easier because
markets are much wider and non-integrated. Any group capable of
exploration-development would do. They would no longer worry
about "finding a home for the oil."
In 1986, Algeria was first in OPEC to change its legal code
to permit foreign participation, and it later improved the law.
But as the drilling record makes clear, little was accomplished.
In late 1989, Algeria reported that it could raise crude oil
capacity, but had no money. Since the limited re-opening in 1986,
it had signed five contracts, but the results were not given.
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[PIW 10-23-89:7] There are more recent reports of discoveries,
but not development. Through 1992, neither drilling nor output
increased.
By 1989, most OPEC countries were openly trying to get
foreign oil companies back, particularly to renew and expand old
oil fields. "Stretch" was the great achievement of American
oilmen after 1930 [Adelman et al 1983, chs. 4, 6, 7], and in a
larger area it promised even more. But the effort was grudging
when it needed to be strenuous.
By the end of 1992, new foreign investment in the OPEC
countries was small to negligible. We will look at the
indicators below, as part of the narrative, since capacity
expansion became a high card in the struggle over production
quotas.
The OPEC governments could not bring themselves to call back
the foreigner on terms he would accept. Companies wanted to
invest for the chance of an adequate return. They did not need to
own the reserves. In fact, they had not really owned them even
before 1970. But letting them back to invest to produce oil,
giving them title to the oil even at the wellhead, was too
repugnant.
Ingenious wording will in time get around the taboo on
foreign ownership. The lawyer in Mozart's Figaro assures us that
with a synonym here and an equivocation there, "qualque garbuglio
si trovera", some suitable mess of words can be concocted. But
even when no equity participation was needed, Kuwait, one of the
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least inhibited, has moved on feet of lead.4 2 And even when OPEC
members rise above principle, they must agree on terms.
There cannot be much investment in the OPEC countries
without a high rate of return after tax, because risk is great.
Companies were once expropriated, with derisory compensation.
Much of the population is ferociously hostile. OPEC quotas will
limit output and make it fluctuate. By late 1992, in fact,
Venezuela, Iran, Iraq, and Abu Dhabi were offering to exempt some
foreign-owned operations from quota. [PIW 9-21-92:3] Particularly
in Venezuela, but also in Indonesia, some officials said "OPEC
membership is actually a liability, particularly since the
potential for quota obligations can scare away upstream
investors." [PIW 10-26-92:1]
Nevertheless, the OPEC governments made substantial
investment and progress on their own, as is shown by the growth
of capacity after 1985. As we will shortly see, expansion was a
weapon in the endless struggle over larger production shares.
Non-OPEC Countries Of course, non-OPEC countries are
similar. "The oil is ours", a precious thing-in-itself, not a
vulgar asset to be sold off for maximum wealth, but a family
jewel or heirloom. Fetishism was strengthened by local interests
42 "Because Kuwait oil wells flowed prolifically with
little mechanical prompting before the damage by the Iraqis, the
oil men there say they haven't the sophistication needed to do
the best job of reconfiguring the fields. Negotiations have been
dragging on for almost six months, with the oil company asking
unusually high fees for its services, the Kuwaitis say. BP was
very active there before the nationalization of the oil industry,
and it has retained much of the geological data." [WSJ 2-24-
92:B3C] The difficulties were soon composed. [PIW 3-23-92:7]
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with political clout trying to pre-empt the good prospects, or
get their rake-off.
STABILITY IN 1989
Non-OPEC producers In January, they "vow to help lift
petroleum prices, but don't say how." [WSJ 1-27-89:C12] A month
later, a meeting resolved to cut production, an action which
"puts them firmly in the camp of OPEC". [WSJ 2-22-89:A3] But the
skeptics advised: "Don't blink or you'll miss the non-OPEC
cutbacks." [PIW 2-27-89:1] They were proved right. (For some far-
fetched optimism see PIW 3-27-89:SS].)
Pricing formulas became more precise and permitted some
geographical discrimination, but the differentials over and above
transport cost were small and transitory; prices were highly
correlated among regions. [PIW 2-6-89:1] A special PIW survey
found that both buyers and sellers preferred stability, but:
"buyers are no longer willing to give up the benefits of
spot purchases. Hence ... term contracts... mimicking the
flexibility of spot markets...now account for over half of world
crude oil trade ..." [PIW 2-13-89:1
[Price competition was vigorous by means of] "the formula
mechanisms used in term contract crude oil sales. The trends are
just harder to identify.... In some cases, Mideast exporters,
using completely different formulas, delicately set prices to
undercut competitors by as little as 5c-10c a barrel." [PIW 7-24-
89:1]
By late 1989, exporters were reverting to simpler schemes,
and mechanisms based only on spot crude indicators, a PIW survey
indicated. [PIW 10-16-89:1] Venezuela long tried to avoid the
spot market, but was turning to it by late 1989, "thwarted by its
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cumbersome official posted price system." [PIW 9-11-89:1]
Rebuilding capacity for higher quotas Iran aimed at 4
million bd in 1989. [PIW 2-20-89:3] To have achieved even 3 mbd
in 1989 was impressive. Their "highly visible ... ambitious
reconstruction drive may be a first step by Tehran to seek a
higher oil production quota later this spring." [PIW 3-6-89:1]
In early 1990, Iran expected to be at 4 mbd capacity within a
year "via foreign contracts." [PIW 3-26-90:1] They did not
obtain the foreign-firm contracts, and to reach 4 mbd took them
not one but three years. (See below, page 145.) It is a measure
of their loss in not bringing in foreign firms. Later the Oil
Minister of Iran thought term contract deals with large up-front
payments would provide both markets and money. [PIW 4-10-89:5]
That would have financed expansion at high cost, which may be the
reason it was abandoned.
Beyond the horizon As usual, the future looked rosy. "For
the long run, there is scarcely any way for prices to go but
up.... In a few years, we should see a break-out of oil
prices...."American imports should reach nine million barrels a
day by 1991", and 12-13 mbd by the middle 1990s. [James R.
Schlesinger, NYT 1-4-89 OpEd] Thus he predicted an increase of
2.6 mbd; the actual increase was 0.2 mbd, to 7.6. The consensus
view was: "Global oil production capacity has been shrinking
steadily, and oil demand is now rising faster than expected--
[indicating]...a much tighter international oil balance in the
1990s." [PIW 4-10-89:4] They did not consider that OPEC nations
132
had to build excess capacity in order to maintain bargaining
power against each other.
PE [9-89:270] called a report by Michael Lynch [Lynch 1989]
"somewhat heretical." The report was unusual in three other
respects. (1) It was based on cost data; and it recognizes
reserves as inventories, and the OPEC nations as revenue
maximizers. (2) It forecast declining prices. (3) It has been
well borne out.
In April 1989, Kuwait and Iraq both demanded higher quotas,
and backed up their words with deeds. Iraq restored the war
damaged Fao terminal, Kuwait produced 1.8 mbd, over its quota.
The GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council, of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the
UAE, and Qatar) would meet in May 1989 to discuss quotas. [PIW 4-
24-89:1] The Saudis had given up some quota in November 1988 to
get Iran and Iraq to sign on to the new agreement, but both of
them would be asking for more by November 1989. Would the Saudis
retreat again, was the question. [PIW 4-24-89:5]
Early in May 1989, King Fahd predicted the price would reach
$26 before the end of the year. He did not want the price to be
"forcibly raised to $26 by reducing production", explained
Minister Nazer, but adherence to production quotas "will allow
the natural balance of supply and demand to work" to raise
prices. [NYT 5-4-89:D1] That is a distinction without a
difference. Saudi Arabia was openly exceeding its quota, but the
excess output was being stored, not sold. [WSJ 5-5-89:A2] That
might be called a second-phase warning. With output increasing
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because of growing demand, "countries such as Kuwait, Iran and
Abu Dhabi are clearly staking their claims for higher quotas by
turning up the taps now." Iraq, surprised and discomfited by
Iran's success in reaching 3 mbd, was also trying to raise its
own capacity. [PIW 5-8-89:1]
At the end of May 1989, Saudi Arabia proposed that quotas be
increased, but that actual production should be decreased, with
the real cutbacks structured to favor the higher-capacity
producers in the Gulf [WSJ 5-30-89:A6] It repudiated the $18 or
any other target price, at least for the moment, and this came as
a shocking reversal. "If OPEC does not give the price signal, who
will?" said one industry analyst. [NYT 5-31-89:D1]
Kuwait's policy reversal (expansion cost) But Kuwait had
made a historic reversal of policy:
Kuwait's willingness to use its production capacity to press
for its long-term goals could be a thorn in OPEC's side for the
years to come... It will rebuild its potential to 3.5 inbd over
the next five years, with a $1 billion investment program. This
reverses its early 1970s decision to reduce capacity in order to
conserve reserves. [PIW 5-22-89:1]
Kuwait's recent capacity had been reckoned by the CIA at 2.2
mbd. Spending $1 billion to raise capacity by 1.3 mbd meant $769
per additional daily barrel of net capacity. The expenditure per
barrel of gross capacity added was less, since some of the new
capacity would be used up over the five years. But we would need
a forecast of two more variables - output and the natural
decline rate - to reckon the difference. In 1990, a project to
increase output at Minagish and Umm Gudair required $300 million
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for an increase of 400 tbd, or $750 per bd. [PIW 4-23-90:1] This
agrees closely with the estimate of a year earlier. Fifteen
months later, a consultant estimated that the intervening war's
destruction had quadrupled cost. He estimated the new investment
needed to attain 2 mbd from ground zero: drilling 500 new wells,
each to produce 4 tbd, for $1.25 billion, hence $625 per daily
barrel. [PIW 7-15-91:7] If his estimates are correct, the cost
had been only $156 per bd before the war. But perhaps he omits
non-drilling expenditures.
Thus despite rising sales, the discord over market share
claims shows why it was expected that the June 1989 meeting would
find "a wide divergence of views on optimal price levels, how far
to lift the group's output ceiling, and quota distribution."
Kuwait and the UAE "seem determined to overproduce if they are
unsatisfied with new allocations." Saudi Arabia "is adamant that
it will not give up its share of OPEC output." Their November
sacrifice of 1.7 percent share was not to be repeated. "The
current rift between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait over price and
market share goals seems to be fostering closer ties between
Riyadh and Iraq." [PIW 5-29-89:1] This would be recalled a year
later.
The long June 1989 meeting: rising demand sharpens struggle
over market share The discord at the June 1989 meeting was even
worse than expected. No matter how approached, "the problem is
how to distribute any [production] increase among OPEC nations."
Some countries insisted that any increase be prorated. Kuwait
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insisted on a larger share. [WSJ 6-2-89:B2] But this seemed in
conflict with Saudi insistence or keeping their near-25 percent
of OPEC production. [NYT 6-5-89:D2] To this end, the Saudis
insisted on prorating the increase among all members. "In a show
of brinkmanship, ... the Kuwaiti oil minister has demanded that
the quotas ... for Kuwait and the UAE be increased by some 30%."
[WSJ 6-5-89:A3]
Iran supported Saudi Arabia against Kuwait. [WSJ 6-6-89:A2]
The meeting ended in disarray after six days, after approving a
production increase which Kuwait and the UAE refused to accept.
Although both signed, the UAE minister laughed and said "I always
sign." [NYT 6-8-89:D1] Prices, which had risen since January, now
turned down. But Kuwait Minister Ali al-Khalifa Al-Sabah called
it "a gentleman's agreement" whereby his country would reduce
output somewhat, though not as much as the written agreement
required. [WSJ 6-9-89:A2] He and Minister Nazer made a brave
show of harmony, but Al-Sabah was considered the winner. But the
problem was permanent.
"OPEC has thought of overhauling its quotas for years. [But]
oil is money--the stuff that pays the bills and buys the food.
... And inherent in the very idea of an OPEC ceiling is that for
one share to grow, another must shrink. Otherwise, everyone would
produce at will and drive prices down for all of OPEC. ... Kuwait
seems to be usurping Saudi Arabia's role as the advocate of
moderation. ... Indeed Saudi Arabia now wants higher prices.
Some ministers say, if OPEC members would just wait maybe five
years, many would see their excess supply soaked up naturally.
But Kuwait can't wait."
They feared higher exports from Iraq and Iran, while Saudi
Arabia drifted, beset by financial troubles. [WSJ 6-12-89:A1]
Moreover, Minister Al Khalifa Al-Sabah was more cautious
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about the rosy long term future. He summed up the state of long
term forecasting: "a consistent underestimation of potential
supply and a consistent underestimation of the consumers' ability
to adjust their demand." The underestimation of price elasticity
or confusion over long and short term "led OPEC (and usually
leads every other cartel) to overestimate its strength." [OPEC
Bulletin, vol. XX, no. 1, 1-89:5] Kuwait was aggrieved because
Saudi Arabia had signed a non-aggression pact with Iraq, without
consulting any other GCC members. Iraq refused to sign a similar
agreement with Kuwait.
From the June to the September meeting The accord was seen
as fragile. OPEC set the ceiling at 19.5 mbd, "below perceived
demand to leave room for expected quota violations". Kuwait only
signed on when promised a review of quotas and ceilings in three
months. (They did precisely the same thing in February 1993. [NYT
2-17-93:D1]) Rising demand and hoped-for decline in non-OPEC
output actually built tension over market share. The paradox was
now familiar:
"It is precisely the lure of rising oil demand that has
opened the Pandora's box of market share for Mideast producers."
[PIW 6-12-89:1]
[I]n September, Iraq's rising export capacity ... will
create new pressure on quotas. [Indeed, that was one reason for
scheduling a meeting early, in September.] No point waiting until
December, when Iraq would have staked out its position with
overproduction. ... Market share remains the [Saudi] top OPEC
priority ... [but] is no longer content with attaining only $18."
[PIW 6-19-89:5]
But output did seem to decline [WSJ 6-27-89:A4], and Iraq
was increasing export capacity more slowly than expected. [PIW 7-
3-89:1] So was Iran: "they are behind, but not irretrievably."
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Iraq could comfort itself with a goal of "6 mbd by the late
1990s". [PIW 7-10-89:3]
Early in 1990, Oil Minister Al Chalabi of Iraq claimed 4.5
mbd capacity, which was not believed. He said the country had
the potential for 6 to 8 mbd, but no plans to install it.
Despite "financial constraints", Iraq was "spending $2 billion a
year on the industry".43 The old state producing company INOC
had been dissolved and replaced by several regional companies.
(This parallels similar moves in Venezuela.) Proved reserve
estimates were said to be based on 10 to 12 percent recovery of
oil in place, hence too conservative. [WSJ 1-8-90:A1]
In mid-1989, OPEC capacity was expected to grow by 3.3 mbd
by mid-1990, much more than the increase in consumption. This
signaled greater excess capacity, and more rivalry in getting
larger quotas. Some, however, projected deficient supply and
higher prices. [Hogan 1989] They disregarded the need of OPEC
producers to build and maintain excess capacity as a bargaining
tool.
"Individual country capacity is becoming increasingly
important as OPEC members jockey for higher quotas and look for
objective standards [i.e. reserves or capacity] for determining
them. ... Iraq, and to a lesser extent, Kuwait and Iran will
have the potential to become swing producers over the next year."[PIW 7-31-89:1]
43 Let us assume it was all on the producing industry: Iraq
completed 137 oil wells in 1989. Average production for the year
was 2.75 mbd through 378 wells, for 7,275 bd per well. [WO-IO]
Total new capacity added was then 997 tbd. If the $2 billion were
all spent for production, the maximum investment per daily barrel
was $2007. Of course, the true number was a fraction of this
amount.
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Saudi Arabia was in financial straits, borrowing for the
first time in 30 years. "Reducing government spending has been
ruled out, lest serious social and political tensions emerge."
Foreign financial assets were down from $140 billion in 1982 to
about $40 billion, most of it not "readily available," and might
be under $30b by end-1989. In fact, it was probably smaller.44
The stringency, it was said, might explain the shift toward a
higher-price policy. [PIW 8-7-89:1] The 1978 ten-year pledge of
$500 million annual subsidy to Syria had just expired, and its
renewal was in doubt. [WSJ 8-21-89:A6] In contrast, Kuwait
continued to run current surpluses and add to foreign assets,
expected to exceed $85 billion. [PIW 8-21-89:5]
Saudi Arabia preferred to hold its quota but not exceed it,
and "lose ground to other OPEC members rather than stake a claim
now for its traditional share of OPEC output, mainly because it
fears undermining prices." [PIW 8-14-89:1] Theirs was the
leader's curse again: they dared not overprice, as smaller rivals
did. One plausible reason was that price had not strengthened
but weakened since the June 1989 meeting. [WSJ 8-17-89:A2]
Iraq now aimed at either a higher quota, or else higher
output if others did not observe quotas. Higher export capacity
44 [Askari 1991a, pp. 37-39], estimates end-1981 holdings
at about $160, and end-1985 holdings at $50, excluding so-called
"loans," chiefly to Iraq. See also [Askari 1991b] During 1986-
1989 inclusive, the cumulative Saudi Arabian current-account
deficit was $38.1 billion. [IMF-IFS, September 1991, p. 517]
Thus Saudi Arabian holdings were around $12 billion at end-1989.
In 1990, there was an additional $4.1 billion deficit. More
recent figures were not released in 1992.
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expected over the next twelvemonth emboldened them. [PIW 8-21-
89:1] And by late August, OPEC production was up but worldwide
consumption even more, strengthening prices. "Those who track
OPEC production say there are buyers for the oil and that very
little of it seems to be going into producer-owned storage." [WSJ
8-30-89:A2] In early September the Saudis were marketing more
aggressively, and producing 0.2 mbd above their 4.8 mbd quota.
[PIW 9-4-89:1]
Venezuela announced it was aiming at 3 mbd capacity "in
short term". [PIW 9-11-89:8] But worries were more immediate. "If
the September meeting goes badly, Iraq may be tempted to use its
rising capacity to stake out market share." [PMI 9-1-89:1]
Kuwait, Libya, and Venezuela had some excess capacity "but
difficulties in marketing their crude". This would seem to
indicate overpricing, a barrier which could be quickly overcome.
But for the moment, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, both with excess
capacity, seemed not about to raise difficult disruptive
questions. [PIW 9-18-89:3]
As the September 1989 meeting approached, the proponents of
a higher ceiling felt. undercut because the $18 target had not
been approached. "Cheating has become so widespread that it has
pushed OPEC's output to the highest level this year--22 mbd."
[WSJ 9-12-89:A2] The OPEC secretariat prepared studies showing
the effects of several objectives on "scientific" methods of
quota setting. If based on capacity, it would benefit chiefly the
Mideast producers. Members were already starting to lay the
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groundwork for claims of rising capacity to get larger quotas.
However: "Verification [of capacity] would be an even thornier
problem than it is in monitoring output levels." [PIW 9-18-89:3]
But the atmosphere was good. "The usual squabbling over
cheating on production quotas was high on the agenda. ... But it
is a measure of OPEC's new equanimity that few industry experts
think the squabbling will escalate to a danger point, at least
not through the end of the year." As usual, their time horizon
was very short. But rising demand was said to have eased the
tension over quotas, though not removed the disagreement. And
there was the comforting delusion that "these new oil-producing
areas already have begun to decline." [NYT 9-24-89:3-1] 45
The September meeting But the squabbling did commence
immediately, and it was clear that nobody's position had changed.
[WSJ 9-25-89:A2] Kuwait would yield none of its claim for the
additional output. Others opposed any increase in the ceiling as
long as the OPEC basket stayed below $18. Three days of talks
brought no agreement.
"Saudi Arabia has adamantly defended its 25 percent share of any
ceiling the organization chooses to fix. Iraq wants a larger
percentage than its 14.7 percent, and Kuwait and the Emirates
want more than their present level of about 5 percent." [But all
were daunted by] the difficult and complicated issue of
reassigning new production levels to its members, ... an exercise
45 Before and after the meeting, Iraq waged a war of nerves
by adding customers and contracts, but "there is little evidence
that points to a quick surge in production." [PIW 9-25-89:3 The
obvious implication would be that it was not expanding as rapidly
as planned. The next week there came some talk of rising export
capacity, "but there is skepticism with OPEC." The consensus was
that capacity was little if at all above 3.2 mbd. [PIW 10-2-89:1]
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... that the group had not been able to address with any success
for the last four years." [NYT 9-25-89:D2]
A compromise of sorts fell apart at the last minute. [WSJ 9-
26-89:A2] After "five days of sometimes acrimonious talk", they
raised the production ceiling, thereby reducing the amount of
cheating. The nations producing at capacity wanted an effective
limit on output, which would raise prices; Kuwait and the UAE
wanted more output for themselves. The effect would be to keep
prices stable.
The meeting had been expected to begin work on a permanent
allocation system, but "well before it began the ministers were
backing off from that task because of its complexities." Iran
offered a new scheme of division: they, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia
would maintain current shares, while Kuwait, the UAE and two
others would receive larger shares, and five others would
received smaller shares. "The hope was that the new system would
help restore OPEC's credibility...and thus firm up prices." The
proposal was deferred. [WSJ 9-28-89:A2] Nevertheless, prices kept
rising because the trade perceived "that demand for oil worldwide
is increasing swiftly enough, and that OPEC's differences are not
significant." [NYT 9-28-89:D1]
Minister Al Khalifa Al Sabah of Kuwait made the classic
statement of what had been happening that year: "Everybody who
could [overproduce], did; everyone who couldn't complained about
it." [PIW 10-2-89:SS]
From September to November As always, the farther-off
future was bright. Robert Mabro calculated that unless there was
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a large enough expansion at the Gulf, oil would be in short
supply by 1992. [PIW 10-23-89:5] Non-OPEC production was
declining, demand was growing, and could only be satisfied by
higher OPEC production. "There is no other way", said an American
manager.
But for the here-and-now, the next two quarters, it was more
difficult than usual to reduce output to meet seasonally lower
demand. "It's unlikely any member will want to reduce output
during the struggle for market share." [WSJ 10-4-89:A14]
By late October, output had risen to nearly 23 mbd, some 3.5
mbd above the ceiling. Most members were running flat out, but a
few had excess capacity totalling from 3 mbd to 7mbd. It was
"enough ... to glut the market and cause an oil price collapse a
few months from now if OPEC doesn't soon adopt a new quota
system." The wide margin for error, between 3 mbd and 7 mbd,
shows how very loose the numbers are. Somebody had to cut. But
the Saudis insisted on 24.5 percent, refusing to cut even one
half of one percent point. The Iranian proposal mentioned above
was still being studied.[WSJ 10-23-89:A2]
"Saudi Arabia remains adamant that its quota share cannot be
reduced, even symbolically." Some delegates believed that higher
oil prices were weakening OPEC resolution. "If the oil market is
sagging and looks likely to weaken early next year as demand
slows seasonally, OPEC could find the political will to forge a
compromise that has eluded it this autumn." [PIW 10-30-89:1]
Kuwait and Abu Dhabi were the principal gainers by rising
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demand. [11-13-89:1] Obviously prices would have risen if they
had not expanded output, or if others had been willing to
curtail.
"The basic problem is finding a way to cut the current 23
mbd production level. But unless there's a solution to the quota
claims of Kuwait and other countries, there is unlikely to be a
viable agreement on total OPEC output for next year. And without
that agreement, most ministers fear, prices could drop sharply."
Iran proposed raising the Kuwait and UAE quotas, but Saudi
Arabia refused to accept any curtailment, and remained "adamant
that it will not waver from its claim to 24.5% of OPEC's total
physical output ... The UAE remains the single biggest obstacle
to a workable quota distribution." A general division persisted:
those without excess capacity wanted higher prices. Those with it
wanted more volume. "The Gulf countries are unwilling to
sacrifice output to provide higher prices for those members that
now have little scope to raise production." [PIW 11-20-88:1] [NYT
11-21-89:D5]
Rising OPEC capacity began to be more generally noticed. At
least 9 of the 13 could expand. "One force driving OPEC nations
to increase oil-production capacity undoubtedly is the notion
that any rejiggering of quotas several years hence is apt to be
based on production abilities." [WSJ 11-22-89:Al] In fact, the
"rejiggering" had been a hotly contested issue for the past three
years, at least.
Early in October, the Iraqi Oil Minister Al Chalabi revealed
that Iraq had no foreign companies producing oil, only some
"engineering, design, and construction projects." [PIW 10-2-89:3]
144
A spokesman boasted that Iraq could export more than four million
barrels daily (as against a 2.92 mbd quota), which "will help to
make people think twice before violating the agreement." [NYT 10-
10-89:D5] This was not generally believed. "There are signs
that Iraq's production capacity may be closer to its current 3
mbd output than the 4.5 million that it now claims." Five fields
currently under development could add from 550 to 650 tbd in
1991.) [PIW 11-6-89:1]
"Breakthrough" at the November 1989 meeting The year-end
meeting, brought forward to late November, was still without any
common ground, despite private meetings since September among
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, and Iraq. They could always
rationalize failure by saying it did not matter. In a sense this
was true: output was well in excess of quota, yet prices held.
[WSJ 11-22-89:A5] But they feared slack demand in 1990. [WSJ 11-
24-89:A2] Saudi Arabia would not retreat from 24.46 percent;
Kuwait and the UAE wanted higher quotas to validate their higher
production. [NYT 11-25-89:32] But the world oil trade was calm,
except for worries over the lower spring demand. Again the
meeting stretched out for a week. [NYT 11-27-89:D1] [WSJ 11-27-
89:A3]
The result was hailed as a breakthrough: "it bases
production quotas on the ability of members to produce rather
than on longstanding fixed percentages." Iran expressed
satisfaction. [WSJ 11-28-89:A2] Of course it looked curious to
cut overproduction by raising quotas. But it would work if the
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over-quota production was cut back. Kuwait received 6.8 instead
of the previous 5.6 percent, Saudi Arabia accepted a cut from
24.46 percent to 23.90 percent. They expressed support for the
$18 basket price. But Abu Dhabi still refused its 1.1 mbd quota,
and their expected overproduction was "factored into the new
ceiling calculations." [WSJ 11-29-89:A3]
But there seemed like a truce among the "Gulf countries,
whose battles for market share and lack of unity have impeded any
effective agreement for two years or longer." However, it pointed
to weaker prices in the first quarter of 1990. The Iranian
Minister thought that quotas would be abandoned by 1991, because
most members would be at full capacity then. More to the point,
he claimed that Iran could produce about 3.65 mbd, but would get
to 4 mbd within two years, and then to 4.3. [PIW 12-4-89:1,4]
This proved premature, but by only 18 months. "News of the
agreement was interpreted on Wall Street as a sign that the price
of oil would rise, increasing the value of the inventories of
major oil companies." And Minister Al Khalifa Al Sabah, "echoing
a widespread judgment by a number of oil analysts ... said ...
'the quota issue will lose its relevance in the 90s'". [NYT 11-
29-89:D1]
But irrepressible Abu Dhabi soon announced that they wanted
to go from current capacity of 1.6 mbd to 2.1 or 2.2 in the next
few years. They had a non-secret weapon: foreign companies with
equity production. Possibly they might need to offer the equity
producers more than the current $1/barrel margin. [PIW 12-18-
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89:5] But this was obviously a small discount.
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THE FIRST HALF OF 1990
Capacity expansion in first half 1990 American contractors
were said to have found a way to work in Iran, which now hoped to
reach 4.5 mbd within two years. [PIW 1-1-90:1] Later, plans to
raise capacity to 3.57 mbd by March 1991 were said to be included
in the fiscal 1990-1991 budget. [PIW 3-5-90:9] But capacity went
barely above 3 mbd that year.
Saudi Arabia announced a capacity expansion "to over 10
mbd," but did not say when, nor whether it was surge or
sustainable. Nor did it state current capacity, which the CIA
reckoned at 7 mbd. (The Japanese Institute of Energy Economics
made it 6.5 mbd.) One company estimated expenditures for
expansion at $6 billion. "Potential contractors totally dismiss
estimates by some Saudi sources that the expansion could cost up
to $30 billion." [PIW 1-29-90:1] One cannot tell how much of the
$6 billion would go, as in the past, to the natural gas network
or other non-production purposes. What it shows is the wild
exaggeration of "some Saudi sources."
Abu Dhabi increased its planned expansion. "Projects already
on the drawing board should nudge short-term peak capacity to
well over 3 mbd by 1994" [PIW 2-5-90:1], as compared with about
1.3 mbd at the time.
There was great frustration in Iraq.
"Following a year of unsuccessful informal approaches to
several majors, oil minister Al-Chalabi says that he is seeking
non-production sharing deals with foreign partners. ... However,
as one oil [company] executive put it, "We are not in the
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business of renting people for the cost of money. ... We are
looking for a much higher rate of return than a service fee can
provide."
Iraq offered the development of the Majnoon field, at the
southeast border with Iran. It was said to hold 6 - 8 billion
barrels, and could produce 1 mbd. Petrobras had discovered the
field under a risk sharing contract in the 1970s, but it was
taken away from them in the late 1970s. For years, lack of funds
had been hampering plans to push Iraq producing capacity to 5.5 -
6 mbd. This year only $3.2 billion were allocated to "oil,
education, and health", and oil's share was uncertain. [PIW 2-12-
90:3] Of course, only a fraction of the oil investment could go
into production. Capacity was officially rated at 4.5 mbd, but
outside sources stated it at 3.5 mbd.
Other producers were also trying to attract foreign
investment. Venezuela had a "goal of keeping pace with output
growth by major Mideast producers." [PIW 2-19-90:4] It failed.
The North African states were also trying. The Algerian oil
minister said capacity could be increased "quickly from current
levels of about 700 tbd to 850 tbd." [PIW 2-26-90:4]
Some OPEC nations were doing better at expansion than
others, and there was "a split in the group between the 'haves'
and 'have-nots'." [PIW 3-12-90:3 ] In March, Saudi Aramco
announced it would raise capacity by about 2.5 mbd, at a cost of
about $6 billion. [PIW 3-19-90:1] This would imply $2400 per
daily barrel, which seems high, but as usual cannot be checked,
either as to expenditures nor for the gas network, nor other
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extraneous projects.
By March, prospects for a rapid jump in OPEC capacity were
fading. In fact, up to half of the 6 mbd new capacity expected by
the mid-1990s seemed in question. Budget constraints were blamed,
as well as "the snail's pace at which oil companies and some
producing-country governments are inching toward consensus on the
kind of terms need for the companies to help finance capacity
development." [PIW 3-26-90:1]
In March-April 1990, Iraq sent teams to various countries to
persuade investors to finance the development of some existing
fields. It was inherently a low-risk operation. But "an Iraqi
quest for upstream investment funds got a chilly response during
oil minister Al-Chalabi's 4-day visit to Tokyo last week, ...
designed in part to hear proposals from potential investors."
Ties were strained by some $10 billion in unpaid debts to
Japanese companies, on which Iraq had suspended interest payment
in 1986. [PIW 4-9-90:7]
At this time, the Iranian oil minister said he was "near
agreement with companies ... to develop established fields, with
payment in crude. ... The decision to seek foreign help in
developing onshore oil fields is a clear policy reversal. ... As
recently as October [1989], Minister Aghazadeh said, 'Iran does
not need foreign investment in oil.' ... His aim is to raise
capacity from 3.3 mbd to 4 million next year," i. e. 1991. The
aim is "to convince OPEC colleagues that Iran ... can turn up the
taps unless it gets the price and quota that it desires." [PIW 4-
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16-90:3] Iran intended to spend $5 in hard currency on "its oil
industry", though that included not only oil production but
natural gas. [NYT 5-28-90:29] In the event, this increase took
about two and one half years not one, because it was apparently
done without agreements with foreign firms, though discussions
continue. [WSJ 10-19-92:A2] [PIW 10-19-92:1]]
In May 1990, Libya expressed confidence it could raise
capacity to 2.5 mbd "by the end of the year". Nine agreements
with foreign companies were said to be already signed or about to
be signed. Industry observers thought it would take at least a
year or two longer. PIW 5-14-90:3] Even these skeptics were too
hopeful. More than two years later, the goal had shrunk to 2 mbd,
and not until 1994. [PE 9-92:40] Saudi Arabia now "aimed at
increasing sustainable capacity from about 7 million bd to 10 mbd
"in the late 1990s at a cost of some $16 billion." [PIW 5-14-
90:8] This was half of the earlier $30 billion. It would imply
$5,333/bd, which is far higher than any of the Persian Gulf
projects reported in enough detail to permit a calculation of the
investment coefficient. Such talk simply destroys credibility.
Abu Dhabi expected to be just under 2.5 mbd by mid-decade.
[PIW 5-21-90:3] At this point we may reprint what is effectively
an industry consensus in early 1990, along with estimates for
October 1992. Apparently Iran and Qatar have done as well as
predicted, but all others have fallen short.
[TABLE XII: OPEC CAPACITY: ACTUAL & PROJECTED]
From March 1990 to December 1995 is 5.75 years, to October
TABLE XI OPEC PRI( CHANGE & CAPACITY USED, SELECIED YEARS.
(CORRECTIONS TO FIGURE 5)
OPEC PRICE, Sbl,
ANN AVG 5.43
INCREASE GNP-IPD I
PERCENTREAL I
PRICE INEASE I
OPEC PRODUC- I
TION, TBD
OPEC CAPACITY, I
TBD
PERCENTUSED I
CIA 'SUSTAINABLE'
CAPACIY, TBD
PERCENT OF 'SUSTAINABLE'
1973 1974 1978 1979 1980 1H1989 1H1990 1H1992
11.33
0.087 I
91.9
30616
38135 1
803 I
1331 19.88 32.21
0.086 0.095
375 48.0
30802 26804 I
35235 34435 I
87.4 77.8 I
34430 34680
895 773
16.7 1633
0.040
16.34
0.036
-5.9 -35
23468 23900 26627
25550
935
27440
855
NB Tie CIA also uses a higler estimate, 'installed' capacity,
whicl donot understa In addition, teyestimate:
'Available capacity reflects production ceilings appliedby'
several argepro s. Tis is n cpaty at all, but
deliberat lestriction.
SOURES: Prices, from Monthly Energy Review, 'otal OPEC
GNP-IPD, frn Economic Report of dr Pesident
Production and capacity, frm PIW, 4-21-75:11, 24-809, 2-2380.9,
7-6927. Capacity as indicated from CIA, lternational
Energy Statistical Review, various issues
0.9, 2-1-93:7
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1992 is 2.58 years, or 45 percent. The percent accomplished
varied widely. Iran, Algeria, Gabon, and Indonesia were ahead of
the track. Saudi Arabia and the UAE were almost on it, the rest
trailed, while Libya had accomplished nothing and Venezuela
actually diminished. Kuwait capacity in mid-1993 already
surpassed its first-half 1990 production, and there is no telling
the date of Iraq re-entry.
Outside OPEC, the longer-run outlook was for supply growth:
"PIW's first worldwide survey of exploration hot spots shows
that oil companies find themselves in an unexpected yet happy
position: they are spoiled for choice [for the first time in
almost 20 years]...Newly discovered, high-potential regions are
competing for attention with large, established producing
countries that are reopening to outside explorers after decades
of dominance by national oil companies.... Even the Middle East
... is making tentative gestures toward Western companies ...
Cash-strapped ... Iran and Iraq have publicly joined the
competition [but] only as service contractors for known but
undeveloped oil fields. [PIW 7-16-90:1,SS]
Iraq reported a deal with a consortium led by Occidental
to develop Rumaila North (discovered before 1960 by IPC), to
be paid for through a long-term crude oil supply agreement, as
Iran was doing. Other international oil companies had been issued
invitations in January 1990. But there was little progress.
"Most oil companies maintained they were not interested in
service-type contracts, while the government was unwilling to
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offer exploration or concession arrangements." [PIW 9-10-90:7] By
the time the Occidental deal (if there was one) leaked out, Iraq
had of course occupied Kuwait.
Expectations in the first quarter of 1990 The trade seemed
untroubled by any price weakness. According to confidential
internal projections surveyed by PIW, steady demand growth would
support oil markets in the second half of the year. There was "a
solid consensus ... on this basic outlook. Market power is seen
swinging back to Mideast OPEC producers, with increases in world
demand falling squarely on their shoulders." [PIW 2-19-90:5] The
Prime Minister of Japan scheduled a ten-day Middle East tour,
"aimed at strengthening Japan's relations with [Saudi Arabia] in
view of the tightening of oil supply anticipated by the mid-
1990s." It was scheduled to begin August 16. [Japan Petroleum &
Energy Trends, vol. 25, Nos 11/12, 1-15-90:18]
Expert opinion: prices to rise, OPEC expansion in doubt At
the start of 1990, two dozen oil experts expected prices to rise
by 50 percent by the start of 1995; the consensus price forecast
was $30 in 1995. Supply could not expand enough to match demand,
and "the question about OPEC is ... whether it can expand its
ability to pump oil enough to match rising demand, experts say."
The chairman of BP predicted oil supply shortages in the early
1990s "because of OPEC's inability to expand production", which
could cost $50 billion to $60 billion, "an amount they cannot
afford." [NYT 1-26-90:D6]
OPEC might be unable to expand enough "without some
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combination of loans, investments and technical help" from
consuming nations. [NYT 2-24-90:1]
Why could not OPEC afford to invest more than between 1.2 to
2.6 percent of their revenues (Table XI)? A question not to be
asked.
The growing plight of the Soviet oil industry also made the
trade more hopeful, although the production decline had not been
fully reflected in Soviet exports. [WSJ 2-26-90:A2]
Another roundup of experts in early March said that there
was now "a widespread consensus among petroleum experts that
unless investments on the order of $60 billion are made during
the next five years to increase production capacity in key
petroleum producing countries, oil prices will surge..." [NYT 3-
6-90:D2]
"Widespread consensus" was made by repetition. The $60
billion was gospel, above any profane demand for evidence. And
no sooner was the figure set than it could be raised. "Iran
alone is reckoned to need some $50 billion to restore its oil
industry to where it stood ... in 1980." [Id.] More soberly,
Minister Nazer of Saudi Arabia expected that "the market will
slowly but steadily turn into a sellers' market." [NYT 3-10-
90:37]
Prices in the first quarter 1990 In early January 1990,
OPEC members began decreasing output. [WSJ 1-19-90:A2] But by the
end of the month, firm prices persuaded them to stop reductions.
[WSJ 1-29-90:C15] Prices then fell in February and March.
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In early March, there was some fear of a growing supply
overhang, because futures prices had shifted into "contango"--i.
e., prompt supply was priced less than farther-off. [PMI 3-8-
90:1] Contango is an inducement to accumulate inventories. The
need for this inducement signals a perceived current surplus, and
the greater the degree of contango the greater the perceived
surplus.46
A brief friendly meeting But the leading OPEC countries
were not alarmed. Saudi Arabia "appeared to be siding with Iraq
against Kuwait in seeking higher prices". [NYT 3-5-90:D8] At the
March OPEC meeting there was a general satisfaction, tempered by
concern over quota violations, especially by Kuwait, which "with
scant support, is advocating a rise in the production ceiling to
stop prices from mounting above the $18 a barrel reference." [PIW
3-12-90:3]
Prices had been heading down since December-January, but the
talk was all of whether or not to raise them. [NYT 3-16-90:D4]
The meeting took only a weekend, and "was most notable for its
friendly and gentle tone." A shortage crisis was coming, though
it was not imminent. [NYT 3-19-90:D1] There was a slight
undercurrent of unease. The price had been sliding. But if all
countries respected their quotas, "we will have a stabilized
46 With statistics on inventories as bad as ever or worse,
contango or its contrary, backwardation, served as a proxy,
superior to the original. It expressed the view of buyers and
sellers over the adequacy of inventories relative to expected
demand in the near future. Philip K. Verleger Jr. was the first
to perceive the importance of this inventory surrogate.
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market", said Minister Aghazadeh of Iran. [WSJ 3-19-90:A2] The
price monitoring committee meeting was concerned with "a shift
away from the problems of the 1980s--how to curtail production
equitably and keep prices from collapsing -- to a wholly new
forward-looking agenda premised on tighter production capacity."
[PIW 3-26-90:3]
Markets awaken in April But a week later, rising production
"seems to reflect a priority on securing markets and satisfying
clients in disregard of production quotas and the slide in crude
prices. ... Both [Iran and Iraq] have had trouble selling crude
and are offering some steep discounts." [PIW 4-2-90:1] The
monthly IEA report suggested an inventory buildup, confirming the
switch into contango a month earlier. [WSJ 4-4-90:A2] As
competition intensified, there was some switching from term to
spot contracts, particularly by Iraq and Kuwait. [PIW 4-9-90:1] A
week later:
"Markets wake up knee-deep in oil, and prices tumble.
...The basic problem is high OPEC production, which reflects
efforts by several Mideast producers to stake out larger market
shares. ... This has led to intensifying price competition and
points to market weakness through the spring." [PIW 4-16-90:1]
OPEC members were now reported "increasingly nervous", and
an editorial in a Saudi newspaper was interpreted by some as an
official threat of "another pricing war unless quota cheaters
curb their output. ... Kuwait is the chief target of the finger
pointing in OPEC." [WSJ 4-11-90:C12] Minister Nazer called on
members to adhere to quotas, and the ministers were "stepping up
their contacts with each other. [WSJ 4-17-90:3]
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Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE who had "all...been
accused of contributing to the oil glut by producing more than
their OPEC quotas", now issued a joint statement which affirmed
their support for quotas and expressed grave concern over prices.
[WSJ 4-18-90:C14]
Price fell by as much as 70 cents the next day. [WSJ 4-19-
90:C14] Kuwait and Abu Dhabi were not expected to blunt their
demands for larger quotas. "Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia have
previously used similar tactics of raising production to secure
or preserve their large share of OPEC's production." [NYT 4-19-
90:D1]
The emergency meeting But Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE
now demanded an emergency meeting.
"They want an agreement about quotas for the second half of
1990 now ... rather than late May. ... They tell PIW that a
reallocation of quotas to more accurately reflect production
capabilities is necessary for a workable agreement. ... The $6
plunge in oil prices since January is putting untenable financial
pressure on [other members]. Their only way out seems to be
accommodating the main quota offenders." [PIW 4-23-90:1]
Iran and Iraq, producing at capacity, could not retaliate
with increased production. [PIW 4-23-90:1] The hope was of a
brief meeting, two days at most, which could give a firm
assurance of output reductions. [WSJ 4-27-90:A2] It was held in
Geneva rather than Vienna. An Austrian official had criticized
Saddam Hussein for his threat to "burn half of Israel". The
change was to rebuke Austria and show solidarity with Iraq. [NYT
4-28-90:OpEd]
The emergency meeting decided on a three-month cut to 22.1
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mbd, the November 1989 ceiling. But Minister Otaiba of the UAE
revealed, after the agreement was struck, that they had been
producing not 1.9 mbd as generally supposed but 2.1 mbd. "In just
one sentence, Otaiba torpedoed the whole meeting." [WSJ 5-4-
90:C14] This is hard to credit, but it suggests the hair-trigger
sensitivity of the oil market. Prices certainly did fall on the
day of the meeting. It was not made clear how much each member
was allowed. It was in effect a gentlemens' agreement.
Still good times ahead But they could see only blue skies
farther ahead. [NYT 5-6-90:F15] "Some oil ministers said it was
only a matter of time before national production quotas--
necessary in recent years of excess capacity--disappear just
because most members will be physically unable to pump more oil."
None dissented. [WSJ 5-8-90:A2]
A curious note: "The Gulf Arabs maintain that sooner or
later, all members will have to recognize that an end to the 8-
year-old quota system is inevitable. They see the system as
unmanageable with most countries at their production limits."
[PIW 5-7-90:1]
This is puzzling. Excess capacity concentrated into fewer
hands seems to make output restriction easier. The few can
restrict and simply disregard the others. Why even bother to hold
an emergency meeting? The only explanation is that they wanted to
force the members with little or no excess to accept some - to
cut back. Saudi Arabia had made good its claim to a market
share, by continuing to produce, and forcing others to cut back
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to make room. Kuwait and Abu Dhabi were imitating the Saudis to
force others to share the burden of maintaining excess capacity.
Pledged reductions not fulfilled in May-June OPEC members
did cut rapidly, but not to the full extent promised. The largest
drop was in Saudi Arabia, but they were not returning to the role
of swing producer. "The Saudi move is contingent on output
discipline from others members and will be reassessed in June."
Iran and Iraq did have some excess capacity, as proved by their
"continuing marketing problems" [PIW 5-14-90:1], a euphemism for
overpricing. Dubai Fateh, which (following PIW and PE) we use as
the marker crude since 1986, fell to an 18-month low.
On June 5, Saudi Arabia issued a statement in Riyadh and
Washington. It reaffirmed its commitment to the May 2 agreement
to abide by its quota. The statement was evoked by a sharp price
drop following the confirmation of newly-discounted pricing
formulas, ranging from 25 to 70 cents per barrel. [WSJ 6-6-90:C6]
Only a small fraction of the losses were regained the next day.
"Saudis are known to be impatient with Kuwait and the UAE,
chronic overproducers." [WSJ 6-7-90:C14]
By early June, the actual May production cuts were seen as
only a fraction of pledged reductions, Saudi Arabia alone
honoring its agreement to cut 430 tbd. "Both Iran and
Iraq...pumped at maximum ..."[PIW 6-4-90:1] In fact, "the main
reason that OPEC's May cutbacks have been much smaller than
expected is that Iran and Iraq pushed their production a combined
350 tbd higher last month." [PMI 6-7-90:1] Iraq's overproduction
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was soon conveniently forgotten.
Formula prices were revised to new lows "and it may soon
force OPEC members to consider whether they are ready to relive
the price wars of 1986 and 1988. ... OPEC production remain[s]
stubbornly high, particularly with flows rebounding from Iran and
Iraq. ...this is leaving Mideast producers such as Saudi Arabia
with the unhappy choice of serving as a de facto swing producer
or cutting prices to keep oil flowing." Both Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia "are now under pressure to reduce prices." [PIW 6-11-90:1]
There now occurred an event of no importance, except to show
disrespect for OPEC output controls: Norway announced that it
might rescind its rule to produce at only 95 percent capacity.
The Oil Minister also forecast peak Norwegian production of 2 mbd
after five years. [WSJ 6-18-90:A2] (It was actually reached in
one year.)
Late in June, the Kuwait oil minister, Sheikh Ali al Khalifa
al Sabah, resigned to become Finance Minister. This did not mean
any policy change. But the historian loses an acute and well-
spoken observer. At this time, the "early promise of June OPEC
cuts is evaporating." [PIW 6-25-90:1] Crude oil inventories
touched their highest level in eight years, and despite the hope
of relief from Iraqi threats and a Norwegian strike, "the hard
fact [is] that there is a huge surplus of crude in the market,
experts say. ... OPEC strategists have wondered whether they are
about to see a rerun of the 1986 price collapse." [WSJ 6-29-
90:A3] June spot prices were at the lowest since September 1988.
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(Saudi June export prices were somewhat higher than in May, but
that may be a contract phenomenon, reflecting retroactive
changes.)
Heads of state take over in July Iraq warned Kuwait and the
UAE to curb their overproduction. The Deputy Prime Minister,
delivered the message in person and stated publicly "that oil
prices, which currently averaged about $14 a barrel, should rise
to $25 a barrel. Saudi Arabia is no longer opposing a growing
Iraqi role in the Gulf region's oil policies. ... Last year, in a
move that infuriated Kuwait, Saudi Arabia signed a non-aggression
treaty with Iraq, leaving its Kuwaiti allies in the Gulf
Cooperation Council to fend for themselves in their border
dispute with Iraq." [NYT 6-28-90:D1]
One wonders: did the Saudis discuss this action with the
USA, pursuant to the supposed "special relationship?" Kuwait had
asked Iraq for a similar pact, which was brusquely refused.
Possibly the Kuwaiti overproduction was based on fear of Iraqi
aggression, and the desire to get all they could before the
deluge; we cannot tell.
As they prepared for the July 25 meeting, Kuwait and Abu
Dhabi said "they deserve higher quotas in light of their output
capacity [and] the sacrifices they made for OPEC earlier in the
decade." [PIW 7-2-90:1] But in early July, Kuwait announced it
was cutting oil output "and could be flexible on its demands for
a bigger quota." (NYT 7-6-90:D11). Early in the year, Iraq had
gained sales from Kuwait by price cuts. Now both were changing
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their method of quotation to grant the buyer a 70 cent allowance.
[PIW 7-9-90:6] Obviously if both did so, neither was better off.
Eight confidential company surveys showed oil markets
threatening "to collapse from the sheer weight of excess oil
supplies." [PIW 7-16-90:5]
By the second week in July, heads of state were taking over
from their oil ministers to try to stop the price decline. Saddam
Hussein of Iraq, and the presidents of Venezuela and Indonesia,
were "among those taking a harder line toward the quota
cheaters... But the King of Saudi Arabia ...seems to be emerging
in the leading role." [WSJ 7-10-90:A3]
All five Arab Gulf producers met in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia,
to agree that all would adhere to the November 1989 accord "until
prices rise to an acceptable level". But they said nothing
specific about Kuwait and the UAE. [WSJ 7-12-90:A4] Then prices
"exploded" on a Saudi announcement that it would temporarily cut
back its 24.46 percent share of OPEC output to 22 percent. Kuwait
pledged to stay on quota, which one Saudi source said, "took care
of 50% of the problem. The other 50% was the UAE", which also
agreed to adhere to their quota. The crude oil futures contract
for August delivery went from $16 to $18.50 in a day. [WSJ 7-13-
90:A3] It held its gains over the next few days.
But disagreement was only deferred. Kuwait and Abu Dhabi
wanted a 1 mbd quota increase in the fall, to let them use "the
bulk of their spare production capacity." Iran and Iraq wanted
stronger prices sooner. Saudi Arabia repeated that their yielding
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of market share was temporary.[PIW 7-16-90:1]
A week later, prospects looked good for "a short and sweet
OPEC ministerial meeting" to ratify the Jiddah plan. But a stable
fourth quarter
"depends on the willingness of Kuwait, the UAE and Saudi
Arabia to forego the hope of quota increases in the fourth
quarter, which seems to have been a key factor motivating the
original Jiddah compromise. ... The escalation last week of
Iraq's verbal assault on its Gulf Arab neighbors may be a symptom
that the proposal is not as solid as it seems. ... Iraq's
threat...was all the more striking in that it followed market
indications that the UAE, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia were already
making [production] cuts. ... 'We all want prices back at $18 and
are willing to take the necessary steps', observes one OPEC
delegate, 'but this spirit of cooperation could vanish if arm-
twisting is used in an effort to achieve more ambitious goals.'"
[PIW 7-23-90:1]
By this time, Iraq had become the chief player in the game.
It is time to look at the background.
IRAQ: FROM SAVIOR TO PIRATE47
After the 1972 expulsion of Iraq Petroleum Co. (IPC), Iraq
profited, first by ignoring the 1973 production cuts ("embargo"),
then discounting prices. While Middle East output was flat, Iraq
reached a 3.5 mbd record in 1979. These number speak well for
their marketing and production. But it was a mistake to let
teams of French, Brazilians, and Russians discover oil, then push
them out without development rights. It felt good to make suckers
of East and West, but it eventually reduced their access to
capital and management, when they needed it most. The North
47 The following is drawn from [FTC 1952]; the respective
issues of [AAPG-B]; [Adelman 1972], ch. 7; Petroleum Press
Service (now Petroleum Economist), various issues in 1972.
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Rumaila field, discovered in 1958, is not developed.
The attack on Iran 1980-1988 In 1980, with production and
its revenues at the peak, the Baath regime reached for a much
bigger gain. The revolution in Iran, and the weakening of its
armed forces, brought a great opportunity. Nearly all Iranian
production was within 200 miles of the border. The expected
quick victory would have delivered it cheaply to Iraq.
We need not speculate about the "real motives" of Saddam
Hussein, then or later. He made great play in 1980 of the Battle
of Qadisiya in 630 A.D., where the Arabs had beaten "those
insolent Persians." His uncle and political mentor had written
that God had made three mistakes: creating flies, Persians, and
Jews. These 1300-year-old hatreds may be good for another 1300
years.
But it is wrong to compare "economic motives" with "non-
economic", because there is no trade-off or sacrifice of one for
another. The more wealth, the better to serve other ends. In 1980
and 1990 the wealth of the victim was a necessary sufficient
condition for the attack.
The 1980 venture failed, with a million dead, many more
wounded, refugees, etc. Both countries lost oil revenue,
directly and by postponed development. But loans from neighbors,
Western suppliers, and the Soviet Union more than covered the
costs to Iraq. They left enough to develop weapons that have
impressed the world, and enought cash to withstand three years of
embargo.
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In 1990, the seizure of Kuwait offered a producing capacity
and cash flow equal to Iraq, and capable of great expansion. Even
if Kuwait's foreign assets were out of reach, the horizon could
practically explode."4
From Enforcer to Hijacker in 1990 At first, Saddam Hussein
was the OPEC enforcer, like the late Jimmy Hoffa keeping the
truckers in line. The June average OPEC "basket", whose target
was $18, was down to $14.10. Dubai Fateh, which we have used as
the surrogate for Arab Light since 1985, was $13.25. Saudi Arabia
indicated its support of higher prices. [NYT 6-28-90:D1] As late
as July 11, the spot price was still under $13. [WSJ 7-12-90:C12]
Inventory buildup had ruined the prospect for the normal autumn
demand pickup. "OPEC excesses pre-empt autumn stock build."
[PIW:PMI 7-5-90:1] Exporters were "playing games" to hide
discounts. [PIW 7-9-90:6] As late as July 16, after the accord of
the five Gulf nations, markets were "teetering on edge of
disaster again." [PIW 7-16-90:5]
Then Iraq began threatening Kuwait and Abu Dhabi, accusing
them of the ultimate crime - being under American influence.
"'Cutting necks is better than cutting means of living.' Saudi
Arabia, Iran and Iraq have joined hands to bring about a greater
sense of discipline to OPEC." The Saudi government warned that
its "protection would not be extended to Kuwait in the face of
48 Cf. Patrick Clawson, of the Foreign Policy Research
Institute, in the Brookings Review, Spring 1991, page 3: "The
invasion of Kuwait was motivated not by dire need, but by greed
on a gargantuan scale."
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Iraqi anger." [NYT 7-18-90:D1]
Oil experts called the cooperation of Saudi Arabia and Iran
with Iraq the most important event since 1979. One "coined the
phrase 'Saddam factor' to explain the new realities in OPEC."
[WSJ 7-24-90:A3] "The general accord of these three ... has set
the stage for a credible policy by OPEC to push oil prices upward
in the 1990s, experts say." [NYT 7-25-90:A8] Another expert
called this "a historic turning point"; another called Iraq "now
the OPEC policeman"; another called it "a landmark in the history
of OPEC" [NYT 7-26-90:A1], or "a whole new ballgame," for which
he thanked Saudi Arabia and Iraq. [WSJ 7-27-90:A2] This is
overblown, as usual, but it would have been very important. See
Table I above, substituting 0.67 ("Persian Gulf") for 0.33
("Saudi Arabia").
The July OPEC meeting was short and decisive in limiting
production and raising the target price of the "basket" from $18
to $21. Past efforts had failed, but this one was different:
"Discipline is guaranteed by a principal player which carries a
loaded gun." [NYT 7-28-90:A1] Bloated inventories and stagnant
consumption were overborne because "Iraq as the enforcer has
become the key." [WSJ 7-30-90:A4] "The Saudis purred. They
pretended not to see the gun Iraq was pointing at Kuwait's head."
[Economist 8-4-90]
Yet the markets were skeptical. The Oil & Gas Journal said
that there was a need for output reduction in addition to the
Kuwait and UAE cuts. "Saudi Arabia, with token help from others,
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will trim output.... This is no small gesture. As they
demonstrated in 1985-86, the Saudis take market share seriously.
They'll want the ground they have yielded back when market
conditions" permit, but this did not look likely. [OGJ 7-23-
90:13, editorial] Others agreed: "OPEC, facing bloated
inventories, faces long wait for higher prices." Excess supply
was expected to reassert itself and bring prices down again. [WSJ
7-30-90:A6]
Up to this point, the "crisis" was on track. The challenge
of oversupply and weak prices had brought the response of
forceful action and rising prices. But at this point, the story
changed.
The policy of the USA We have mentioned that in 1986 the
then Vice-President Bush urged the Saudis to cut back output to
support prices. In 1990 his Administration wanted "a
rapprochement" with Persian Gulf countries, especially Saudi
Arabia and Iraq, who "will be crucial to the USA's economic
viability in the 1990s." Why we needed a rapprochement or
anything else "to ensure that the oil will continue to flow" [PE
2-90:60] passes all understanding. But it was believed on high,
and there were consequences.
During the Spring of 1990, despite mounting threats, and
revelations about Iraq weapons programs, the United States could
see, hear, and speak no evil. Stroking a tiger would turn him
into a tabby cat.
On July 25, a week before the invasion, the American
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Ambassador told Saddam Hussein that the United States sympathized
with his "need" for more money, never mind for what; that some in
the United States wanted an even higher oil price than the $25
Iraq demanded; and the US had no opinion on Iraq's border demands
on Kuwait."4  The Ambassador was only shocked when Iraq occupied
all of Kuwait. [NYT 9-19-90:A29] 50
The message to Saddam Hussein parallels a message sent on
the eve of World War II.
"[President Roosevelt's April 1939] message left Hitler with
a feeling of oneupmanship over a man he should have regarded as
potentially his most dangerous enemy. It does not bode well for
the peace of the world when the President of the United States
allows himself to be maneuvered into appearing as an inept and
ignorant fool." [Watt 1989, p. 264]
United States help for Iraq--of money, intelligence, and
49 The Ambassador later said this report, published in the
press (e.g. NYT 9-23-90:19], was "fabrication....
disinformation". [NYT 3-21-91:A1, A15] Nobody believes this.
"An unidentified senior State Department official was quoted in
the New York Times as having said it [the news report] was
"essentially correct'". ([NYT 3-22-91:A1]) See also Elaine
Sciolino, The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein's Quest for Power and
the Gulf Crisis (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1991), pp. 179,
271. Senators who finally secured access to the original
documents were indignant over the Ambassador's evasive and
inaccurate version of them. [NYT 7-13-91:Al]
50 Even after the attack, Professor Brzezinski thought Iraq
had "financial and territorial claims (not all of which were
unfounded)." [NYT 10-7-90 OpEd] The president of the Council on
Foreign Relations (Undersecretary of State in the Clinton
Administration) urged Kuwaiti "concessions to Iraq regarding oil
pricing and production, territory and debt." [NYT 11-30-90 OpEd]
This is amusing to anyone who follows the oil market. Since the
end of 1989, Kuwait had reduced output by 200 tbd, while Iraq had
increased by 400 tbd. Plainly Iraq was the bigger price cutter.
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strategic and other products--was propelled by the self-
flattering myth, that the U. S. Government would influence Saddam
Hussein, and change his behavior. The same U.S. Ambassador to
Iraq, in April 1990: "Iraq has modified its behavior and policies
in large part because of our diplomatic efforts." [q. Boston
Globe, 6-15-92:1,10]
Seen from the oil market, this fat-witted self-conceit is
deja vu. The U.S. Government has for decades thought it was
influencing Saudi Arabia and other producers.5 1 It still
believes it has a "partnership" with a "top ally". The leading
advisor on Middle East affairs on the National Security Council
staff thinks there is "a bilateral relationship" with Saudi
Arabia, thanks to which we get "cheap and plentiful oil". [WSJ
10-26-92:Al] As General Sherman said, people believe a delusin
harder than they do a fact.
Invasion, blockade, and dilatory OPEC On August 2, Iraq
seized Kuwait. The Oil & Gas Journal explained it:
"An OPEC accord that effectively lifts the group's second
half quota by 400 tbd with demand soft and the world awash in oil
stocks seemed more likely to collapse rather than support a $3
hike in the marker ... [Saddam Hussein] recognized that members
could be tantalized or cowed into agreeing to an absurd quota
increase. He must also have recognized that it wouldn't work. So
he invaded Kuwait." [OGJ 8-6-90:NL1; Editorial, p. 19]
The Saudis' hired gun was now pointed at them. On August 5
51 Cf the previous papers in this series. State Department
documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act and
published in the [Washington Post, 7-21-92:1] tell of frequent
communication during the Reagan-Bush Administration, who
apparently followed their predecessors' rule: since we said it,
somebody must have done something to comply.
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came the UN blockade of Iraq and Kuwait. In January-February,
military action drove Iraqi forces from Kuwait, and forced it to
agree to destruction of chemical, biological, and nuclear
weapons. The United States acted without of any treaty or
understanding or "bilateral relationship" with Kuwait, because
its interests required it to do so. The Saudis had always known
that the USA would support them no matter what they did about
prices.
Following the August 5 blockade, the price rose faster than
in previous crises, to a monthly high of $31.55 in October. Part
of the increase was due to the deliberate inaction of the other
OPEC producers.
During the first half of 1990, Iraq and Kuwait had produced
5.0 mbd, consumed 0.425 mbd, and exported 4.575 mbd.52 The loss
of their output almost precisely offset OPEC excess capacity,
excluding Kuwait and Iraq, as calculated by PIW [PIW 3-12-90:6]
But true excess capacity was probably larger than estimated
by about 1.5 mbd. PIW had reckoned excess capacity for the Gulf
big five at 3.45 mbd. But just before the invasion, Sadad al-
Husseini, an Aramco senior exploration-production vice president
had said the five had "more than 6 mbd" excess, and increasing.
[OGJ 7-23-90:NL3] Less than 1 mbd of that 6 mbd excess can be
ascribed to Kuwait and Iraq. Kuwait was credited with 2.4 mbd
capacity, and produced 1.7 in July. Iraq's capacity was reckoned
52Production is from PE, which includes condensate and
natural gas liquids. Consumption is from the CIA, inventories
from DOE : IPSR.
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at 3.1 mbd in February, but it produced 3.4 mbd in July. Mr. al-
Husseini implied that excluding Kuwait and Iraq there was more
than 5 mbd of excess capacity at the Gulf. Thus the excess
capacity exceeded the shortfall, by about 1.5 mbd.
Of course the additional capacity could not simply be
switched on overnight. But inventories were excessive, to let the
market take the interim strain. On April 1, stocks were 100 days
of forward consumption, as compared with 92 days on January 1.
[OGJ 7-30-90:72] The large accumulation during the first quarter
was contra-seasonal. At the end of June, stocks had grown to 102
days. During the July-September quarter, stocks actually
increased again, to 105 days' consumption, and were 103 at years-
end. [DOE-IPSR]
The inventory buildup shows that production exceeded
consumption. The 1990 oil crisis was like the others. The threat
of shortage generated precautionary demand for more inventories,
which raised prices, which brought additional speculative demand.
Expectation of a higher price is a self-fulfilling prophecy.
OPEC excess capacity was considered "ample to replace loss
if producers move." [PIW 8-13-90:1, emphasis added] They could
easily have prevented the jump in precautionary demand, by
immediately stating in public that they would take immediate
action to produce to the limit as soon as possible. They did not
do so. Saudi Arabia and Venezuela carefully dithered, seeking
OPEC unanimity which they did not need. By August 14, neither
had even stated an intent to increase production. [WSJ 8-15-
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90:A3] Venezuela made "contradictory start-and-stop announcements
on providing extra oil..."[PIW 8-20-90:4] OPEC nations were
"uncomfortable with the high levels of commercial stockpiles
around the world." [NYT 8-16-90:A1]
Oil prices were helped up by "a Saudi request for an
emergency OPEC meeting, without a date or time being established,
and the report of lower Saudi production next month." [NYT 8-17-
90:D1, emphasis added] But Saudi Arabia (and Venezuela) said
they would increase output "to replace much of the 4 mbd lost
...[which] would slow the recent runup ...The Saudis also
rescinded indicated supply cuts for next month." [WSJ 8-17-90:A3,
emphasis added] The next day, a Saudi official who insisted on
anonymity said the country "could increase its production by two
mbd 'by tomorrow morning', and could add an additional 0.5 mbd
quickly thereafter." Venezuela promised a decision soon. [NYT 8-
18-90:33] The next day, the Saudis said that they would increase
by 2 mbd, but not how soon or how long. [NYT 8-19-90:1] A few
days later, this became "as much as 2 mbd". [WSJ 8-23-90:A3] Or
it was "nearly" 7.4 mbd from 5.4 mbd. [NYT 8-23-90:A14] It still
was not clear a week later. [OGJ 9-3-90:31]
"Oil markets [had] remained jittery because neither the
Saudis nor the Venezuelans had publicly declared their plans."
Minister Nazer urged other OPEC countries to produce more. [WSJ
8-20-90:A3] President Perez "strongly suggested that Venezuela
and other OPEC countries will soon increase production", but not
past quotas. [WSJ 8-20-90:A4] On August 23, Venezuela "appear[ed]
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to end three weeks of indecision" by announcing that September
production would be up 325 tbd, and December by 500 tbd. [NYT 8-
24-90:D4]
A week after the invasion, the International Energy Agency
estimated the September shortfall at 0.6 to 2.5 mbd. But on
August 20, they raised their estimated gap to 1.4 to 3.2 mbd. The
reason: "little evidence that any additional oil has actually
been pumped to replace the lost output of Iraq and Kuwait." [NYT
8-21-90:D1] There were varying reports on how much OPEC would
produce above quota: perhaps 3 mbd [WSJ 8-28-90:A3] or 3.6 mbd.
[NYT 8-28-90:D6]
The UAE, "one of the most frequent quota breakers in the
past, called on all OPEC states to strictly adhere to [i.e, stay
within] quotas." The president of Iran said higher output would
be treachery, etc, etc--but he had raised output immediately,
reaching the limit in August. [OGJ 8-20-90:24] So did others
while arguing it was not their mission to save the West from an
economic crisis. Consumers were better served by greed than by
high principle and "special relationships".
Prices kept rising, doubtless because of fear of war, but
the head of the well known consultancy of Purvin & Gertz thought
the market was reacting to delays by Saudi Arabia and Venezuela.
"The market thinks the additional production just isn't coming on
on schedule, and the clock keeps ticking away." [NYT 8-23-90:A1]
Some "senior OPEC ministers" had an interesting explanation
for keeping capacity unused. "The only thing keeping a lid on
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prices is the promise that OPEC can produce more when it becomes
necessary. Once that capacity is spent, any added shortfall will
create chaos..." [PIW 8-27-90:9] Thus producing less would lower
prices. The message was that they would produced less.
On August 29, OPEC finally met and lifted all restrictions.
[WSJ 8-30-90:A3] But this did not guarantee capacity output.
Spot prices fell, then jumped again. At the end of the month, the
IEA predicted a substantial oil shortage for later in the year.
[NYT 8-31-90:D1] Such a perception probably underlay the resumed
price increase. [WSJ 8-31-90:A3]
By early September, it was known that Saudi production for
that month would be up by over 2 mbd, with smaller increases in
Abu Dhabi and Venezuela. But "the Saudis offer no indication of
likely production levels for the fourth quarter". [OGJ 9-10-
90:24] Supplies were ample, but the mere prospect of fourth-
quarter shortages raised them. [WSJ 9-6-90:A3] There were reports
of hoarding by distributors and retail consumers. [NYT 9-6-90:D4]
Private economists were more pessimistic: "usable commercial
crude oil stocks will be depleted by the end of October." [NYT 9-
6-90:D1] In hindsight, of course, they were wildly wrong. But
Saddam Hussein was still in Kuwait. When he issued new threats,
there was a strong interaction of precautionary and speculative
demand, and a new price peak at end-September. "
53 Former Minister Yamani said on October 8 "that the price
of crude oil should drop to $15 to $18 ... once the Persian Gulf
crisis was defused." [NYT 10-9-90:D25] He was right on target,
one of the most successful forecasts ever recorded.
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"Ridiculous surplus" In the first half of October, there
were predictions of oil prices reaching $45 before winter ended;
if war came, Herman Franssen predicted $60. [WSJ 10-19-90:A2] The
Venezuelan oil minister was much more astute: he wanted an
agreement by "some of the world's biggest oil consuming and
producing countries" to fix the price somewhere between $25 and
$30. [WSJ 10-19-90:B9] (There was a meeting in Geneva a month
later, with 18 countries represented, to report to the UN
Secretary General. [NYT 11-7-90:D8]) James R. Schlesinger thought
"a simple war," with no damage to Saudi fields, could send the
price to $60. [WSJ 10-22-90:B3A]
But prices dropped on October 19, and then it was all
downhill. Late October heard the familiar refrain. Iran
"softens price terms in an effort to increase flagging Western
sales. [PIW 10-29-90:1 That week, Saudi production surpassed 8.2
mbd, and it was estimated that the lost output had been made up.
[NYT 11-4-90:1] A week later, OPEC production exceeded the pre-
invasion ceiling, demand was "sluggish" and an oil expert said
"OPEC could end up in the ridiculous situation of a production
surplus even without Iraq and Kuwait." [WSJ 11-12-90:A3] In
fact, the surplus was already there. "Excess capacity is back. In
November, for the first time since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait,
OPEC members produced less than they could have, and sold even
less than they produced." [PIW 12-3-90:1] IEA noted the same
phenomenon. [WSJ 12-5-90:A6]
At this point, all that kept the price up was the
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uncertainty surrounding any expected war. Even so, the December
spot price was at about the August level, while contract prices,
influenced also by declining futures prices, were between June
and July levels. The December OPEC meeting was openly worried
about price collapse, even down to the range of $10. [NYT 12-11-
90:D1] [WSJ 12-12-90:A2] Both Iraq and Kuwait attended as usual.
It was agreed without dissent that quotas would be restored once
the crisis was over. [WSJ 12-13-90:A2] By early January, "oil
glut seems likely as demand slows, even if there is a short-lived
war." [WSJ 1-8-91:A5]
There is no evidence that consumption had slowed, except as
caused by recession; but there was an end to precautionary and
speculative demand. The IEA had projected a fourth-quarter stock
drawdown of 500 tbd; it now estimated there had actually been a
200 tbd buildup. In addition, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Venezuela
had built up their land or tanker storage by about 100 mb, of
which 50 mb was above normal. [WSJ 1-10-91:A16] No one should
reproach IEA; its basic data were too delayed and fragmentary.
The actual war in January-February ended the uncertainty.
The spot price had declined to $27.40 by January 16, the first
day of the bombing of Iraq. Two days later, it was down to
$16.40, and stayed in the $16-$19 range. Essentially prices were
back to where they had been in early 1990, before the trade had
been scared by excess inventories. The speed of reversal was
unprecedented.
Appraisal of the 1990 crisis This price upheaval started
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like the other two. The challenge was excess supply and weak
prices; the response was drastic action to restrict supply. Iraq
began as cartel enforcer, then became a pirate. Overnight, two
major suppliers vanished. The upward price spiral was quicker
than in 1973 and 1979. Of course the loss was soon made up, but
so it had been in 1979.
But something was new. The price dropped back to earlier
levels so quickly that the OPEC nations had not even the chance
to discuss how they would peg it at a higher level. Several
factors explain this.
First, the Saudis acted differently. After a month's
profitable silence, letting the price rise, they increased output
and let it be known they would keep it high. Within a month,
prices had peaked. That was a far cry from 1979-1980, when their
prolonged refusal to assure more supply kept driving up the price
for over a year.
Second, there were no price controls in consuming countries.
There was no incentive to hoard: to buy crude oil or products at
low controlled prices to hold for inevitable and guaranteed
higher prices. Hence there was no additional kick to speculative
demand.
Third, the use of futures markets also helped. Buyers bought
futures contracts instead of bidding for physical barrels. Of
course this raised futures prices, and made it profitable to buy
now for sale later; but the effect was damped by postponement and
hedging, and stopped altogether as soon as the news ceased to be
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threatening. This appraisal is supported by the work of [Weiner
1992].
Strategic petroleum reserves in the USA, Japan, and Germany,
were used too little and far too late. They were saved for a
"real physical shortage." This was nonsense. Shortage can happen
to an individual, and fear of shortage drives him to panic
bidding, which raises the price. But for the whole market a
shortage is impossible. Price rises to equate the amount offered
with the amount demanded. The price rise does the economic
damage. If the SPR had offered large or unlimited amounts for
sale (or options for future sale), it would have been prevention
not cure.5 8
But use of the SPR to prevent a price rise was considered as
interfering with free markets. If so, a central bank should be
prohibited from changing the money supply, since that affects the
interest rate directly and all other prices indirectly. Any
economic policy change affects supply or demand, hence prices.
Perhaps the US, German, and Japanese governments had some deeper
reason they could not reveal, and had to offer these jewels of
economic illiteracy.
In my opinion, the SPRs must have had some effect, like a
wartime fleet over the horizon. The knowledge, that the reserve
was there and could be used, moderated though it could not
prevent a suddenly swollen precautionary/speculative demand.
58 This had been explained in my presidential address to
the IAEE, published in The Energy Journal, 1984.
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Perhaps more important, the knowledge quelled the panic in
governments. There was no feeling of a gun pointed at the
decision-maker's head. Hence the reserves bought time to take
diplomatic and military action.
When the war began and prices collapsed, the IEA
recommended, and DOE announced, token sales from the strategic
reserves--just when they were no longer needed. Samuel Johnson
defines a Patron as "one who looks with unconcern at a man
struggling in the water, who when he reaches ground, encumbers
him with help." IEA-DOE were patrons of security.
When the fighting had just ended, General Schwarzkopf was
asked whether Iraq could rise again to threaten the Gulf. He
replied in effect: No, unless "someone chooses to rearm them".
But many will choose to sell when Iraq--or Iran--has enough oil
money to buy. "Mideast nations are eager to purchase some of the
powerful high-tech gadgetry that won the Persian Gulf war. ...
American defense contractors are salivating over the prospect of
big Mideast sales." [WSJ 3-4-91:A1]
Official Washington believed, as Daniel Yergin wrote: "What
we had before was a special relationship [with Saudi Arabia].
Now we have a more special relationship." [NYT 6-19-91:D1] They
expected the USA would have "more influence in OPEC than any
industrial nation has ever exercised. ... They are now just
beginning to discuss how they might use their new franchise. ...
If crude oil price plunged ... Washington might lean on a
reluctant Saudi Arabia to cut production and push prices back up
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to a range of $18 to $22." [NYT 3-5-91:D1] Others believed that
the failure to raise prices was the result of US influence.
[Hogan 1992]
In fact, shortly after the bombing of Iraq began, Saudi
Arabia cut output by 15 percent. When prices recovered it
suddenly rescinded "most" of the cuts. [WSJ 1-22-91:A2] OPEC
output for January was substantially down, for lack of demand. At
end-February:
"Opinions differ even in the kingdom on how much the Saudis
should reduce output on OPEC's return to quotas. But there are
signals from the kingdom's oil-policy makers that they will be
willing to cut output as much as necessary to support a $20 or
$21 price so long as others in OPEC cooperate. ... 'We hope that
we get more commitments from the others--and a better
understanding of our sacrifice in not using all our capacity'",
[said a Saudi official]. WSJ 2-25-91:A1, emphasis added]
In fact, they did not get the cooperation, and were
steadfast in refusing to be swing suppliers. The lesson had been
learned. The alleged American influence is nowhere to be found.
THE POSTWAR MARKET IN 1991-1992
As Figure Ic shows, prices in the years 1991-1992 look like
the rest of the post-1986 period, excepting June-December 1990.
Measured excess capacity has stayed at practically zero. Yet as
already noted, by November 1990 members felt burdened by it, and
the feeling continued. We look at excess capacity below.
Pricing methods show chronic oversupply These did not
change much. The lines between spot and term contracts remained
unclear. [PIW 7-29-91:3] But a PIW survey found continuity from
about the beginning of 1988. Term prices actually averaged below
spot:
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"For the past four years or so, since formula pricing was
introduced, the long-term nature of supply contracts appears to
have been more valuable to producers than to buyers. The
producers are effectively willing to pay for the insurance of
having steady customers by discounting their crudes relative to
spot markets. The differences ... are not insignificant." [PIW 1-
6-92:1]
This is strong evidence of an oversupplied market over the
whole period, with the amount offered chronically in excess of
the amount demanded. Yet during this time, the percent of
capacity utilized was high and rising. By 1990, the apparent
excess capacity was within the margin for measurement error -
effectively zero. But prices declined more steeply than at any
time since 1986.
Additional evidence is that an increasing number of
suppliers signed "frame" contracts, which bound sellers but not
buyers, who had "no obligation to take the oil if they don't want
it" and "without canceling the contract". Prices were set cargo
by cargo, and the exporter benefitted by keeping a wider customer
list. [PIW 5-11-92:3, and SS] There is an obvious saving in
transaction costs, but the buyer gained most.
There were price differentials according to cargo
destination. These are usually but not always discriminatory. In
spot markets, premia tended to be rapidly arbitraged away. But
for term contracts on major Persian Gulf crudes, the advantage
would last "anywhere from two to nine months at a time". In
rising markets, Western buyers overpaid, in declining markets
Asian buyers did. Apparently buyers expected the premia to
balance the discounts. [PIW 4-13-92:1] This does not look like a
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permanent systematic difference. The prices of many crudes sold
under term contracts were linked to one or another actively
traded "benchmark" grade. In August 1992, PIW noted that for at
least some important cases, the particular benchmark did not much
matter, the result was nearly identical. [PIW 8-10-92:1]
Co-operation, dialogue, interdependence Japan briefly
considered funding its commitment to a larger contribution to the
Persian Gulf war by an import tax. "Some Saudi and Kuwaiti oilmen
are furious. ... The energy tax proposal is seen as actively
hostile." [PIW 2-4-91:3] The issue was kept alive partly at OPEC
meetings. In March, some members said that
"the group should publicly distance itself from old policies
of large volume cutbacks aimed at creating price rallies in favor
of an identity that emphasizes the need to prop up prices in time
of surplus to ensure that capacity will be available to meet
demands." [PIW 3-18-91:1, emphasis added]
This is a useful reminder of (1) what "old policies" had
actually been: "large volume cutbacks" to boost prices; (2) the
feeling of "surplus" even with Kuwait and Iraq shut down, when
capacity seemed fully used; (3) exploiting consumer anxiety of
not enough oil. In a May 1991 speech at Harvard, the Saudi Oil
Minister Nazer called for "reciprocal energy security". In return
for "even modest demonstrations of goodwill toward [Saudi Arabia]
... the US and other consumer nations would gain guaranteed
access to a fairly priced ocean of oil." The modest goodwill was
in financing of oil investment. [PIW 5-27-91:16] The terms of
that investment, what "access" meant, or how it was to be
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"guaranteed", or "fairly priced" were all left unsaid.5 9
"Low oil prices are bad, some U.S. experts say." [NYT 3-12-
91:D6] A Paris meeting of 21 consumer and producer nations was
called for July 1991. The convening governments, France and
Venezuela, said the conference would avoid pricing issues
"focusing instead on finance and investment." [PIW 5-27-91:10]
The journal itself saw not much of either form or substance at
the meeting, but:
"Rising European and Japanese oil product taxes were the
target of the most intense attack by Saudi Arabia, Iran, and
other producer countries. ... The producers shared their
nightmare vision of billions of dollars in new investments--made
partly at the behest of consumers--lying fallow because said
consumers won't consume enough. ...the softer message being
whispered in the corridors was that the clear battle lines from
the oil wars of the 1970s and 1980s are becoming increasingly
blurred." [PIW 7-8-91:1]
Money invested "at the behest of consumers" is the usual
suggestion that producing countries invest to help consumers.
But "clear battle lines" imply that there was organized
resistance to the oil producers in 1970-1990, which could hardly
be more untrue.
The International Energy Agency called a meeting of experts
from producer and consumer countries. First scheduled for autumn
1991, it was held in Paris in March 1992. It also ignored prices
and production, but addressed "industrial cooperation", and
funding for upstream and downstream investment. [PIW 3-2-92:6]
And a meeting of Ministers was called in Bergen in July 1992, to
59 The thesis is elaborated but not further clarified in
Robert Mabro, "A Dialogue between Oil Producers and Consumers"
(Oxford International Energy Studies, 1991)
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pursue similar topics. Meanwhile the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation Conference set up an energy task force, which held at
least four meetings to discuss Asian energy shortages. [PIW 5-25-
92:4]
The surplus seemed permanent, and so did consumers' fear of
shortage. Never the twain shall meet.
Foreign investment in OPEC Reports of foreign investment in
the OPEC countries have been many and elusive after 1985,
increasingly so in 1991-1992. But through 1992 there was mostly
frustration.
Venezuela invited bids to reactivate old fields under
service contracts, which did not require Congressional approval.
[PIW 2-4-91:3; PIW 4-8-91:3] Nearly 90 bids were received, but
only five bidders stayed because of the restrictions in the
contracts. Negotiations dragged on over the amount of fees. [PIW
3-23-92:5][NYT 6-23-92:D4] But some contracts were signed in
June. Foreign firms were guaranteed that production from the
restored marginal fields would not be reduced by OPEC quotas.
[PIW 9-21-92:3]6o One deal fell through because Shell's
insistence on international arbitration of disputes would have
required Congressional approval. [PIW 10-26-92:1] Finally, we may
mention the Cristobal Colon liquefied natural gas (LNG) project,
which seems to be uneconomic at prevailing natural gas prices in
60 Similar provisions were being discussed in Iran, Iraq, and
especially Abu Dhabi: "Companies say that they would be prepared to
invest in further boosting capacity if the increased flows are
guaranteed once the outlays are made."
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the United States, the designated market.
There was also an attempt to form "strategic associations"
with foreign companies, who would put up capital to build
refineries to upgrade Orinoco crude, and thereby obtain "a better
shot" at obtaining a conventional exploration contract, "although
such ventures would be subject to approval by the Venezuelan
Congress". That made it hopeless, especially with elections the
following year. A proposed joint venture with Mitsubishi was not
presented for Congressional approval. [PIW 4-20-92:6] [PIW 5-4-
92:1] [WSJ 7-16-92:A7] By late 1992, time was running out for
these "association" contracts. An attempt in the Venezuelan
Congress to block them was in effect a warning that they might
all have to wait until after the next elections, in late 1993.
[PIW 8-17-92:3]
Venezuelan progress is slowed by political resistance to
foreign investment. PDVSA receives insufficient funds for
drilling, and makes uneconomic investment in oil refining and
petrochemicals. They have come nowhere near their end-1991
target of 3 mbd capacity.
Kuwait was at first preoccupied with putting out the fires
and capping the wells exploded by Iraqi forces before they
withdrew. Outside the oil fields, things were soon normal. "Their
nation saved, Kuwaitis now wait for someone to fix it." [NYT 4-
5-91:A10] Diplomats now estimated the cost of rebuilding the oil
industry at $5 billion to $10 billion--one tenth the sums being
bandied about two months earlier. [WSJ 5-16-91:Al] It was a small
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part of their foreign assets.
Putting out all the fires was expected to take as long as
two years. [WSJ 4-5-91:A11] "Experts here don't expect
significant [oil] revenue for a year, perhaps longer. [WSJ 5-30-
91:All] Even at end-June 1991, the Kuwaiti Oil Minister expected
only that more than half the fires would be out by end-March.
[NYT 6-25-91:C4] In fact, all fires were extinguished and wells
capped by November 6, in "less time than almost anyone expected,
at less expense in lives and money, and with very few technical
innovations." The first half of the work had taken six months,
the second half less than two. The cost was variously estimated
at from $1.5 to $2.2 billion. [NYT 11-7-91:A3] The incentive was
strong. "The longer it takes Kuwait to get its industry up and
running, ... the less clout it carries in OPEC power structure,
where muscle is measured by oil output." [WSJ 2-24-92:B3C]
But Kuwait had "severe managerial problems". Had Kuwait Oil
Company (KOC) installed downhole blowout preventers in wells,
there might have been fewer fires. [PIW 5-6-91:1] In 1991, they
were offered several equity deals, but refused them on principle.
"Oil company expertise is essential for reservoir damage
assessment and correction. ... Although KOC might be able to do
much of the work itself, it does not have advanced reservoir-
management experience." [PIW 9-30-91:3] BP as former operator had
a natural inside track, asked for equity or production sharing,
and was refused. The earlier-than-expected capping of wells
improved KOC confidence. [PIW 11-18-91:3] But "Kuwait's lack of
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expertise in reservoir management" persisted, and an agreement
was reached in March 1992, with BP reimbursement apparently both
in cash and in crude oil. [PIW 3-23-92:1]
A trade publication, and Kuwait oilmen speaking privately,
said future costs would be three times prewar because of damage
and the need for pumping and secondary recovery. [WSJ 4-26-91:A1]
There are some rough cost indicators. "Some $2 billion to
$2.5 billion of the near-term expenditures will be used to
rebuild Kuwait's badly damaged oil fields." [WSJ 5-20-91:A8] This
agrees with another report. "The total cost of rehabilitating
Kuwait's oil industry is put at $8b to $10b". [NYT 5-4-92:A1]
According to [CMB 1984], in the Middle East in 1980-1984 (the
last five years available) expenditures on "crude oil and natural
gas" were 23 percent of total oil industry capital expenditures.
If so, then taking the high end of the range, crude oil
production expenditures would have been $2.3 billion. If the
newly established capacity is 2 mbd, the required investment
would be $1,150 per daily barrel.
Kuwait recovery in production exceeded expectations. But
they hoped to increase light crude oil output. This was believed
to require the help of oil companies rather than engineering
concerns, and there was no sign of lessening political resistance
to oil companies. [PIW 7-13-92:1] Yet they remained hopeful of
some kind of arrangement involving margins per barrel produced.
[PIW 10-26-92:3]
As noted earlier, Algeria had been the first OPEC nation to
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begin trying to win back international companies. The prime
minister floated a trial balloon, proposing to sell off part of
the oil fields, but it was quelled by "vocal domestic
opposition". [PIW 7-29-91:7] No more was heard of what was of
course a red flag to the bull of fundamentalist Islam. By
December 1991, Algeria claimed "expressions of interest from at
least 19 firms in its plan to attract some $6 to $7 billion in
cash bonuses for entry into enhanced oil-recovery programs", to
increase oil production to 1.0 then 1.2 mbd. [PIW 12-23-91:3]
But nothing more was heard of this interest. Algeria provided
that foreign companies could take up to 49% of production of
existing fields, but only after paying an amount equal to
expenditures made by Sonatrach to discover and exploit the field.
[NYT 12-2-91:D5] This was too clever by half. Nobody would
reimburse Sonatrach for its notoriously improvident expenditures.
In 1992, the returning Oil Minister, Nordine Ait-Laouissine,
successfully proposed to de-nationalize gas. "I had, 20 years
earlier ... advocated the very measures that I was now proposing
be overturned. But the national company was without money and the
technical and human resources..." [PIW 3-9-92:6] The Minister
was soon forced out, but the policy remained. However, there is
as yet no evidence of an actual increase in Algerian investment.
Drilling rigs active in 1992 were slightly below 1991, and one-
fourth down from 1986.
Iraq remained cut off from foreign investment. But during
August 1991, the USA suggested allowing the Kurds to use some of
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the Iraqi assets and funds held by Western governments "and to
begin to exploit and export the huge oil resources in the north
of Iraq." [NYT 8-20-91:A8] This would have added a formidable
competitor to the market, with large resources, anxious to
attract investment and sell oil. It would have endangered OPEC.
Nothing more was heard of it.
Iraq actively negotiated with foreign companies.
"And unlike the flurry of talks before Iraq's takeover of
Kuwait last August, this round is likely to bring equity
positions for foreign companies and an active role for these
firms well into the next century. ... Officials want to move
quickly and seem likely to accept what was rejected out of hand
18 months ago [i.e., in April 1990] ... Baghdad would probably
accept an agreement ... which would look a lot like a standard
production-sharing contract but would be called something else."
[PIW 10-28-91:1] [Nine months later:] "We are prepared to
discuss all conditions, including production-sharing and profit
oil, which will meet our requirement to increase production
capacity to 5 to 6 mbd within four years", They were offering a
production share of "5% and lower". [PIW 7-13-92:1, SS]
So said a senior official. (The reporter warned that not
everyone in Baghdad agreed). A five percent fee is around $1 per
barrel. It must provide a high rate of return for the unusual
risk. That tells us much about Iraqi costs.
PIW reported after an on-the-ground tour that much of the
Iraqi oil production industry had been restored. This paralleled
other reports to the effect that "reconstruction efforts,
financed by multibillion dollar slush funds still held by Iraq
largely in Switzerland" have done much to repair infrastructure
and provide food. [NYT 7-27-92:A7] It would be fascinating to
know how the funds were built up. Iraq borrowing from foreign
governments (over and above private banks and corporations) was
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estimated at from $86 billion to $90 billion. [WSJ 2-25-91:A5]
[NYT 3-1-91:A8] It took some skill to divert a large proportion
to safe havens. The cash reserve was estimated at nearly $30
billion before the war [NYT 4-25-93:14] and about $20 billion in
early 1993. [Salomon Brothers International Oil 4-20-93] The use
of the funds implies that Saddam Hussein and his government
expect to remain in power. Total (formerly Compagnie Francaise
des Petroles) has sent negotiators on frequent trips to Baghdad
recently to discuss a return, particularly to develop the big
Nahr Umr field in southern Iraq. [PE 1-93:5]
Iraq's willingness to accept foreign equity investment is
unique among OPEC governments, a revolution in policy. We do not
know how seriously to take it. Perhaps it will only prove that
the Irish are right:
When the Devil was ill,
The Devil a monk would be.
When the Devil was well,
Devil a monk was he!
An increase in Iraq capacity, even to less than "5 or 6
mbd", financed and managed by foreign companies on equity
contracts, would put overwhelming pressure on other OPEC
producers to follow their example.
Iran is probably the most important example of attempts to
link up with foreign companies. In May 1991, the goal was
stated, of 5 mbd by 1993. [NYT 5-27-91:35] The method of
association would be: "Long term crude sales contracts on
favorable terms to companies that invest in exploration and
development in Iran. However, [the Minister] ruled out any equity
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or production sharing agreements. ...Talks mainly involve
existing discoveries that they can't afford to develop on their
own." [WSJ 5-30-91:A6] There was even an NIOC-Total letter of
intent on offshore oil field development. [WSJ 5-31-91:A10] No
results are known.
Late in 1991, three offshore projects seemed "all
remarkably close to equity deals". [PIW 10-14-91:1] Oil Minister
Aghazadeh called them service contracts with a payout in crude
oil.
What actually happened was a series of relatively short term
loans. In about four years following the end of the war in 1988,
Iran incurred roughly $25 billion of debt, by borrowing and by
using suppliers' credits, for restoration of all kinds, including
oil. Financing of this type tends to be expensive, and by end-
1992 some interest and principal payment were in default. [PE
2:93:3]
It was not clear what if any kinds of oil development
contracts had been signed. Iran and the companies were still far
apart on the speed at which firms would be allowed to recover
costs through crude liftings. Operators wanted 5 to 7 years, NIOC
originally suggested up to 18. The fields would revert to NIOC
after full recovery of all costs and a one-time return. [PIW 5-4-
92:1] Two months later, Iran was said to be receptive to onshore
exploration with foreign firms. Again equity could not be
considered, but some risk-reward element might be. [PIW 7-27-
92:1]
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All this recalls the double-talk in Iraq over production-
sharing "which would be called something else." It appears that
Iran has had little help from foreign companies in restoring
production. At end-November 1992, they could at most claim that
"Iran expects to conclude negotiations soon on some" projects. As
in Kuwait, questions have been raised about maximum sustainable
capacity. "Wartime neglect, along with damage to surface
facilities from Iraqi attacks, did greatly reduce pressure in oil
reservoirs over the past decade." [WSJ 11-25-92:A1]
By their own efforts the Iranians have made slow but
impressive progress. In 1989 they aimed for 4 mbd in one year,
and they did get there in four years. In October 1992, Iran
produced briefly at 4 mbd. This was not yet sustainable capacity.
[PIW 10-19-92:1 [WSJ 11-5-92:A5] But even the forecast of 4.5
mbd in March 1993 [WSJ 10-19-92:A4] was treated with respect
because Iran permitted a visit by foreign journalists, and gave
estimates by individual fields, onshore and offshore. [OGJ 11-9-
92:37] Such detail had not been released since 1978, although it
was not audited. There might be slippage, but by no more than a
quarter.
Moreover, NIOC said 60 drilling rigs were working or
scheduled. [OGJ 11-9-92:37] By early 1943, 48 were reported
operating. [OGJ 5-17-93:76] This is an impressive new departure.
The previous (1978) high had been only 31 rigs. [AAPG-B, vol. 63,
no. 10, October 1979, p. 1894] After zero rigs in 1980-1981,
there had been only 3 in 1982, 13 in 1983, and thereafter a
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fairly steady 18-20 through 1991. [IPE] None of the big Gulf
producers had ever exceeded 30 rigs, except for Iraq in 1980-
1981. If maintained, the drilling rate promises a steady growth
in Iran capacity. Iran aims to "convince OPEC colleagues that
Iran--like Saudi Arabia--can turn up the taps unless it gets the
price and quota that it desires." [PIW 10-19-92:1]
But an underlying 10 percent annual decline rate was also
mentioned. Minister Aghazadeh said average output per well had
steeply declined since the peak of the 1970s, but gave no data.
He expected to exceed 5 mbd in the next five years. After that,
it depended on demand. In the past two to three years, they had
tried to compensate for war damage and underdevelopment. There
were also some "enormous" prospects needing exploration. [PIW 10-
26-92:7]
OPEC: MARKET SHARE CONTENTION AS USUAL
The 1991 meetings: "capacity is king" Capacity as a
bargaining tool was again a major theme from the start of 1991.
"Additions to capacity should ensure that Iran is better placed
to argue for larger OPEC quota allocation the next time the issue
is discussed." [PIW 1-28-91:3]
The first meeting was in March. Despite a 97 percent
capacity utilization rate, and "despite all that has happened
since Iraq invaded Kuwait ... [OPEC] delegates are making many of
the same old arguments about the same thorny controversies that
plagued them through most of the past decade." Should they
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restrict output, or was the price perhaps too high? Should the
low-population Gulf producers make disproportionate cuts? Who was
to blame for excess capacity? Should quotas be changed?
But there was one constant: "Saudi Arabia is adamant in its
refusal to take on the swing-producer role even after the war."
[PIW 2-25-91:1] "OPEC eyes hard job of allotting quotas as glut
looms". [PIW 3-4-91:1] "They all recognize they have to cut
output collectively for the second quarter. But how [to] do it?
That's where the problems arise." [NYT 3-11-91:D1] The Saudis had
been producing about 5 mbd, were now at 8 mbd, and would not
consider going down to 7 mbd. If others insisted, there would
simply be no agreement. [WSJ 3-11-91:A3] "As in the bad old days
... the key issues are whether oil glut and price collapse
threaten and, if they do, who should bear the burden of fending
them off." [PIW 3-11-91:1] The final decision was to cut by 5
percent, the Saudis keeping 8 mbd, with which others were
discontented.
In form, quotas were suspended after the invasion. They were
published, yet they were not considered quotas because they were
voluntary. [NYT 3-13-91:D1] [WSJ 3-13-91:A3] That was a fig leaf.
In fact, total output and its division continued as the obsessive
interest of the group, no matter what the formal agenda (or lack
of it) at the meetings. The pretense of non-quotas continued
through November 1992. [WSJ 11-30-92:A2]
OPEC's "seemingly intractable conflict over how much each
and all members should produce" remained. Any attempt to base
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quotas permanently on capacity would destroy OPEC, said two non-
Gulf delegates. "Can the Saudis really afford to have us quit?"
[PIW 3-18-91:1] Iran made "a stunning departure" from past
policy to become a Saudi ally, a pricing "moderate", no longer
calling for production cuts. [WSJ 3-18-91:A5] Nobody bothered to
recall that only eight months earlier, "the general accord" of
Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq had been a new dawn for the 1990s.
(Above, p.165, NYT 7-25]
After the March 1991 meeting set the temporary quotas, "the
burden of excess supply facing spot crude markets is keeping
prices weak." [PMI 4-5-91:1] Saudi Arabia insisted that its
capacity was 8.5 mbd, but many in the industry thought only 8 mbd
was sustainable. Contractors tended to think it was below 7.5,
but they were after all interested parties, "given the potential
for lucrative contracts if more work is done." [PIW 5-20-91:1]
At the June 1991 meeting, "the conflict created by a
shortage of customers now and a potential shortage of capacity
later on could strain relations ... between Saudi Arabia and
Iran." [PIW 6-3-91:1] There was worry over phasing in Kuwait and
Iraq production, but neither issue had to be faced just then.
[NYT 6-6-91:D6] It was "the shortest conference in more than a
decade", and simply extended the production ceiling and the non-
quotas. But sluggish demand led to inventory buildup and worry
over prices. [WSJ 7-25-91:A2] Kuwait began exporting again, on a
very small scale, and worries over the possibility of resumed
Iraq exports depressed prices. [WSJ 7-30-91:A2]
195
In looking ahead to the September meeting, Saudi Arabia let
it be known it wanted a higher OPEC ceiling, which would raise
its non-quota to over 8 mbd. [WSJ 9-19-91:C14] It insisted that
its sustainable capacity was 9 mbd. But "some insiders" worried
that not enough maintenance work was being done. [PIW 9-23-91:1]
The ministers disagreed on what level of demand to expect, but
were gratified by a price increase since early September. [WSJ
9-24-91:C18] At the meeting, the big issue was:
"whether and how to move to a world without formal
production quotas. ... But securing agreement from the others to
supply 23.65 mbd--even given that this level implies little, if
any shut-in capacity--was no easy task for the kingdom without
formal quota allocations for individual countries. ... Riyadh
managed to hold most of its ground, insisting that it would
produce 8.5 mbd [whatever others did]. As always, the smaller
producers would be expected to continue pumping at capacity."
[PIW 9-23-91:1]
The last two sentences are not consistent. If smaller
producers stay at capacity, the Saudi "ultimatum" is flouted.
Yet the Saudis said they would make room for nobody. It had to
be 8.5 mbd. [NYT 9-25-91:D10] The meeting agreed, with obvious
reluctance. Other ministers were hostile to Minister Nazer's
refusal to budge. [NYT 9-26-91:D1] [WSJ 9-27-91:A4] It was said
that "all 13 countries now are living with a strong revenue
imperative" [WSJ 9-30-91:Al] --as though they had ever lived with
anything else.
The OPEC nations asked consumers for oil development aid.
Secretary-General Subroto had said:
"OPEC is going to need substantial financing help if it is
to expand capacity to meet the estimated growth in demand for its
oil .... An increase in production capacity of five million
barrels a day, over a five year period, would require investments
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amounting to $60 billion. ...[Including Iraq and Kuwait] a figure
of $100 billion or more has been mentioned." [WSJ 4-9-91:A3]
In August 1992, the OPEC need was raised from $60 billion to
$80 billion "in the next five years" and non-OPEC was said to
need $170 billion. [OGJ 8-31-92:25] [WO 9-92:13] Requirements
per country ranged from 2 to 30 thousand dollars per bd, but it
was not explained whether the range included only OPEC or also
non-OPEC. Such vague numbers are invulnerable.
In December 1991, there was the usual far-off glow of the
day when demand would rise, perhaps beyond "technical capacity to
produce." [NYT 11-25-91:D2] But in the meantime there was fear of
weak prices in Spring 1992. [WSJ 11-25-91:A2] Accordingly, the
end-November meeting agreed to continue at current production
levels through the first quarter of 1992, but then cut in the
second quarter. The non-quotas were expected to become quotas.
[WSJ 11-27-91:C12] Saudi Arabia stated that their higher levels
of output since the invasion were permanent, and that capacity
would be raised to 10 mbd by 1994. [NYT 11-27-91:D1] There was
"fear of a stormy spring. ... All, including Saudi Arabia, agree
on the probable need for production cuts. But the abnormally
fuzzy outlook for both supply and demand reinforced the usual
conflicts ... to leave the group deeply divided on how best to
cope with this prospect." [PIW 12-2-91:3]
IEA now reduced its estimates of expected demand. "The
market consensus is that too much crude is being produced." [WSJ
12-5-91:A2] The Saudis refused to be the only ones to cut back,
"holding oil taps wide open in soggy market. ... Oil prices may
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have dipped by several dollars in the past few weeks, but don't
expect [production] cutbacks from Saudi Arabia as a result." [PIW
12-16-91:1] Algeria called for an emergency meeting, but was
rebuffed. [NYT 12-24-91:D1] Another newspaper report gave some
estimates by the respected Algerian oil minister of the effects
of a production cut. They suggested a short-run demand
elasticity at a very surprising 0.4. [WSJ 12-26-91:C12]61
The Saudis were not bluffing. They made "a sharp rise" in
December output. Some Iranians cried "treason", but the Saudis
repeated that they would not cut output unless all other members
did so. [WSJ 1-7-92:A3] Venezuela cut by 2 percent and said it
hoped others would do so. [NYT 1-11-92:33] Others did, but by
only small amounts. "Forecasts of a sharp drop in exports from
the former Soviet Union...have not materialized. [NYT 1-21-92:D5]
But on the eve of an emergency meeting, and after some more
announcements of small cuts, the Saudis now said they would cut
100 tbd, or 1.2 percent. [WSJ 1-22-92:A2] Called in haste, the
December meeting was "the most important for OPEC since December
1985". One estimate was that a cut of 2 mbd (from 24 to 22) would
raise the OPEC "basket" from $17 to $21 [WSJ 2-10-92:A2], which
implies elasticity of 0.41, again surprisingly high.
There was no formal debate over a proposal by the OPEC
61 Nordine Ait Laoussine said OPEC should immediately cut by
at least 10 percent. Several oil analysts shared his view, one of
them saying that without an output cut, prices would fall "quite
possibly by as much as an additional $4 a barrel." [WSJ 11-26-
91:C12]. Let the price ratio P equal $17.15/$13.15, the output
ratio Q equal 0.9. Then if Q=Px, and .9 = (17.15/13.15)x, x=-.397.
If we suppose a price decline of only $2, x = -.85
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Secretariat: to fix second-quarter output to a given uniform
percent below current output. The Saudis favored this, but Iran
and others were unwilling. There were the usual puzzles over
defining and measuring capacity. "Saudi Arabia will likely
threaten to withdraw from the agreement and [produce more] if
there is significant cheating by other members." [PIW 2-10-92:1]
"Capacity is king in OPEC efforts to overhaul quotas." The
ministers agreed unanimously to cut output to raise prices. But
the Saudis immediately said they wanted to retain their 35
percent of OPEC output. They recalled a bitter past when they
were the only ones to honor an agreement to cut. They professed
to want to keep prices "at a modest level--not much higher
than...$18". [NYT 2-13-92:D6]
The Saudis wanted acceptance in principle of capacity or
production as the basis for quotas. There was the rub. "Smaller
members of OPEC such as Algeria ... want Saudi Arabia to account
for most of the cutbacks because its production increased the
most in the wake of the Persian Gulf crisis." The Saudis hinted
they would be willing to reduce to 8 mbd, but only if others
matched the percentage cuts. [WSJ 2-13-92:A2] After a few days'
wrangling, OPEC agreed to reduce total output from 24.2 to 22.9
mbd, of which Saudi Arabia claimed over a third. The accord was
viewed as "shaky". [NYT 2-16-92:19] Some wanted to come down to
22.5. [WSJ 2-18-92:A2]
It seems like a remarkably narrow range of disagreement, yet
it had stretched out the meeting, and was never resolved. The
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Saudis kept insisting that their capacity was 9 mbd, and backed
this up by reaching that level in early February 1992. It was "a
demonstration of capacity tied to the kingdom's demand during the
Geneva OPEC meeting that new quotas and prorata cuts be based on
production potential." [PIW 2-24-92:1]
Governments had an interest in overstating both capacity and
production to get higher quotas. [PIW 2-24-92:1; see also PE 10-
92:54] Minister Aghazadeh of Iran explained that its policy was
to increase capacity, and it would have 4 mbd annual average
capacity for the fiscal year beginning March 1992. "But it
doesn't mean that we will need to produce at full capacity all
the time. That depends on demand." [PIW 2-24-92:7] Like Saudi
Arabia, Iran was making a demonstration of capacity for
bargaining power against the others.
There was general disbelief of the 4 mbd; but as we will see
later, Iran came close. In March, Saudi Aramco said it was
actually awarding contracts for development to bring total
capacity near 10 mbd. But they did not name a date. Current
sustainable capacity was estimated officially at 9 mbd,
unofficially at 8.6 to 8.7 mbd. [PIW 3-30-92:1]
The cuts agreed upon in February amounted to only 740 tbd,
of which Saudi Arabia accounted for 500, short of the 1 mbd
"seen as necessary to stabilize markets." [PIW 4-6-92:1]
Prices were up in early April 1992, on reports of actual
OPEC March cuts of 0.9 mbd. But production was still considered
too high, and Saudi Arabia, it was believed, would rebuff any
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suggestions that it produce less than 8 mbd. They had cut enough,
and Iran had not. "Virtually all members agree that production
restraint is still needed to preserve the fragile positive
psychology found in oil markets."
Moreover, Kuwait was recovering faster than expected,
reporting 920 tbd for the third week of April, and others would
have to make room. [NYT 4-20-92:D2] "Although the high output
declared is probably motivated in part by a need to increase
[Kuwait's] quota allocation, there is no doubt that it is making
rapid gains." But output data was becoming less trustworthy, and
also less meaningful, since Saudi oil production might be going
into its worldwide storage network. [PIW 4-20-92:1,SS]
There was a meeting late in April, and another meeting with
10 non-OPEC producers, not including Norway, Mexico, and
Colombia, but including the oil-producing republics of the former
Soviet Union. They had "a very useful exchange of views", said
Minister Nazer. [WSJ 4-24-92:A4] An OPEC meeting the next day
froze non-quotas--and they hoped output--at existing levels. [NYT
4-25-92:45] But they instructed the OPEC secretariat to report on
"new ways to monitor effectively members' actual output." The
market balance was considered as "fragile". [WSJ 4-27-92:A2]
By late May, prices had risen because of static output for
three months despite rising demand. "Core Saudi policy goals
remain intact, including ...at least 8 mbd." True, it had not
been "legitimized" by the others, "but OPEC's poor track record
in observing its ceiling undermines claims that Saudi Arabia made
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any major concessions." [PIW 6-1-92:1]
Their chief concern was the threat of taxes on oil products.
"[The May agreement] is a 'momentary signal' to Western
governments that if higher oil prices are wanted to thwart
demand, oil producers would be 'perfectly happy to oblige'.
[Saudi Oil Minister] Nazer recently warned the EC that adoption
of an environmental, tax-oriented posture 'introduces elements of
uncertainty that would [negatively] affect investment to expand
production capacities.'" [PIW 6-1-92:1]
At end-May, indeed, Saudi Arabia abandoned its "moderate oil
pricing policy", and said it favored a $3 increase. Some
observers considered it a show of disapproval of oil product
taxes. Others said that having gained market share, Saudi Arabia
was willing to see higher prices. Some Gulf oil officials
cautioned that the Saudis were leaving much room for maneuver,
and their policy was reversible. If other nations violated the
"informal pledge" (the non-quota quota) they would raise their
own output to retain their 35 percent share. Or, if Japan and the
USA dissuaded the EC from product taxes, "the Saudis might reward
the industrialized countries with lower oil prices." [NYT 5-27-
92:D1] "This is a shot across their [Europeans'] bows", said a
Saudi official. A carbon tax "wouldn't discourage energy use but
would simply siphon off revenue rightfully [sic] due to the oil
exporters." Others paraphrased OPEC sentiment: if they want
higher prices, we'll give it to them. [WSJ 5-26-92:A3]
In fact, OPEC opposed taxes on oil products because they
would depress demand, OPEC's market share, and crude oil prices.
During 1990-1992, most consuming country governments made
substantial increases in taxes on oil products: the twelve EEC
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members, by roughly $10 per barrel on average. They "scooped"
the decreases in crude oil prices, diverting them from the
producers and consumers into the national treasuries. [CGES, vol.
4, issue 3, May-June 1993, pp. 35-44] The Economist in 1985 had
urged this particularly on the US, which however continued unable
to tax gasoline. One must agree with the CGES warning that "the
OPEC countries have far more reason to dread the fiscal demands
of OECD governments than the introduction of environmental
taxes."
The concern over consumer-country taxes was well founded.
But the threats were ridiculous (see Table II: Effects of a Price
Rise). They were made because OPEC knew many in the consuming
countries would take them seriously. "The Bush Administration
reacted with disappointment to the decision of its moderate Arab
ally." [WSJ 5-27-92:A2] Daniel Yergin said that oil producers
had sought higher prices after European countries had raised oil
product taxes. [NYT 6-6-92:37] He seemed unaware that "after"
was in fact decades after. But the ancient post hoc fallacy has
no statute of limitations.
At any rate, OPEC's "surprise endorsement of an output
ceiling below most estimates of the third-quarter call on its
crude gave off a loud bang in oil markets last month. Now ...
strong prices [are] the runaway favorite." [PMI 6-4-92:1]
They continued strong through August, and at the end of the
month "winter looks tight". [PIW 8-24-92:1] But only a week
later, the market was having difficulty absorbing OPEC crude.
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[PIW 8-31-92:1] Prices began moving down. More than ever, at the
September meeting, attention focussed on the basket, which was
below $19.50 when it should have been $21. There was unusually
good agreement on estimates of fourth-quarter demand, the range
being only from 24.5 to 25.1 mbd. "The debate is more over what
each country should produce to meet the demand." [WSJ 9-15-92:A4]
Iran warned that if others exceeded their quotas, they would
produce an additional 800 tbd. It was now a credible threat, for
they now claimed capacity of 4 mbd, and announced they would
produce at that rate during some part of October. By March 1993
they would be up to 4.5 mbd. They claimed that the investment in
new producing capacity had been entirely for cash; only refinery
and petrochemical investment had been on suppliers' credit. [PIW
9-27-92:1]
At the September meeting, all members favored higher prices,
but there would be "a sudden, if brief, tailspin should Saudi
Arabia and Iran lock horns over their respective production
capabilities and related claims for market share." They all
agreed that the safest way to avoid a row over quotas was to
extend the existing agreement, and let Kuwait have the increased
production. Kuwait expected to (and did) reach 1.5 mbd by years-
end. OPEC expected a strong winter. [PIW 9-14-92:1,5] But: "with
the passage of time, the group's repeated inability to compromise
in periods of comfort bodes ill for its chances of reexerting
discipline when times get tough." [PIW 9-21-92:1] Prices
declined on Iran's assurance that they "won't flood the market,
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but pump as much as the market will bear." [WSJ 9-22-92:C14]
Good news for the group was that Libyan plans to expand to
2 mbd by 1993 had slipped a year [PIW 9-28-92:4], and that
Nigeria had refused to improve terms for resident companies,
which could delay or derail plans to reach 2.5 mbd by 1995. But
there was "a nagging source of uncertainty": just how far Saudi
Arabia would go to defend the market share which it had
formalized at 34.7 percent. [PIW 10-5-92:2] For the year 1992,
however, it was just under 33 percent.
Iran's escalation was matched by its neighbors. Kuwait's
claim for a 2 mbd quota "is seen as positioning in response to
Iran's attempts to stake out a 4 mbd capacity figure. ... Recent
UAE claims that it plans to expand its current 2.4 mbd capacity
are seen in the same light." [PIW 11-3-92:1]
Prices had been strong throughout 1992, but futures began to
decline in early October, and spot price fell more, going into
"contango" by the beginning of December. This meant that prompt
oil was selling at a discount, the usual symptom of overfull
inventories. OPEC output in October had gone over 25 mbd, a 12-
year high. At the November 25 meeting, they returned from non-
quota quotas to real quotas. [NYT 11-4-92:D7] The Saudis called
for lower output, but were not willing to be the only one to cut
back, despite Iran and others urging that honor upon them. [WSJ
11-10-92:A2] [WSJ 11-23-92:C12]
Suggestions for an output cut were of the order of 2 to 3
percent. [WSJ 11-24-92:A2] But even this modest objective eluded
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them. All agreed on the need. "But no one wants to make the first
or deepest cut." [NYT 11-27-92:D10] Finally they decided that all
must make "temporary allocations" [11-28-92:34]. It took them
another two days to arrive at an output cut of only 0.55 percent,
which is of course effectively zero. Essentially it was a return
to the pre-invasion schedules, except that Iran received 3.5 mbd
instead of its old 3.2 mbd. It took Iran nearly a day to accept
this. [WSJ 11-30-92:A2] "Saudi Arabia refus[ed] to budge from
its 8.4 mbd allocation, although the kingdom did accept a modest
drop in its percentage." Iran, which had gained respect with the
4 mbd output demonstration in October, again promised 4.5 mbd for
March, and even implied it would be sustainable, and demanded
that its quota be raised to 4 mbd. [PIW 12-7-92:1]
At any rate, November's quota reductions were negligible,
and actual output was not reduced, "underscoring the 'you first'
problem that members have when it comes to ceding tangible market
share in order to defend prices." [PIW 1-11-93:1] It was
estimated that perhaps 2 mbd additional capacity would be in
place by midsummer, mostly in Saudi Arabia and Iran. "Others
seem to be running to stay in place." [PIW 1-4-93:1]
Two constants remained. One was "the standing position of
Saudi Arabia that production cuts must be shared proportionately,
leaving it a one-third share of OPEC's output." [WSJ 1-26-93:A3]
The other was the chronic financial crisis. Only the UAE
was still clearly a creditor nation. All the others currently
"seek extra funds to finance budget deficits and industrial
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imports, ... or simply to subsidize layabout relatives. None of
OPEC's main members is living within its means, nor is likely to
any time soon." [WSJ 1-29-93:Al1]
The most important was, of course, Saudi Arabia.
"The bloated public sector can no longer absorb every young
Saudi, and the private sector prefers cheap, well-trained
foreigners to Saudi graduates whose education still relies
heavily on rote and on Islam. Private sector employment remains
only 10% Saudi. ... The infrastructure and welfare state built in
the boom years of the late 1970s and early 1980s also are
starting to creak. Some Jidda streets get water only two days a
week, doctors often deliver babies in the emergency room because
hospital beds are scarce." [WSJ 1-13-93:A1]
From the week of October 12 to the last week of January
1993, the OPEC basket fell from $19.60 to $16.33; the Dubai Fateh
marker, from $18.70 to $14.70. [PIW 10-19-92:8; 1-36-94:8]
Everything now depended on the mid-February meeting.
Nigeria summed up the plight of the OPEC nations:
"Plagued by debts of nearly $30 billion, fear of civil
unrest if subsidies are cut and IMF wrath if they aren't, ... the
Nigerian government ... in hopes of reducing its deficit for
1993, ... is opening the crude taps every side and --despite
earlier laments from partners that this would delay capacity
expansion--cutting oil field budgets from 1992 levels." [PIW 1-
25-93:1]
The private companies wanted to invest more, because it was
profitable. It would have meant larger production and revenues
in the future. But if the government could not match the
outlays, its share of ownership would have been reduced. And
this was intolerable.
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THE SOVIET IMPLOSION62
We first briefly review what has happened inside the FSU
(Former Soviet Union) oil industry, then its effect on the world
oil market.
FSU oil industry The conventional wisdom, reviewed earlier
in the article by Arbatov, was rising marginal cost, i. e.
increasing capital expenditures per unit of incremental capacity.
The Soviet Government had responded to growing scarcity in the
1980s by investing ever more heavily in order to maintain
production and exports. A more rational system would mean much
less investment and production, indeed a change from export to
import.
The theory was right but a basic assumption was not: that
aside from excessive investment and some incidental waste the
Soviet oil industry was not radically inefficient as compared
with the capitalist world. But this was not true.
Haste, lack of accountability, and rigid adherence to rules
which nobody dared question had brought about a severe distortion
of effort. An outsider might have suspected this.63 But what
62 The following sketch is based on press reports, and on the
references cited. It has benefited from the comments of Joseph S.
Berliner.
63 I may be permitted a personal reminiscence. In 1970, I
chaired a session at a conference on Arctic oil and gas of the
American Association of Petroleum Geologists. There was some Soviet
attendance. After my session was over, two Soviet petroleum
engineers walked up to the podium, where I was the only remaining
person. I wish I could have had a tape recorder under the table.
Their remarks were quite apolitical, but they were extremely
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proved it, and made the idea of imports grotesque, was numerous
private oil companies crowding into the FSU, trying to obtain
production rights. Of course there had been a general
deterioration of equipment and producing reservoirs. Much of the
old FSU industry needed to be shut down, but there could be great
expansion, to the profit of all concerned. It seemed
providential: a large industry which could export and supply a
stream of foreign exchange with which to buy badly needed
consumption and investment goods.
Unfortunately, it has not worked that way. Underlying all
the detailed mistakes, some to be noted shortly, was a complete
absence of any notion of investment, and of the marginal
efficiency of capital. No producing unit owned assets, with a
value it would try to expand. It brought factors together by
using funds made available by the next higher command unit,
carried out its plan as best it could, and transferred revenues
back to the command unit. There was no scanning mechanism to
evaluate many possible courses of action and choose the most
profitable in the long run. Managers might be rewarded with a
bonus for output not return. The earlier discussion of regressive
taxes based on output not profit (above, pp. 28) fits precisely.
Many have noted how similar was Soviet agriculture to the
articulate and disgusted with the rigid rules they had to follow,
where and how deep to drill, etc., and the waste it entailed, in
time and capital equipment and supplies. Why use trained engineers,
one of them asked, to do stupid things which revolted their
knowledge and intelligence, because somebody had written them into
the rule book for reasons which had long since ceased to make
sense, if they ever had.
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harsh paper-stacking bureaucracy of Ptolmaic Egypt. We need a
similar perspective on industry. In antiquity there was trade,
private property, and widespread laissez faire, but money capital
did not exist. There was no banking system, no means of pooling
savings, no negotiable credit instruments. There were not even
the most rudimentary notions of investment, return and risk.
Hence the lack of innovation, and of economic thought. There was
no such thing as the value-maximizing firm, spending a present
amount of money to generate a future income stream worth more
than the outlay, seeking the better investment and shedding the
worse. [Finley 1981, pp. 179-190] [Green 1990, pp. 362-375]
[Schumpeter 1954, pp. 54-78]
No such things were known in antiquity, nor in the Soviet
Union. The FSU oil industry is a fossil. But (cf. above, pp.
125), the OPEC and non-OPEC national oil companies are not
strongly different. None of them has its own capital assets whose
value it tries to increase. It is ironical that national
companies account for over two thirds of world oil production at
a time when Socialism is scorned everywhere as a bad idea whose
day is gone.
The worst mistake in the FSU was probably to continue price
controls, and then only gradually relax them. The same bad reason
was given as in the USA in the 1970s: decontrol would promote
inflation. But the effect was much worse in the FSU because of
the strong or hyper inflation generated when the banking system
extended unlimited credit and spending power to industries. The
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slowly decontrolled oil prices lagged the rise in other prices.
The net result was a drastic fall in the real price of crude oil
and products, which at end-1992 were about 5 percent of world
prices, prevented producers from buying current supplies and
services, and depressed living standards further in locations
often harsh and remote. Until the end of January 1993, the
national gas field price was 1.1 cents per mcf, industrial
customers paid 5.7 cents, European customers $2.40. [WSJ 4-9-
93:A6]
Failure to decontrol prices also meant failure to begin
rationalizing consumption. Energy was grossly wasted in industry
and households, e.g. overheated apartment buildings where the
only way to lower the temperature was to open the windows. Energy
costs were a small part of the total production or living cost,
and increases could have been borne relatively easily. Hardship
subsidies could have been provided at a small fraction of the
cost. Private motorists were few, and grass-roots grumbles over
gasoline prices accordingly faint.
The second mistake was a sort of squatters' privatization,
de facto takeovers by the old management of regional producing
groups or associations. Because of price controls, the
associations lost heavily, and could not obtain supplies or keep
labor. The associations were propped up by "loans" which kept
them all going, the best and the worst. The most important task
is to sort out the assets, and choose which wells and fields to
shut in and which to expand. It has not begun.
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The gap between the controlled and uncontrolled price levels
now generated enormous rents. Of course the "owners" tried to
sell all they could in non-controlled markets, particularly as
exports, where some of the proceeds could be diverted into
foreign bank accounts. The bizarre result was an FSU export of
capital. These sales were often illegal, and huge sums were
reported paid in bribes. This in turn provoked the FSU
governments into heavy and haphazard taxation, in order to keep
most of that income flowing into the national treasuries.
Many Western oil companies tried to obtain concessions in
the FSU, but the great activity had generated little investment
by the end of 1992. There was no legal framework within which
companies could work, nothing they could take for granted. To
work out terms of investment is difficult at best (above, pp.
27). Here it was made harder by unfamiliarity with concepts like
risk-bearing and return. The tax system seemed to combine most of
the bad features of tax systems around the world. Of course there
was the usual populist suspicion of foreign capitalists, and fear
of giving away the family jewels. The extreme devaluation of the
ruble fed these fears, yet it was irrelevant, because foreign
companies were not acquiring tangible assets, only rights to
invest.
Moreover, domestic "squatters" wanted to have preference to
exploitation rights. They could in part re-sell to foreign
companies. The usual protectionist slogan was jobs for the local
boys. In the great Stokmanovskoye gas field, a Russian company
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said it could do the job more cheaply, and provide "more jobs for
Russians and ...a large part of its equipment orders with
domestic enterprises." [OGJ 11-16-92:NL1] When the cheapness is
seen to be illusory, it will be too late to avoid waste and
delays.
There was contention between each FSU republic and its
constituent regions, each of which tried to get its share of the
investment spending and eventual income. Of course this is a
familiar pattern worldwide, in any country with a federal or
provincial system of government. Moreover, non-producer republics
through which pipelines passed could play the robber baron and
demand high fees for transit rights. In October 1992, Ukraine
reduced the flow of Russian gas to make its threats credible,
which jolted foreign customers, and injured both Ukraine and
Russia. In March 1993, Russia was apparently doing the same thing
to Kazakhstan. These power games involved direct immediate loss
but the worst efforts were long run: increased risk made foreign
and domestic investors more reluctant and determined to hold out
for bigger returns.
Thus, although the FSU oil industry was shown in a very
short time to be capable of much profitable expansion, its
potential had not checked the decline in output by the end of
1992. Natural gas had so far held steady, but under-maintenance
threatened a decline. Possibly Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, free
to make their own bargains with foreign companies, will show
Russia the way.
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World market The FSU industry is worth much more attention
than we can give it because it is the largest non-OPEC segment.
The problems are thrown up onto a huge screen. But the effects on
the world market were already well advanced by the end of 1992.
By dissolving the old Soviet enclave into the world market, they
enlarged that market and decreased the OPEC share. As of 1992,
OPEC exports were about 22 mbd (27 mbd production including
natural gas liquids less 5 mbd OPEC consumption). Total non-
Soviet consumption (the old "free world" less OPEC consumption)
was 53 mbd (58 less 5). But total world consumption was about 60
mbd (65 less 5). Thus OPEC market share was 41 percent in the old
market, 37 percent in the new.
This arithmetic anticipates a gradual process, of course.
Shipments within an FSU republic will in time be paid for at
world market prices, as exports are already. Urals crude has
emerged as a marker or designator crude for Western Europe,
analogous to West Texas Intermediate in the USA. It "already
influences markets for dozens of crudes, including most Mideast
barrels moving into Europe." [PIW 5-4-92:3] And in August 1992,
"deliveries [by FSU republics] have risen ... to 2.4 mbd despite
falling production levels, leading OPEC to complain of market
disruption." [OGJ 8-17-92:NL3, emphasis added]
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CONCLUSION: A LOOK BACK AND AHEAD
Price turning point From War II to 1970, consumption grew
by a factor of six. Not only was there no strain on supply--
finding-developing-production costs declined.
OPEC was formed in 1960, and for its first ten years it
increased its members' share of oil revenues at the companies'
expense, without affecting prices. They converted income taxes to
excise taxes, which were a floor to prices. This gave them a new
option: by raising excise taxes, in concert, they could raise
prices and receipts. They did this in 1970-1973. Then they
carried out two price explosions and expropriated the
multinational oil companies.
Defining the cartel Before the 1970s, low-cost output
expanded rapidly at the expense of high-cost. That is how a
competitive market works to economize resource use. Then a
complete reversal: higher-cost areas expanded while lower-cost
producers contracted. For over 20 years, high-cost producers have
sold all they can produce, while the low-cost producers hold back
and produce only what they can sell, at the current price.
Why do low-cost producers stand aside for high-cost, and let
enormous cheap deposits lie untouched or underdeveloped?
"Political explanations" make no sense in theory or history. Only
a simple explanation works: low-cost producers restrict output to
protect the price. But what price are they protecting?
Limits of OPEC power A rational monopoly tries for a price
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yielding maximum profits.
[FIGURE 4 -- REAL & ILLUSORY D-CURVES]
Figure 4 shows how the cartel set the price target in 1973,
and again in 1979. They thought the price could be raised, with
very little sales loss, up to where synthetic crude oils could be
produced in large amounts.
This is a logical monopoly target. Only when oil-on-oil
competition is suppressed can the price be fixed to the nearest
alternative. So the theory was right, but the facts were not as
expected. Consumers responded to price within a few years.
Even in 1981, OPEC saw itself as still on the upward path,
and expected to raise the price again in time. By 1983, their
real (inflation-adjusted) revenues were less than in 1978, before
the second price hike. Seldom has a mistake been punished so
quickly. OPEC members did not lose their power, they regained
their wits.
[TABLE II -- RESULTS OF AN OPEC PRICE INCREASE]
The market share trap With the benefit of hindsight, we can
see that the OPEC mission is to trade market share for a higher
price. When market share gets too low, there's no more to trade.
Table II shows the relation between market share and demand
elasticity, both for total OPEC and for Saudi Arabia. The table
can be used to trace the effects of the incessant pull and heave
of the OPEC members trying each to get just a bit more, and the
final impact on Saudi sales.
The far-right column shows the effect of a 10 percent tax on
Figure 4. Real & Supposed Oil Demand Curves
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TABLE II. RESULT OF AN OPEC PRICE INCREASE
notation
AGGREGATE ALL SELLERS
New Drice: ratio to old price P
Price elasticity of demand
New sales volume: ratio to old
New revenues: ratio to old
SUB-GROUP
Initial market share
New sales volume: ratio to old
New revenues: ratio to old
Sub-group elasticity of demand
E
Q=PAEPQ=PA(E+I)
G
Q(G) =
Q-(1-G)/G
PQ(G) =
P^(E(G)+1)
InPQ(G)/lnP =
( 50 PERCENT INCREASE)
CRUDE OIL CRUDE OIL
ONE YEAR
1.5
-0.10
0.96
1.44
0.37
0.89
1.34
-0.28
FIVE YEARS
1.5
-0.20
0.92
1.38
(Saudi)
0.12
0.67
1.01
-0.97
0.37
0.79
1.18
-0.58
(Saudi)
0.12
0.36
0.54
-2.51
10 PCT TAX
ON PRODUCTS
(LONG TERM)
1.10
-1.00
0.91
1.00
Total
0.34
0.73
-3.23
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oil products. The long-run price elasticity is around unity, so
total consumption would fall by 9 percent. But since the loss
would be all at OPEC's expense, their sales and revenues would
fall by 27 percent. Of course this would put the price under
pressure. In fact, the non-OPEC producers would only keep their
market share by undercutting OPEC.
There are occasional threats that if oil is taxed OPEC will
"retaliate" by raising crude prices. The empty threat is taken
seriously by some in the consuming countries. OPEC members'
high time preference Members find it hard to resist cheating
because their time horizons are short, and their discount rates
are high. The conventional wisdom of their "low time preference"
[IEA 1991] is the nice contrary of the truth. Members cannot
wait, yet they must fear making another big mistake, because they
are so dependent on oil income. There are no other export
industries, despite heavy spending."
Before expropriation The multinational companies had a much
easier time of it. Since they were vertically integrated, they
competed mostly in selling finished products in many local
markets. Sellers at each point of sale were few. The value of a
purchase (mostly gasoline at the pump) was very small in relation
to the buyer's income, so he had no incentives to hunt for
bargains. Hence competition was sluggish. Reactions to price
changes were limited and slow, and provided little incentive to
64 Indonesia is the exception in achieving export-led growth,
like their non-oil neighbors.
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discount prices.
But OPEC members sell into a world market. Their customers
are refiners, with thin profit margins, strongly affected by even
small price differences. A buyer looks for better offers
everywhere, like the thousand-eyed Argos in the Greek myth. Even
a small discount attracts many buyers and more volume; being too
high loses sales. Contrariwise, a member's increase in market
share may show price cheating.
Cartel quota allocation Under competition, market sharing
is automatic. Each operator produces all he can, up to the point
where the cost of additional output would exceed the price. But a
cartel exists for only one reason: to keep the price above the
marginal cost.6" Thereby the cartel shuts off the automatic
market sharing mechanism. It must be replaced by a joint decision
of the members. But market sharing is a zero sum game. Any
member's gain is another member's loss. There is no principle to
it, only luck and bargaining power, of which more later.
Even in the 1970s, when prices were being raised, market
division was always Topic A at OPEC meetings. They progressed
from the squabbles of 1976-1977 to the secret agreement of 1978,
the proposed safety-net agreement in late 1979, the gentlemen's
agreement of 1980 (mooted by the Iran-Iraq war), the quota
agreement of March 1982, then the more binding quota agreement of
March 1983, and since then the endless succession of annual and
" There is widespread misunderstanding of marginal cost as
being something very low, only part of total cost, etc. See the
next section, on excess capacity.
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quarterly and special meetings and quota agreements.
The discord was worse because production and export data
deteriorated after the companies left. It was hard to agree on
what had already happened, let alone on what would happen if they
took one or another action. In April 1993, OPEC members openly
voiced their distrust over reported production numbers.
The bumpy road down: 1981-1985 A single monopolist might
have reduced the price, early on. But the group feared that the
spiral of price discounting and counter-discounting once started
could not be stopped. Hence they preferred to hold the line, and
let time work for them. It did not.
For nearly two years, while other members made more and
deeper discounts, Saudi Arabia sold at the official price, but
did not lose sales. The Aramco companies took their full
allowances of overpriced crude, for the sake of "access" to Saudi
reserves. But losses in the billions finally taught them that
"access" was a mouthful of air. In 1982, they began cutting back
on Saudi liftings, and in January 1983 they said they would no
longer buy overpriced crude oil.
Within two months, OPEC had established the most explicit
and binding quota system so far. The Saudis accepted the
temporary role of swing producer, and assumed the burden of
excess capacity. This was a sharp policy reversal. Saudi Arabia
had discounted prices in 1976-1977, and in 1979-1980, and gained
greatly thereby. They had always resisted the role of swing
producer, and in 1983 could reasonably hope they would not long
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stay in that role.
They were disappointed. Demand for OPEC crude oil continued
to drop, Saudi exports fell nearly to zero in August 1985.
Threats of retaliation did not work.
The Saudis reject the burden of being "swing producer" The
Saudi response in late 1985 and 1986 was not a price war. By
using a "netback price", they would automatically meet the world
price level, but would not beat anybody's price. 66 The Saudis
could have offered much more oil than their quota, but almost
invariably they stayed within it. The other members took nearly a
year (roughly from August-December 1985 to August-December 1986)
to come around to patch up an accord.
Since then, the Saudis have repeatedly rejected the role of
swing producer. Despite constant pressure from the others, their
constant theme is: if you won't cut in proportion, neither will
we. They sometimes had to make good their threats. The net
result was a chronically weak price.
EXCESS CAPACITY AND PRICE CHANGE
OPEC capacity after early 1974 was in excess, and all
attention was focussed on the "surplus", as if it were some
passing misfortune. Let only demand rise, and capacity shrink,
and prices would inevitably rise. In fact, excess capacity
declined greatly to 1986, and kept declining afterward, yet the
price did not rise.
16 Purchase of downstream refining/marketing assets is simply
permanent built-in netbacking.
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The economics of excess capacity Under competition, the
percent of capacity utilization is a good proxy for short run
marginal cost. Hence it is often used to measure inflationary
pressure. High production calls into use the high-cost standby
equipment, materials, and employees; and stops normal maintenance
and downtime. The attempt to get more output than designed
overloads the whole system. To produce an incremental unit makes
every other unit more expensive. Thereby the total cost of an
incremental unit goes up steeply, until the cost curve goes
vertical. Hence the capacity utilization curve--assuming good
data--shows the price under competition as the demand curve
shifts up the right or down the left along the short run supply
curve. (For a classic demonstration, see [Zannetos 1966] ch. 6,
especially p. 172. There is a fairly abrupt bend in the curve at
about 88 percent.)
[FIGURE 5: OPEC CAPACITY USE & PRICE CHANGE]
[TABLE XIII: OPEC CAPACITY USE & PRICE CHANGE
The supposed link of capacity with price change Figure 2 is
often reprinted. (Our additions and corrections, in boxes, will
be explained shortly.) The vertical axis shows, not the price but
the annual price change, deflated. "OPEC is assumed to increase
or decrease prices depending on whether capacity utilization is
above or below the desired level [such as 80 percent]." [EMF
1992, p.173] A co-author had explained [EIA 1991, p.158]: "There
is no fundamental serious economics driving this curve. However,
it works."
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It does not work. We have entered additional data points:
for 1974, 1990 (first half, compared with 1989 first half), and
1992 (first half, compared with 1990 first half). We have also
corrected the entry for 1980. Sources and calculations are in
Table XII.
The new and corrected data points show that the only large
price increase which may fit the curve is 1979, when capacity was
uncertain, to say the least. In 1987, 1980, 1974, and 1989, there
were large price increases despite capacity utilization under 80
percent. The years of highest utilization were first-half 1990
and first-half 1992, in both of which real prices decreased by
comparison with the earlier period. (We avoid the second half of
1990 and the first half of 1991, the time of invasion and war.)
Excess capacity as bargaining tool The curve of aggregate
excess capacity is best forgotten. But individuals' excess
capacity is part of the bargaining process. The cartel member
producing to full capacity bears no burden of restriction. It
falls on those with excess capacity. But their grievance is also
their bargaining power. If their demand for a larger market share
is refused, they can damage the others by expanding output.
A cartel member who wants a larger quota must build excess
capacity. Without it, he gets no respect. Hence the announcements
of OPEC capacity expansion are generally exaggerated for effect.
The members with excess capacity are called price "doves", a
rather misleading name. They demand higher quotas, which means
the others must cut back or accept lower prices. The "hawks" want
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the current price, or a higher one, but they want the others to
carry the burden. An impasse weakens the price, and teaches the
"hawks" a lesson.
By February 1993, excess capacity was expected for the
second quarter, even without Iraq. And by late March, 15 months
after ground zero, Kuwait was threatening it would increase from
1.6 to 2.0 mbd if others didn't stay within quota. [WSJ 4-7-
93:A2, C12] Perhaps the 25 percent excess was exaggerated; nobody
wanted to find out. In 1990, many rejoiced over the Enforcer to
threaten Kuwait. But Saddam Hussein is no longer heard from.
But there is a catch--capacity requires investment. We will
need to look at it shortly.
WILL MARKET SHARE RISE AT CURRENT PRICE?
Shaky stability since 1986 In 1979-1985, it was OPEC's
painful task to divide up a shrinking sales total. In 1985-1992,
on the contrary, exports soared from 12.5 mbd to 20.8 mbd. Yet
repeated experience shows that a demand increase is almost as
hard to handle because increase means a fresh contention over
sharing the gain.
Prices since 1986, before and after the Iraqi piracy, have
been very stable. Fluctuations are generated by inventory
buildup and drawdown. Much of this variability has been
generated not by expected consumer demand and by individual
supply responses, but by expectations of what OPEC meetings would
accomplish. But there has been chronic weakness. We saw that
during 1987-1991 inclusive, before and after the Gulf war,
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contract prices were consistently below spot prices. The
assurance of having a ready customer was more important to
sellers than was the assurance of supply to buyers. This reflects
chronic oversupply. In a recent summary of the past six years:
"OPEC's perennial dogfights over quotas and prices in recent
times have reached dramatic peaks every two years. Reminded of
the squabbling that preceded price collapses in 1986 and 1988 and
helped to spark the Gulf war of 1990, traders are nervously
mulling the possibility of another major price plunge as 1992
draws to a close." [PIW 12-14-92:6]
This should not be taken literally, as a two year cycle. But
it sums up what has happened: from time to time collaboration
breaks down, the trade "nervously" waits for it to be patched up
again. Since the report, there has been another meeting, and the
"basket" has regained the 1987 target of $18, but now lessened by
inflation. The $21 set in July 1990 seems farther away than ever.
The return of Iraq will be a danger for OPEC, not chiefly
because of more excess capacity but because of lower market
shares for all the others. It will sharpen the confrontations
with Saudi Arabia. The lower its share, the more adamant its
opposition to higher prices.
OPEC cannot escape this trap by its own efforts. But it
could be rescued, if the combination of demand growth and non-
OPEC production decline would raise their market share high
enough, so they could again trade some of it off against a higher
price.
Consumption Of nine demand projections gathered by the
Energy Modeling Forum [EMF 1992, p. 44], the two highest are
already riding far above actual. We take the highest of the
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remaining seven, which seems about on target for 1991, high for
1992. It shows an increase of about 11.5 mbd from 1990 to 2005 in
the market economies.
We assume the increase of 11.5 mbd for the whole world. In
1992, world consumption (ex-OPEC consumption) was 60.5 mbd, and
adding 11.5 mbd makes it 72.0 mbd in 2005. Assume the increase of
11.5 mbd all goes to OPEC. Its 1992 exports were 21.8 mbd, or
35.2 percent of the world market. Its 2005 exports are assumed at
33.5 mbd, or 45.3 percent of the world market.
This assumes that the change in FSU consumption will equal
the change in FSU production.6 7 [Watkins 1993] suggests that
uncertainty about the FSU could change the call on OPEC by as
much as 3.3 mbd either way. Assuming it as an increase, it would
be 36.8 mbd, or 49.8 percent. Such a difference, which would take
place over a decade, is no promise of higher prices. When Saudi
Arabia's share drops with the return of Iraq, that makes things
worse for OPEC as a whole. But even this is a best-case
scenario.
Natural gas back on track First, expanded natural gas
output will displace some oil. The expansion of gas was knocked
off course in the 1970s. In the USA, there were price ceilings
and end-use control. Canada was reluctant to export the scarce
precious stuff.
67 FSU production and consumption will both decline for some
years along with declining GDP. But with economic revival, rational
pricing and conservation will keep reducing consumption. FSU prices
have become even more irrational than Soviet prices because price
regulation and inflation have lowered the real price of fuels.
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In Europe, natural gas use had risen from 2.3 percent of
total energy use in 1965 to 13 percent in 1975. But then gas
prices were raised to match oil. The Dutch and others thought
both were headed off into the blue, hence gas resources should be
hoarded not used. In 1985, gas use was up only to 16 percent.
[Adelman & Lynch 1986] explained why gas was plentiful and cheap.
Good sense has won out in North America, and to some extent
in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The increase in natural gas
consumption will be felt in a lower than expected oil growth
rate.
Non-OPEC expanding More important, non-OPEC output will
keep growing. Forecasters seem unable to kick the habit of
expecting non-OPEC output to decline after a few years as they
"use up their reserves". It makes as much sense as predicting
that plants making bread or automobiles or computer chips will
shut down in a few months as they use up stocks of materials and
parts.
Reserves are inventories Non-OPEC reserves have been used
up several times over since 1960, and are now larger than ever.
After 1985, the price collapsed, yet outside the USA (and FSU)
non-OPEC output has crept up and more than overborne the USA
decline. The trend will continue because at current prices oil
development is highly profitable pre-tax. The price decline
promoted oil development, because it dashed the expectations of
ever-rising prices and moderated taxes. As we saw above (pp.
28ffst), the supply curves have moved to the right. Lower costs
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promise more expansion.
Regressive taxation: the real barrier The principal
obstacle to non-OPEC production, slowly being overcome, is high
and regressive taxation. As shown above, regressive taxes abort
development and increase exploration risk. Because small fields
are overtaxed, big fields go undiscovered.
Many non-OPEC countries have lowered rates and have moved,
painfully slowly, toward a profits-based tax system, aimed to
skim the rents, not abort them. That is the only way to explain
why output has risen since 1981 and especially since 1985.
The other important obstacle is state ownership, discussed
in more detail below. But past mistakes are present
oppportunities. As both obstacles are slowly overcome, non-OPEC
output will increase, andtperhaps much more than since 1985.
BLOCKS TO OPEC EXPANSION: UNREAL AND REAL
OPEC "willingness" to expand In the consuming countries
there has for decades been high anxiety, whether OPEC will build
capacity "enough for our needs". The modelers' form of anxiety is
to make OPEC capacity an exogeneous variable. The theory seems to
be that OPEC would prefer less production and income, but chooses
to accommodate the consumer nations. [EIA 1989] It is an
important symptom of what's wrong with the consuming countries.
If the OPEC nations were reluctant, they would have run
current-account surpluses every year and piled up ever-increasing
foreign balances. In fact, they have overspent their oil
revenues. All have been "high absorbers". The 1974 OPEC current-
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account surplus went to deficit in four years; the much larger
1980 surplus went to deficit in only two. Saudi Arabian foreign
assets, in 1981 over $160 billion, may have been around $10
billion before the Gulf war. Each OPEC nation is not only
willing, but eager, avid, and impatient for more money. OPEC
members' production is set by demand at the price they fix. Then
they build more capacity than they expect to use in order to have
bargaining power against each other.
"Capital crunch?" Estimates are being repeated, with no
explanation of how derived or what they mean, of tens and
hundreds of billions of dollars of alleged capital requirements.
Then comes the solemn rhetorical question, whether such huge
investment would pay out.
My own estimates [Adelman 1993] are built up from USA data,
adjusted for conditions elsewhere. The number can be replicated,
and checked against independent data, e.g. the old Chase
Manhattan Bank reports.
By my reckoning (see Appendix A), the highest-cost Persian
Gulf member in 1989/1990 needed $2000 per additional daily barrel
for crude oil development. To reckon profitability, we assume a
$15 wellhead price, and operating expenses at $1 per barrel plus
5 percent of capital cost. We also reckon a decline rate from
published data. The rate of return is about 240 percent per
year.
In 1976-1987 (we have no earlier or later data), the OPEC
nations of the Middle East and Africa used, on average, 1.7
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percent of their oil revenues for oil and gas capital
expenditures. Their problem is to reduce their non-oil spending
from 98.3 percent to something in the mid-90s, or at worst low
90s. They find it very difficult. The complaints of an OPEC
"capital crunch" are an important symptom: the weakness of state
enterprise.
[TABLE XI - OPEC ME & AFRICA CAPEX]
The flabby national dinosaurs: OPEC OPEC national oil
companies are chronically short of funds because they are not
free to reinvest. The earnings go to the governments, which spend
them. What each claimant draws out of the stream depends on his
political clout. Each claimant wants others, not himself, to make
room for oil investment. The state oil company is only one of
many.
Oil revenues make countries more oil dependent. Farming and
native industry decline. Towns fill up with people who need food
and other imported necessities at subsidized low prices. To cut
budget and foreign-exchange deficits by ending subsidies
threatens revolution. So budgets are strained, and OPEC national
companies are strapped.
Some of the OPEC countries will help themselves. Nobody else
can. Higher prices would no more promote investment in the 1990s
than they did in 1976-1987.
Bring back foreign companies? Engineering/ management
expertise is usually even more important than money. Foreign oil
companies have both. OPEC countries have been trying since 1986
TABLE XI OPEC OL PRODUCTION AND CAPITAL EXPENDITURES
MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA, 197619817
YEAR 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1981 TOTALS
MIDDLE EAST
1UfAL RIGS 190 192 189 143 175 170 200 206 197 201 178 139 2180
Of'EC RIGS 125 132 131 89 102 91 114 112 98 94 70 51 120
PERCENT 66 69 69 62 58 54 57 54 50 47 39 37 55
AFRICA
TITAL RIGS 138 173 175 200 219 212 209 150 105 118 97 90 1886
OPECRIGS 122 153 149 166 180 160 151 102 70 82 74 66 1475
PERCENT 88 88 85 83 82 75 72 68 61 69 76 73 78
ME+AFRCAPEX ($M) 2375 2290 2250 3120 4100 4820 6130 5970 4530 4010 3160 2170 46125
OPEC RIG PERCENT 75 78 71 74 72 66 65 60 56 55 52 51 65
OPEC ME+AFR CAPEX ($M) 1788 1788 1731 2320 2935 3161 4361 3589 2520 2212 1655 1415 29480
OPEC ME4AFR REVENUES 118565 129627 123916 187193 254952 234952 182784 140668 129189 117019 74882 92138 1781514
CAPEREVSPCT 1.51 1.38 1.40 1.24 1.15 1.34 239 255 1.95 189 2.21 154 1.65
SOURCES: Rig operaing,mationa, oal em Ecyclpedia
(origial so , Bain Hu~ s Coip.). Revenues, from OPEC
Annual Slatiscal Bulleti Caplal Expendiwmes, born Chse
Manhattan Bank, Capital Expwres of t World Pelem isy
(no finer eakdwn available, publictim cases a•ler 1987)
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to bring them back. This makes good economic sense, not only for
new-field discoveries but because the companies could "stretch"
old fields as they did in the USA. Between 1930 and 1970, very
few big fields were found, but the original "remaining reserves"
were produced several times over, and replaced. Development costs
were steady to declining over 40 years.
But despite the great potential, there has been almost no
foreign investment in OPEC. There are two great risks. First,
fluctuations in OPEC output amplify the demand swings, and quota
struggles add to the uncertainty. Second, there is the chance of
confiscation like 20 years ago. 18 High risks can only be
overcome by high rewards for equity investment, whatever name it
is given.
But thus far the OPEC nations cannot bring themselves to
accept equity investment in production, in name or in fact. Only
Iraq, after the Gulf war, even said it would. Perhaps Saddam
Hussein will set an example.
68 It is easily proved that if i is the normal discount rate
for an oil project, 2 the probability of expropriation in each
year, and r the rate which just compensates for total risk, then
r = (i + p7/ (1 - p). If a company's discount rate is 12 percent,
and the chance of expropriation in any one year is (say) 1/20, then
the necessary equity return is 18 percent.
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THE FLABBY NATIONAL DINOSAURS
Today, Socialism is scorned everywhere as a bad idea whose
time is gone. But most of the world's oil is produced by flabby
national dinosaurs, usually wasteful and corrupt. Their "wider
social purposes" at best are unrelated enterprises like local
housing, but mostly contracts and jobs for friends: payoffs,
kickbacks, and featherbedding. But even when clean, in or out of
OPEC, they cannot have a rational capital budget because the
money is not their own. The lesson is learned at an
excruciatingly slow pace. The Indian Petroleum Ministry recently
announced: "There is a decision in principle to consider
proposals for developing discovered oil fields on a joint-venture
basis" with the state company. [NYT 5-4-92:D11, emphasis added]
The Former Soviet Union (FSU) The most important state
companies outside OPEC are in the Former Soviet Union (FSU).
Their problems are a photographic blow-up of what happens in
others.
The FSU situation is defined by two facts, which at first
seem contradictory. (1) There was huge investment during the
1980s, yet Soviet production crept up only slowly, then stalled.
This seemed to mean they were running smack into sharply rising
investment per unit of additional capacity, and needed to cut
back. But (2) as soon as they were permitted, foreign oilmen
poured in, tried to sign various kinds of deals for exploration,
development, and workovers (rehabilitation), and estimated that
billions of barrels could be profitably developed, much more than
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current proved reserves.
The only way to reconcile these facts is to recognize that
the problem with state enterprise was not just slackness and
inefficiency all over the place. There was no rational
investment, guided by the marginal efficiency of capital. No
producing unit owned assets, with a value it would try to expand.
The unit brought factors together by using funds made available
by the next higher command unit, carried out its plan as best it
could, and transferred revenues back to the command unit. There
was no scanning mechanism to evaluate many possible courses of
action and choose the most profitable in the long run. Managers
might be rewarded with a bonus for output not return.
Aside from a number of errors in detail, especially on
taxes, the FSU republics have not shown much understanding that
they need a system which will sort out the assets according to
marginal profitability, to see which wells, reservoirs, fields
must be shut down and their manpower and supplies transferred to
the wells worth maintaining or expanding, taking account of risk.
The FSU oil industry is a fossil. But the other OPEC and
non-OPEC national oil companies are different only in degree.
None of them has its own capital assets whose value it tries to
increase. As for risk, one hears in OPEC, non-OPEC, and FSU:
"There is no risk, you know the oil is there!" But if the
investment needed is too great, or the flow too small, or tax too
uncertain, etc, the oil is not there.
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APPENDIX A. RATES OF RETURN ON OIL DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT
To calculate the rate of return, we set up a break-even
equation. The discounted present value of the flow of revenues
over an indefinite time just equals capital
expenditures: PQ/(a+i) = K, or P/(a+i) = K/Q [1]
where P is the wellhead price net of operating expenses, Q is the
peak output, assumed to be in the initial year, after which it
declines at a percent per year. K is total capital expenditures,
assumed all spent in the year before production starts.
The gross wellhead price P' is reduced by the variable cost
v per barrel produced, and the fixed cost per well or per lease,
which is a fraction c of the capital expenditures per barrel of
initial output.
P = P' - v - cK/Q [2]
(The fixed cost constantly increases per unit as output Q
declines. But these higher costs must be discounted. On balance,
the present-value-equivalent is greater, depending on the decline
rate and the discount rate; we reckon with c= .05 x 1.67 = .084).
The decline rate is approximated by Q/R, the ratio of
initial output to reserves. This can be refined somewhat if
necessary."
9 A more precise rule is: a= (Q-Qf)/R, where Qf is final
output. With no information, we appreciate Qf/Q=Q/R. Then a=Q/R-
(Q/R)2. With more data, we can use the relation for the final year:
(P'-v-cK/Q)Qf/Q=cK/Q, hence (cK/Q)/ (P'-v-cK/Q)=Qf/Q
Moreover, since Qf/Q=e -aT, T=-ln(Qf/Q)/a If some of the
variables are known, we have a check on the others.
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Substituting [2] into [1], and transposing:
a+i = (P'-v)/(K/Q) -c(K/Q))/(K/Q)
i = (P'-v)/(K/Q) -c - a [3]
For the OPEC example, we take the Persian Gulf member with
the highest 1989/90 investment requirements, Abu Dhabi;
K/Q=$2033/365 =$5.57. Since there are only a few fields, we can
calculate the decline rate directly: 2.34 percent during 1962-
1980. (We disregard later unstable years.) Assume a $15 wellhead
price:
i = $14/5.57 - .084 - .023 = 2.41, or 241 percent per year.
For the non-OPEC country (upper quartile in 1990), K/Q =
$10,210/365 = $28. We use conventional values: v = $1 per barrel,
c = .067, a = 1/15 = .067. Then:
i = $14/$28 - .084 - .067 = .50-.151 = .349.
This is pre-tax. Assume now 50-50 production sharing, which
amounts to the government taking half the wellhead price.
i' = $6.50/28 - .151 = .081
The pre-tax return is well worth investing for, and could be
split to benefit both parties. The post-tax return is no more
than marginal.
Example: West Siberia (Jack A. Krug and William Connelly,
"Evaluating oil, gas ventures in W. Siberia:feasibility studies",
OGJ 2-8-93:72-76) This is a hypothetical waterflood development
project. The basic data are: R=120mb, capital expenditures
K=$295m, and peak output Q=32.6 tbd. The price assumed in the
paper is P=$20 per barrel.
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By our simplified method:
K/Q= $24.79 ($9048/daily barrel)
The decline rate a = Q/R - (Q/R)2 = .089
Using Equation [3]
i = (P'-v)/(K/Q) -c - a [3]
i = $19/$24.79 - .05 - .089 = .617 [4]
In fact, a is overstated. Since Qf/Q=eaT, we have an equation
with four unknowns, of which the paper gives us three, allowing
us to calculate 3.08/11.9 = e-2 a, and a = .0675. This would make
i = .641.
But our basic assumption is far too pessimistic: that
capital expenditures are all made at the outset, starting the
project with a very large negative cash flow, whose discounted
value is equal to its undiscounted value. In fact, the project
capital expenditures take place over the first seven years, half
of them in or after Year 4. Pretax revenues exceed costs starting
in Year 3.
Using a conventional DCF, to bring the pre-tax net cash flow
to zero takes a discount rate of 145.6 percent, which is far too
high, and only shows up the limitations of conventional DCF, in
discounting all outlays and receipts at the same rate.
However, the post-tax DCF discount is only 13.3 percent,
which will be adequate in some such projects, not in others.
Furthermore, the venture probably cannot survive a price below
$20. I think a $20 price very unlikely even in Western Europe,
and there is a freight disadvantage.
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At a wellhead price of $15, a recalculated Equation [4]
yields a pre-tax .426. But unless the parties begin with a much
lower price, and a much more flexible tax schedule, there is no
hope of such projects ever starting, despite their being highly
profitable before tax.
